


A circular gold emblem with a double-line border is centered at the top of a deep red, textured book cover. Inside the circle, the words "THIS WORLD OF NATIONS" are printed in a dark red, serif font, arranged in four lines: "THIS", "WORLD", "OF", and "NATIONS".

THIS
WORLD
OF
NATIONS



THIS WORLD OF NATIONS


Foundations, Institutions, Practices



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Geneva, traditional center of international and cosmopolitan life. The League buildings are located along this (the northern) shore of the lake.

THIS WORLD OF NATIONS

Foundations, Institutions, Practices

BY

PITMAN B. POTTER

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

AUTHOR OF

*An Introduction to the Study of International Organization,
The Freedom of the Seas,
etc.*

New York

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1929



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P854

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Set up and electrotyped.
Published November, 1929.

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BY THE STRATFORD PRESS, INC., NEW YORK

TO DALTON AND JIMMIE
WITH THE THOUGHT THAT THIS
MAY BE MADE A MORE ENJOYABLE
WORLD IN WHICH TO LIVE.

61450

FOREWORD

It does not seem that much needs to be said in explanation of what is attempted in the pages which follow, but a few words of introduction may be useful. The writer has attempted in these pages to describe the present world of nations and of international relations accurately, and to raise and discuss certain problems concerning the relative values of different forms of organization and action in the conduct of international affairs. In the description of the existing international situation he has tried to set forth at least by suggestion the essential facts of world geography, world economic and social conditions, national and international psychology and politics, and contemporary international organization and action. In the discussion of programs for present and future action in the international field, however, he has of course written from his own personal point of view. The writer is not, in so far as he can judge his own views and personality, an extremist of any kind. He is certainly not a militarist, a jingo, or an ardent nationalist; just as certainly he is not a non-resistant, conscientious-objector pacifist. He is not, certainly, an isolationist when it comes to American foreign policy, nor yet does he feel that all will be lost and America eternally disgraced unless she joins the League of Nations as it exists today. He is neither a one hundred percent Lodge Republican nor a one hundred per-

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cent Wilson Democrat. He has not, therefore, hesitated to express sharply his own judgments, which though moderate and balanced, are very strongly held, feeling sure that they will not lead to any extravagant position and feeling sure that readers will at least credit him with believing what he says and believing it only because it seems to him to be supported by the facts. He is devoted or committed to only one main view in regard to this whole international problem. That is that the present world of nations must, as a matter of reason and policy both, be at once and from now on provided with organized international government commensurate with the world-wide individual and international interests which are developing year by year. By this he is quite prepared to stand.

The emphasis placed in these pages upon formal organized institutions of international government may be surprising, and may seem unjustifiable, to some readers. The writer has been criticized before this for placing so much emphasis on the "legalistic" aspects of international affairs. He would like to reply to this criticism and anticipate objections from readers of the present book.

In the first place, he feels, it is not a fact that the legalistic aspect of international affairs is emphasized or over-emphasized at all in this treatment; in only a few places have the legal aspects of international activity been mentioned, and all students of international law proper will feel that they have been grossly neglected. It is, rather, the institutional and procedural aspect of international affairs which has been

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emphasized in these pages, at the expense of the more purely economic and political aspects of the matter.

The reasons in the mind of the writer which have led him to stress these aspects of the problem and to place the chief emphasis where he does are two. He believes that, while in economic and social facts and considerations are to be found the motives impelling the interested parties to action in the field of international relations, as is true in the field of national life, it is just as certainly in the activity known as "politics"—the formation and execution of personal and public policy and the exercise of public authority—that these motives come to fruition, are expressed, and are at the same time controlled. It may be that "under all is the land" and its economic implications; it is also true that over all is the state and that over all states is the more or less organized international community. He also believes that as between policy on one side and institutions and form of procedure on the other it is to the latter that most attention should be given, and to the institutions rather than to the methods of procedure as between the latter two. Policies, the policies of the nations, are proverbially unstable, and fluctuate from year to year or even from month to month. Institutions or organs of government represent the crystallization of the most firmly adopted conclusions which men and nations have reached in the regulation of their common affairs. They constitute the solid framework of international co-operation, the bony skeleton and the anatomy of world government, about which the various forms of procedure

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cluster. They support the body of world government of which these methods of doing official international business are the functions, the physiology. And by a roundabout process they serve not only to express preëxisting opinion in favor of international coöperation but thereby to strengthen and develop that opinion; their very existence encourages their use. These institutions are, finally, not mere abstractions, as is too often suggested. Institutions are composed of men and women, and there is no element more important in all government, international as well as national, than the personal element, the human individual. It is the policies and the legal principles which are abstractions, for the institutions are actually groups of living persons who can take action to apply and control these policies and principles. Even the somewhat abstract forms of procedure or methods of action are actually human habits and ways of doing things, than which there is nothing more decisive in human intercourse. Hence the chief emphasis in the pages which follow.

Finally there is one basic assumption which is made by the writer in all that follows. This assumption is stated and elaborated at various places in the treatment, but it were well to call attention to it at the start. This is the assumption that nations act upon the motive of self-interest and not of altruism. The phrase "international coöperation" seems to carry an emotional or sentimental connotation, an implication that the nations engaged therein are actuated by motives of service to one another or at least of mutual service.

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This is no part of the present writer's thought or intention. When two nations coöperate with one another they do so, individually, out of motives of selfish benefit; it is not so much that two nations "coöperate" as that each nation acts toward the other for itself alone. The result may be described as concurrent action, joint action—coaction perhaps—or co-operation, when viewed by the observer, but it is not to any appreciable extent, in motive, different from individual national action. Its importance as a mode of action comes from the fact that in form and result it represents a synthesis of national activities and an organic combination of national interest and action with international benefits and results. As such it is of its own paramount importance.

Many friends, students and colleagues and laymen, have contributed to the thoughts contained in this book; to all of them I am keenly grateful. The conclusions drawn are, of course, my own.

PITMAN B. POTTER.

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Chapter I. Introduction

MOTIVES AND METHODS IN STUDYING INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ONE of the two rival newspapers in our town recently lost to the other paper in our town its rights to run a certain famous comic strip. As a result it also lost hundreds of readers, who turned to the other paper for "Dinty" or "Skippy"—or whatever it was. The unfortunate rival was compelled to develop, at the price of great effort and expense, a rival attraction in the sports department. They are still fighting it out on these lines—and there will probably develop a permanent feud over the competitive attractiveness of the "features" offered in the two papers. All of us readers are having a great time out of it!

The interesting aspect of the situation to a student of international affairs, however, is found in the fact that one of these newspapers is progressive and pro-League while the other is labor-socialist or so-called "radical" and anti-League! One is in favor of constructive American participation in organized international coöperation while the other is critical, isolationist,—a conscientious objector not only against war but against the existing organization for international peace and order. Does that make any difference to us when in pursuit of

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our favorite comic? Not much! We follow our favorite comic, be the paper's policies on international questions whatever they may be.

Now it would be childishly easy to preach a sermon on this incident. And there would be as much justification for it as for any sermon ever preached. Hence if no sermon is preached here it is merely because of the belief that preaching sermons is a pretty weak method of getting action. But it ought to be of some use to point out how blind most of us would be to think of the comic strip as, alone, among all the contents of the newspaper, entertaining. And that can be said while freely granting that the comic strip is one of the two most popular forms of entertainment among us today—that it is now reported to be spreading even unto the confines of our allegedly unhumorous British cousins!

Percy Mackaye said somewhere a few years ago—and doubtless many others (among them Mr. Mencken) have said the same thing elsewhere—that if peace were ever to be made popular and war unpopular peace must be made a great deal more attractive than it is and war must be given some vigorous competition as an interesting and entertaining performance. Mackaye then wrote a pageant in the effort to glorify peace—which, as it turned out, was not, to the present writer at least, very impressive or very thrilling either one. But the real answer to the complaint made by the dramatist was formulated by a great German military writer a good many years ago. Said he: War is but a continuation and a carrying into effect of peace-time national policy. In the

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midst of peace we are in war, because in the midst of both we are in the maelstrom of international politics, which are a stupendous mixture of peace and war, life and death, sense and nonsense,—but always very interesting.

It would be very easy to “prove” the truth of these remarks by parading here the choicest specimens of interesting episodes culled from the course of international affairs. A number of printed books exist in which such things as “Dramatic Incidents in American Diplomacy” are related. That is likely to be cheap stuff, however. Such material proves nothing concerning the general character of international relations and really distorts the whole picture in a disagreeable way. Such treatments spoil the taste for the true pleasures to be had elsewhere.

The great difficulty, indeed, soon appears to be that of avoiding just such an unhealthful dramatization of the events of international relations as is involved in such books. So much drama—farce, comedy, melodrama, tragedy—leaps out from the daily record of international politics that it is somewhat difficult to avoid the temptation to visualize international relations entirely in this light. Briand and Stresemann thunder at one another across the Rhine—in accordance with a pre-arranged scheme for handling their extreme nationalists back home. King Albert of Belgium visits Paris and “cements the ties which bind the hearts of all Belgians to France”—including the unheroic ties of geography. Mussolini composes an historic quarrel and restores the Papacy to the status of a sovereign nation—and we are all of us (S.

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Mussolini included, probably) left wondering what will be the results on international relations. China wallows in international weakness flowing mainly from her internal disunity. So much spectacular drama! So much sensational action and decay!

The curse of this type of thing is that it is somewhat grandiose and unreal. It is almost too big, too striking, too theatrical. It neglects too completely the fact that Stresemann is bald while Briand needs his hair cut, that Signora Mussolini has a new baby, and a lot of other items which might better not be entirely forgotten. It becomes somewhat thin from inflation. We are led inevitably to exclaim: but things really cannot be so grandiose, so heroic, so glorious, or so tragic as all that!

Relief is to be had in the stories of the people involved in this unreally big game. For many of us Edith Wharton's highly personal *Hilltop on the Marne* will be for all our lives the most authentic point from which to view the invasion of France in 1914. Count Luckner saw little of the World War for a naval man, but many of us have seen more of it through his eyes than we were likely to see in any other way. Some of Mrs. O'Shaughnessy's reminiscences, or those of many another ambassador's wife, are reassuring in their testimony that some diplomats do eat breakfast, that one becomes tired at court balls as well as at any others, and that the Czar really did stand in the bay window talking to the French ambassador for fifteen minutes, as was diligently reported in the papers.

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Thirty cents a pound for sugar and poison gas in the lungs, however, are other considerations which can hardly in common fairness be left out of account in thinking about these things. That is to say, while seeking satisfaction and pleasure in watching international affairs in the large and in the small, in their truth and in their folly, we may just as well, and indeed we may very much better, realize the connection between the grand opera being played on the theme of "no more war" by the old allies France and the United States, or the heroics of a Mussolini, and—"our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor." The fact of the matter is that we may see our happiness and our families and our future life shot to pieces at any time by the incompetence or the indifference of somebody in Jugoslavia. And while being entertained at the spectacle of an international six-ring circus we may well watch that none of the wild beasts or the clowns—or the demi-gods—bring death and destruction down about our ears.

We are, it may be realized, just ten years from the end of the World War. The first decade of that post-war period of respite in which peace might be made secure has passed. Has peace been made secure? It has not. The moral vigor of the drive for peace and international coöperation as we knew it in 1918 seems to have largely spent itself. Once more a post-war world is about to forget that eternal vigilance is necessary if repetition of the disaster is to be averted. Ten years more and the period of reaction and exhaustion will be over and serious war will have again become a real

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possibility. Imperceptibly we have drifted into a crisis, a crisis of inaction, signalized by continued stalemate in the disarmament movement and by confusion and ambiguity in the attitude of all but one of the leading powers in the world today. Every intelligent person in this country who desires to protect himself and his kin against the entirely unpredictable consequences of war must be impelled to turn to the problem of international relations and American foreign policy at once. It is the next ten years that will be decisive. It is we who are in position to direct the course of public affairs in the next ten years who must cope with this emergency. The younger children who are now being imbued with somewhat more wholesome and practical ideas of international relations than those upon which we were fed will have their own problems in the future; ours is here now: to solve the problem of war and peace in the next decade.

Needless to say, such an effort would be out of the range of possible success if it were not for the thought and the discussions and the experiences of these past ten years. We have an incomparably better understanding of the whole problem of international relations and of the problem of war and peace in particular than the world ever had before. We are ready to tackle the job as those who went before us never were.

There come to mind here not simply the technical and profound studies of these problems made by scholars in our universities here and abroad. There come to mind not

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merely the studies made at Geneva under the auspices of the League of Nations, by military, political, and economic experts from all over the world. There is that news reel which they are running in our neighborhood movie theater. There is that article on raising artichokes in Spain which you saw in the paper Sunday. We read of "student third class" accommodations on trans-Atlantic liners. In short, we may well take some account, in this connection, of the enormously increased familiarity which we all have with things foreign, things international, in these later years, thanks to modern travel, the movies, and the newspapers.

So very often a question is raised concerning the utility of the newspapers in any observation of international affairs that the writer is forced to conclude that many people are seriously puzzled regarding this matter. Yet the situation seems essentially simple. Perhaps we can get at the truth by a series of questions: Are the present-day newspapers all that we should like them to be in their treatment of international affairs? The answer is a decided "no!". Are they entirely useless in this connection? The answer is just as clearly "no." Have we anything to take their place in this service? And again the answer is "no." That ought to settle it. "But," it may be asked, "can we obtain anything like an adequate knowledge and understanding of international affairs by the use of our current newspapers?" It seems that the answer is definitely "yes." If one deliberately selects that paper in his or her community which gives the greatest quantity and variety of news on international affairs. If one

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looks occasionally at another paper which selects its news with a different outlook on world affairs. And more than all else: if one reads the news steadily, day after day and week after week, until one acquires a sufficient familiarity with the general international situation and the more important details of that situation and a sense of how things go in international relations. The steady reader will automatically feel the inadequacy of the news here, the exaggeration of emphasis there, the distortion of the picture in another place, the self-contradiction in a fourth. The fact of the matter is that any person reading almost the worst of our daily scourges consistently can obtain a reasonably good account of international affairs by such a process. We are speaking here merely of news stories. When it comes to editorials—to which the reader with independent judgment will turn largely out of curiosity—the writers of these essays in statesmanship are pitifully at the mercy of the steady reader. Lack of information, rash judgment, biased preferences,—fatuousness in general—, is shown up for what it is merely by the cold story of events if followed over several weeks or several months at a time. Why, why, why do not editorial writers read the newspapers? The Bolsheviks are even now being predicted by our editors to be about to fall again!

* The suggestion that one can study international affairs adequately in the newspapers is certain to offend the professional academic savants and all of those who have been influenced by them. The oldest and best known branch of

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the study of international affairs is international law, unless it be diplomatic history. How can we presume to place newspaper reading alongside of such august activities? Well, the simple fact of the matter is that international law and diplomatic history, considered as forms of study in the international field, have come perilously near to ruining the whole study of international relations. They have scared people away from the study of a field which is of fascinating interest, or primary importance to human welfare, and no more difficult of understanding than human affairs on any level. Now if the sciences of international law and diplomatic history had in the meantime produced any proportionate results—in the direction of an orderly and peaceful world—we might forgive them their attempt to secure a monopoly of attention in this connection, but they have not. They have amounted to little or nothing as aids to the solution of the world problem of peace, order, and progress, and they have set up absurd pretensions to their own importance and their own scientific soundness and have insisted on frightening the common layman away from any study of international affairs.

Happily this situation is changing. Of course, we have drawn a rather absurdly dramatic picture of the situation in the above words. What has happened is simply what has happened in every branch of science and art and we might just as well look at the situation from the detached, impersonal, evolutionary point of view. In international affairs as in raising chickens, men begin by living, and they pass

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on—or a favored leisured few pass on—to thought, and it is only in a third stage that thought is systematized and is brought back into contact with life in an attempt at controlling the results of living. In the meantime, thought on the matter is almost certain to be rather thin, idle, and—academic. It is only when the actual life situation becomes so acute that it calls for scientific analysis and treatment that the scientist is compelled to get down to brass tacks. Pure science precedes applied science not because it must “logically” precede applied science, as is often claimed, but because absence of pressure from life allows it to stay “pure.”

Well, the mooning period in the science of international relations is over. Biological, technological, and economic changes in the world situation make it imperative that we get at the job of organizing and conducting international affairs so that they run with a reasonable degree of smoothness and effective benefits to all concerned. If the older sciences of international law and diplomatic history can give us any aid, many thanks to them. But they can hardly object if we turn to the immediate study of the materials of international affairs with which they have so far accomplished so little.

This does not mean that we are going to study “current events” merely, or embark upon a new peace movement, or engage in any sensational muckraking at the expense of the national Governments of the day on account of their activities in international affairs. We have had quite too much of all three. We intend rather to get beneath the

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surface of current events to the causes of international phenomena. We intend to build peace indirectly, by treatment of the causes or occasions of the outbreak of hostilities. And we do not intend to assume that public officials charged with the conduct of international affairs are infected with any more than a normal human degree of weakness and viciousness. In short we are not going to go chasing wind-mills; we are simply going to try to understand how peace and ordinary human welfare may be promoted in the world of nations by practical and concrete steps.

If we are to return to the study of international affairs with this practical attitude of mind, however, we will need to select rather carefully the materials to be employed. Granting that the newspapers are not enough and that the works on international law and diplomatic history are somewhat less than serviceable, are there no really sound and also helpful scientific treatments of international problems available? It is a good thing that we are raising that question today instead of thirty years ago, at the beginning of the present century. As astounding and as scandalous as it may seem—and as it should seem to the professional political scientists in the international field—the dawn of the twentieth century saw in existence no scientific works of importance on the serious problems of international organization and inter-governmental coöperation. But today we can find a still limited but a steadily increasing number of studies in this field, such as current studies of the problem of international arbitration. To them we can turn to supplement

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our knowledge of actual current affairs by their thorough analysis, sound interpretation, and constructive suggestions.

The writing of such books, and to some extent the study and reading of such books, we shall nevertheless have to leave mainly to the experts. If we press the scientists for such studies in the place of the formal and empty treatments of former years (as we shall if international life presses upon us hard enough), they will produce them. If we pay attention to such books as we should (as we shall if international life presses upon us hard enough), and allow sane science to overrule insane emotionalism, we shall do well. But we must leave most of this work to the scientists themselves; our job is to become sufficiently familiar with international relations in their general aspects to realize the need for such a subjection of their main problems to scientific treatment, to achieve a feeling of acquaintanceship with the problems involved, and a disposition to participate in the indirect if not in the immediate conduct or control of public affairs.

In order to do this we might know a little something concerning the manner in which this present international situation has come about. Is it entirely new in the world? Hasn't this kind of thing existed before? If so what have people done about it? We shall actually discover that the international game as we know it is in fact both very old and very new, that the Greeks were playing this fascinating game to almost the full extent of its capacities over two thousand years ago, but that it has been badly neglected for most of the centuries since.

STUDYING INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

We talk very glibly about international relations and national this and national that but we don't take very much trouble to decide what we mean by nations and international affairs. Races and religions and governments are scattered about on the surface of the globe. Red and green and blue patches dot the maps of all the continents. Boundary lines are drawn along rivers and mountains, across pasture lands and deserts, and even in the waters of the sea. Empires and colonies occupy Europe, Asia, and Africa, not to mention the new world. But we don't really know much about these things. It is time we began to learn.

Then there is this matter of travel and trade. And oil and immigration and Olympic Games and missionaries. Where, in the language of familiar conversation, do they come in? The writer stood on the deck of an American steamer in an English harbor one Summer morning not long ago and watched Mexican and Brazilian and Japanese and hundreds of other mail sacks being unladen from an American steamer onto a tender for transportation not only into England but across the North Sea to Germany and the Continent. All over Europe shops are selling radio supplies as they are sold in New York and Chicago and San Francisco, and in Canton and in Sydney and in Rio. What have these private activities to do with official international relations?

And that is just a bare beginning. These interests and activities lead to the formation of "national policies," so-called, and these policies, including the policies of our own

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United States, come into contact and often into conflict one with another. How are these conflicts adjusted? The nations in dealing with their mutual interests and their rival claims have worked out a system of principles and rules which are known as rules of international law. How are these rules formed; how are they applied? The nations deal with one another through diplomatic and consular agents. How do these gentlemen come to play their parts in world affairs; what are their parts; to what do their activities lead? And what of the making and execution of international treaties—with all their different varieties in form and substance?

And still we are merely at the beginning. Beyond lies all the superstructure of courts of arbitration, international administrative bureaus—such as the one which decrees that our familiar two-cent postage stamp shall be pink instead of purple or yellow—, and the spectacular international conferences such as monopolize the headlines and the news reels from time to time. And finally, capping it all, come those bitterly denounced and warmly championed international alliances, those balances of power which seem to be regarded alternately as the hope and despair of the world. Such arrangements lead ultimately to elaborate federations such as our own Pan-American Union and the League of Nations at Geneva. What is it all about? Where does the idea and the fact of war fit into this complicated pattern? What of the hope of peace and the steps for its attainment and preservation? Disarmament? Outlawry of war? Security and safety from invasion and destruction?

STUDYING INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

To all of these questions the inquiring student obtains, indeed, many answers today, but the answers are commonly vague and confused and at times they contradict one another. And that is precisely the attitude in which this is being written. There is no overwhelming necessity for this confusion. The present confusion is caused by two factors in the main: neglect of these matters in the past and an attempt to escape from these problems today by reliance upon oratorical ideas and exhortations from political leaders without adequate attention to the facts. We want to try to make up in some small measure for the neglect of the past, and we want to examine the facts which should indicate the way out of the present terrifying situation without recourse to quack ideas of political demagogues and idealistic cranks. Of one thing we may rest assured: the present difficult international situation is not going to dissolve on its own accord, it is going to become a great deal worse before it becomes very much better, and it will never become any better, it will never become even tolerable, until we who have to live in the world of nations grasp hold of the problem and straighten it out by our own forceful intelligence, our own sharp wits, and our own warm good will.

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Chapter II

ANTECEDENTS OF THIS WORLD OF NATIONS

TOPSY, according to her own testimony, "just grew." Most of the nations of the world today are in the same predicament. Not that they have no parentage or are unaware of their parentage; most of them are rather burdened with both too much of a past and too great a consciousness of their past. But they have grown up to be what they are now without a great deal of deliberate planning and without any great success in carrying out such plans as have from time to time been made for their development and their place in the world. Or, to put it more accurately still, their plans of life have been changed many times and the results are therefore somewhat confusing.

Hence it behooves us to begin our study of international affairs with a rapid examination of the antecedents of the nations of the world today. Where have they come from, these seventy independent nations—for there are some seventy of them in existence at the present time—; and how have their antecedents influenced their present outlook on international affairs?

Definitions and "concepts" are favorite playthings of the philosophical and the theoretical mind. And if ever there was offered an obvious opportunity for parading a formal

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definition it occurs right here. What is a nation, now that we have come to the point of examining the origins and the nature of the present-day nations? What is it and how may it be recognized when we meet up with it in actual life? Shall we not yield to the temptation to be theoretical for the moment? Shall we not have a formal definition?

Let us have a formal definition but let us avoid being too philosophical about it. A nation has been defined by students of sociology and social life in many philosophical ways. The political and legal theorists, on the other hand, define something which they call "the state" in somewhat different terms. We are compelled to be somewhat more realistic than either and accept the current view that nations and "sovereign states" are pretty much the same things in actual life. And we certainly will desire to avoid the general character of the sociologist's definition and the metaphysics of the legal theorist. We shall be satisfied to think of a nation—or a sovereign state—as a group of people who are organized under an independent government. These people usually form a unified social group in the sense that they have certain customs or ideas in common, but that is more or less incidental and may be left out of account here. They live, as all people must live, somewhere on the surface of the earth, and if they constitute a unified social group they will probably live on a certain definite patch of territory, but again this may be left aside at present. The main point is that their Government exercises control over all members of that group and acts independently of control imposed

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upon it by any other Government. This will include France, for example, but not French provinces or cities or French colonies. It would not include the Jews or the Gypsies or the Single-Taxers. Just what it will include, what the further characteristics of a nation may be, and wherein nationality and statehood are related to geography, to social life, and to government may be put aside for the time being.

The antecedents of these present-day nations are still to be discovered. Where shall we seek for them? How far back shall we go in searching for the roots of our contemporary national states?

It has been said that the present world of nations is the product of the nineteenth century. It is commonly felt that Europe as we know it today, the Western Hemisphere, and even the Far East, in its present political arrangement, are what they are chiefly as a result of events which have occurred since 1815 or at least since 1789, capped by the events which have occurred since 1914.

With this need be little disagreement in spite of the classicists and the mediaevalists. Modern France is doubtless what it is because of ethnic and religious and social causes which date back to the Middle Ages and even to remote Antiquity. But the causes operative prior to 1789 may be appreciated in the results which they had left behind them at that point of time. We shall not, therefore, pause to examine the origins of the nations in more remote periods.

We shall, however, do well to notice the broad outlines of the way in which the whole general international situa-

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tion in the world had developed and had changed from time to time prior to the opening of the nineteenth century. Both because of differences between ancient and modern conditions, and because of certain resemblances between them, the story of the state-system of the world in ancient and mediaeval times throws much suggestive light on our present situation.

To begin with, there existed in classical Greek times—in the fifth century B.C., for example—a toy international world of several hundred city-states, or independent urban communities, in the Greek peninsula and all around the Mediterranean basin, which anticipated our modern international world in startling fashion. Most of the phenomena of modern international relations made their appearance among the Greek city-states. Diplomacy, treaties, arbitration, and Leagues more mature than our present international unions had made their appearance. From our position of twenty centuries later, from amid our struggles for international peace, order, and unity today, the achievements of the Greeks in this field seem, as do their achievements in so many fields, precocious and brilliant to the last degree.

When we examine more closely the story of Greek interstate relations, however, we find several features of the situation which are suggestive not so much because of Greek success but because of Greek failure. The Greeks developed a very elaborate system of interstate practice but they failed to rationalize that practice and work out any scientific system of interstate law and procedure. Hence they failed to

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hand on to posterity any science of international political action remotely comparable with their contributions to posterity in other fields. The Greeks never succeeded in overcoming their interstate jealousies and rivalries for very long at a time or to degree sufficient to enable them to form any very powerful union. They fell before Macedon and later before Rome largely on this account. And they maintained to the end an attitude of hostility toward "the barbarians" or the non-Greek peoples, which makes their interstate practice, elaborate and mature though it was in many ways, seem strangely provincial in retrospect. We have in modern times escaped from these errors in part, but we would do well to bear them in mind and guard against them more carefully than we have. Neglect of the science of international government, exaggerated nationalism, and suspicion of non-European peoples might easily wreck our own highly prized civilization.

The next chapter in the history of interstate relations was written by Rome. Here also the lessons for us are largely lessons implied by the failure or unwillingness of Rome to work out along fruitful lines of interstate coöperation. Early in Roman history there did develop a certain amount of free interstate action and interstate coöperation. But soon the smashing imperialism of Rome snuffed out all such activity and the nascent science and art of interstate practice passed into what was to be a long eclipse. There developed in its place a type of world peace and order whose keynote was that of imperial domination, the "pax Romana"

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or "Roman peace." This world unity was more stable and effective, probably, than any which could have been secured at the time by free interstate coöperation, but it depended for its maintenance upon the preservation of Roman hegemony; with the collapse of Roman power chaos ensued. The implication is obvious. Imperial domination is incompatible with free international coöperation, and while it may create a large degree of world unity and peace while it lasts it is a precarious basis for world order. This implication is all the more significant in a day when national resistance to imperial domination is still stronger than in Roman times. Neither France, Germany, Britain, nor America can give to the world peace by Empire.

The chaos which followed the collapse of Roman power lasted for nearly fifteen centuries. Attempts to replace the unity dictated by Rome with a unity imposed by the Papacy and by various pretended successors to the Roman political empire—the empire of Charlemagne, the Holy Roman Empire of the Hohenstaufen and the Hapsburgs, and later the Napoleonic attempt—failed of ultimate success. The multiplication of states or nations founded by Germanic invaders, and of feudal states both small and large which grew up in all parts of Europe, rendered the development of systematic and stable international relations impossible. There were carried on during all these centuries a great many activities which resembled Greek and Roman diplomatic activities and which faintly anticipated the diplomatic activities of modern times. Embassies were sent from

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one state to another from time to time. Treaties were concluded, wars were fought, and many interstate disputes were settled by arbitration. Rules of law—feudal law in the main were worked out which sought to regulate various questions of territorial jurisdiction and nationality. But the aggregate results were hardly more impressive in the end than had been the results of Greek interstate practice. By the end of the eighteenth century anticipations of something far more solid had appeared, to put it moderately, but the chaos of the preceding centuries still rendered the establishment of a unified and authoritative system of international law and organization difficult. A diplomat could still exclaim in 1815: "What have we to do with the law of nations?" The project of a league of nations was still considered to be utopian or worse. And even the secondary forms of international organization—arbitration, conference, administrative bureaus—were still in their infancy. The world of nations was still in a condition for which the term anarchy is hardly too strong.

One important contribution the later Middle Ages and the early modern period did make, however. From the time of the Renaissance onward there began to develop here and there in Europe and later in the outside world, numbers of stable and powerful independent national states which were to constitute the foundation stones of the present structure of organized international activity. This process and the building of the more immediate antecedents of the present nations occupied the centuries from 1400 onward.

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The principal nations of Europe have been constructed out of mediaeval materials by two processes, in the main. The huge pseudo-empires of the Middle Ages broke up into their component parts and the petty feudal units were gathered together into larger and more stable national states. The first process was delayed by the survival of Hapsburg power in Austria and by the Napoleonic effort at European domination, and the second was retarded by the slowness with which national unity was realized in Italy and Germany. But eventually Great Britain and France and Spain and the two countries just named were welded together from earlier feudal units after being cut off from the mediaeval empires. Other countries of Europe—Portugal, Belgium, The Netherlands—were created by similar processes. Some of the newer nations of present-day Europe, such as Poland, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia, have been established in more recent days by being liberated from Russian, Turkish, and Austrian imperial domination in similar manner. The creation of most of the European nations may thus be traced to these twin processes of dissolving empires and unification of national states.

A few of the European nations have been created without, to any great extent, passing through such experiences, and there also survive some few feudal units which have not yet been assimilated to any larger national community. Among the former are the Scandinavian states and also Great Britain in some measure. Among the latter are relatively unimportant states such as Luxembourg, Andorra,

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and still less important anachronisms which we need not even notice.

Outside of Europe these processes played little part. The independent states of Asia, Africa, and the Americas have come down to us by very different paths, of great importance in themselves.

The states of Asia—China, Japan, Siam, and others—as well as one or more independent states in Africa—Abysinia and perhaps Egypt—may be traced to remote origins as native states which grew up in those regions through long centuries of unity and independence. Some of them have been at one time or another affected by feudal conditions or dominated by European or Asiatic imperial conquerors. But ultimately they derive from more authentic sources of local social and political life, and the political statehood such as they possess today is theirs by virtue of these origins.

In other parts of Asia—Australasia particularly—and in the Americas, the present-day nations have been established by the process of colonial revolution or at least colonial evolution. Great Britain and Spain colonized India, Australasia, South Africa, and the Americas, both by discovery and occupation and by conquest. European settlers migrated to these regions and established new communities which later acquired local characteristics and independent national life and traditions of their own. The children grew up and asserted themselves. In most cases they proceeded further to rise in revolution, declare their independence, and secure

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recognition as independent nations. All of the nations of Latin America have come into existence by this method. To these must be added the United States. The British Dominions—Canada, South Africa, Australia, India, and the others—have lately achieved varying degrees of independence by less revolutionary methods. We have recently witnessed the refreshing spectacle of great colonial communities being set free for virtually complete national independence by the voluntary act of imperial Britain, following upon the appearance of circumstances which make such action wiser than any attempt to hold the Dominions by force. Twenty-five states have been added to the international community by the process of colonial settlement and eventual independence. It is a passage in world constitutional history which is of supreme importance for the situation today, and which may in the future be repeated or continued in many still dependent parts of Asia and Africa.

Needless to say, there remain a certain number of states in the world whose origins cannot be traced to any of these processes without large qualifications. Such are Switzerland, Liberia, Russia, and Turkey. The two last named may perhaps be grouped with native states of continuous existence, with allowances for their own imperialistic venturings afield. But Switzerland has been welded together out of pre-existing free communities which were only in part members of the feudal system. And Liberia is the result of the transplantation, or the retransplantation, to Africa, of negroes who were, or whose ancestors had been, once brought

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to America as slaves, together with native populations. Into these exceptions we do not need to go further. We have now a fairly adequate picture of the origins of the nations of the world today.

The importance of this survey lies in the fact that these nations which cover the face of the globe are in their attitudes toward one another very much the children of their past. They are largely influenced by the geographical and economic conditions of their contemporary life, it is true; but in their political life and in their attitudes toward one another the nations seem to be particularly influenced by their experiences in getting free from imperial domination in the past, in building up national unity in face of tendencies toward local separatism, and so on. This is quite natural, and it is rather important, but it is not uncommonly neglected in thought upon the general problems of international relations.

France and Great Britain are too far removed in point of time from this process of nation building to be sharply influenced by such considerations. It is rather the geographical and social conditions and the more recent international experiences of these nations which determine the character of their attitudes toward other nations. Great Britain habitually tries to prevent the establishment of imperial domination on the part of any Continental European nation not so much because she once escaped from such domination herself but for more specific reasons which lie in the field of modern international relations. France stresses her national

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position in conflicts with other nations in part because national unity in face of provincial separatism was once a vital problem for her but in part for ulterior purposes and out of habit and tradition and mere theory as well. It might even be said that Great Britain and France are two of a very small number of nations which can actually conduct themselves in international affairs as seems best to them in spite of their past. In this group we also may place the United States perhaps.

The best examples of nations influenced in international politics by their constitutional history are to be found in such countries as Italy and Czechoslovakia, Cuba and Canada, and Japan,—not to mention San Marino and Ireland.

Italy, like Germany, attained her national unity by rising out of feudal disorder only in very recent times,—in 1870, to be exact. As a result she is constantly preoccupied with the necessity for preserving her spirit of national unity and strength. The Papacy offered the last obstacle to the creation of Italian unity and independence; hence the Italian Government has been inclined toward an attitude of hostility, or suspicion or, at the very least, caution, as regards the Holy See. Certain Italian provinces were held by Austria for a long time, the Austria of the Hapsburgs; hence even today Italy maintains an attitude of hostility toward the pitiful remnant of Hapsburg empire which is republican Austria. All this can be said without any disparagement of Italian policy. And so it goes. Germany is influenced likewise by her recent attainment of national unity and by her centuries-

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long struggle with France, whether that be desirable or undesirable. All we intend here is to picture things as they are, without passing judgment in any way.

The recently liberated states of Central and Eastern Europe reveal the influence of their constitutional experiences even more vividly. Czechoslovakia escaped from Austrian domination only in 1918, Poland from Russia, and so on. As a result these countries, which for centuries had been suppressed and held in bond by Kaiser and Czar, are prone to stress their nationalistic feelings and policies in a manner not only at variance with the behavior of more securely established countries, but in a manner which is somewhat dangerous to European peace and order. Poland takes a strongly nationalistic attitude today resembling that taken by the United States around 1800, or that taken by the Latin American states around 1830.

It is interesting to observe how the revolutionary spirit, the spirit of national independence, mellows and becomes altered in quality as time passes. The colonial community which has become free by revolution has a vivid reason for suspicion of the imperial power from which it has escaped. Her recent escape from domination constitutes the main element explaining the attitude of Poland toward Russia, for example. There is also the quite distinct feeling of resentment which is usually present in any colonial community toward the metropolitan community whose people are thought to look down on the colonials. In the United States in earlier years and in Latin American countries as well, both

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of these feelings were present. But time passes and mellow-ness comes with its passing. If the seceded colony is not reconquered reconciliation may be attained between former oppressor and former oppressed, and startling new friendships may replace the hostilities of revolutionary days. Thus in spite of many exceptions England and the United States may be said to stand together fairly often and fairly closely in the general international situation today, and Spain is not the most bitterly hated nation in the regions south of the Rio Grande,—to put it mildly. Finally, when a colonial community is given its independence as a matter of grace, as the British Dominions have been, to a large degree, given their independence by Britain, then the usual hostility encountered in such situations is likely to be reduced still further except where, as in the cases of India, Ireland, and South Africa, special circumstances, of an aggravating kind, are present. Thus the positions taken by some thirty nations in the world today must be gauged to a large extent by the ways in which they have reacted from their experience of colonization, colonial administration and liberation. The analysis of national attitudes and policies to be made in such cases is not simple but neither is it so complicated and conjectural as to be entirely worthless by any means.

Japan is reputed—at least her people are reputed—to be inscrutable. Her attitude toward other nations is often thought to be not only inscrutable but in some occult way open to suspicion and condemnation. This seems an exaggerated attitude to take. Japan has had a checkered experi-

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ence in her constitutional development and in her relations with other nations. She is a proud Asiatic nation of ancient lineage. She was forced into intercourse with the Western nations. She was taught that realism and pragmatism were sound gospel. She learned by watching her neighbor, China, that military power was the only sure protection against exploitation. She also learned that with military power she could herself exploit others; unfortunately for her she learned this just before a slight change in styles of international ethics set in to hamper the full development and utilization of her powers in this direction. In any event her attitude toward other nations seems to correspond very naturally with her antecedents. She is both eager to join the Western nations and somewhat cautious in dealing with them. She is somewhat amused at the caperings of certain of the more recently arrived nations of Europe and other regions of the earth, and proud of her dynastic and constitutional continuity; this pride may lead her to unwise persistence in opposition to popular reform within her own gates. And she is somewhat slow in her readiness to turn to the newer methods of conducting international relations, to abandon the ethics and the practices of a decade or so ago.

Thus we might make a survey of the nations of the world one by one and examine and describe their positions with reference to their history. It would be possible to spend time less profitably. We should emphasize the international aspects of the experiences of each nation in such a survey, the long feud between Germany and France over the Rhine

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valley, which is part of the historic process of European state-building, and the problem of statehood for Panama, Haiti, and other small states of Central America and the West Indies. Enough has been said to describe the general lay of the land, however—if that figure of speech is not inappropriate in this connection. And an examination of the nations from another point of view—namely, their present geographical, social, and political conditions—is of much more importance.

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Chapter III

THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD TODAY

It is well known that no two leaves of a tree and no two individuals in any one family or in any number of families are identical. It may easily be guessed that no two of the seventy nations of the world today are identical in their geographical, social, or political conditions. There are all of fifty-seven varieties of nations and of national personalities, so to speak, in our modern world of nations. In all sorts of ways the nations which have come down to us through such varied paths differ also in their present conditions and traits. We must therefore proceed to scrutinize the present-day nations from three distinct points of view, namely, in respect to their geographical conditions, their social compositions, and their political or governmental organizations.

One school of economists or the members thereof are fond of repeating an aphorism which reminds us that "under all is the land." Whether or not this obvious statement implies and proves all that the economists feel that it proves, it is clearly a statement true to fact. And so we begin with the land, with the earth, or the territories of the nations, and the varieties thereof.

The differences among the nations in point of area are

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most obvious. The sun never sets upon British territory, it can be said, while the Republic of Panama is almost synonymous with an isthmus or even the banks of a canal, and certain independent nations are so small as to be almost invisible to the naked eye upon a map of Europe. North America from the Rio Grande to the Arctic harbors but two nations, little old Europe holds thirty. Asiatic areas are similarly out of all comparison with European areas and African areas are likewise fantastic.

Just how much this means in terms of national standing is a complicated problem. It means one thing which should be very evident at once, however, and that is that the nations are distributed very irregularly over the continents. In addition to Canada and the United States the North American continent shelters also Mexico, itself a large country. The contrast is seen when six countries are crowded into the remaining area of the continent—Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Salvador, and Panama—, and when three are found in the West Indies—Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. More room is found in South America again where ten nations—Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil—divide the earth's surface. Still more room is found in Asia where eight nations may be named—Japan, China, Siam, India, Afghanistan, Persia, Arabia, and Turkey. In Africa four independent nations only can be found—Abyssinia, Egypt, Liberia, and South Africa—although Australia and New Zealand might be added from

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the Afro-Asiatic ocean (the Indian Ocean) to the south. But when we come to Europe we hesitate even to attempt to list her thirty-odd nations; omitting petty states such as Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, and Liechtenstein we have Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Belgium, Ireland, Great Britain, The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Latvia, Esthonia, Lithuania, Russia, Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Jugoslavia, and Greece. Iceland and Danzig and Nepal or Bhutan might be called in to make up our seventy if we were insistent.

It takes no mention of Iceland to make us remember, however, that a hundred square miles in the Sahara mean less than one square mile in Belgium, and that an hour in Southern France is worth years in—some other countries. What are these nations like beneath the surface of the earth, and in their sun and rain? What of their soil and climate, in other words?

The answers to these questions must be sought in the geographical and statistical publications of which we now possess such an excellent supply. Iron and coal exist in the United States in abundance, they are rare in Italy. The soil in France is fertile, in Arabia it is not. Precious metals abound in Mexico, tropical vegetable products in Brazil. The climate of Abyssinia is not conducive to strenuous and persistent labor; that of Germany is normal for the life and activity of civilized man. A study of the maps and tables show us what resources are possessed by each nation and

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what are its climatic conditions. No items are of more importance as a basis for our further reflections upon international relations.

A very striking feature of the situation is seen in the fact that most of what turn out to be the more important nations are located in the temperate zones of the earth. The tropics exhibit large areas not occupied by any independent nations. The explanation lies deep in human psychology and economics and in world history but the phenomenon is worth noting whatever its explanation.

And then we should want to draw those seemingly capricious but apparently also very important lines between the territories of the nations known as boundary lines or frontiers. We should find that the geographers speak of natural frontiers such as the Rio Grande River. The economists would talk of the desirability of drawing frontiers in such a way as to leave regions economically interdependent within the confines of a single state. The military scientists would demand defensible frontiers. The historian would explain existing frontiers by reference to wars and transfers of territory in the past. And the humanitarian reformer would demand the employment of plebiscites to permit the location of national boundaries according to self-determined popular choice. In actual fact we find that the international boundary lines of the world are of all these varieties and others as well—linguistic and religious, for example—and that the location of boundary lines is as yet not controlled by those detached and broad considerations

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of the welfare of all concerned which should govern it. We are still far from any such deliberate international view of the territorial organization of the world as this implies.

For some reason or other, however, color and race seem to impress themselves on the attention of students of international relations more sharply and more strongly than any other traits of foreign individuals or groups of individuals. Perhaps, therefore, after our geographical survey, a review of the nations from this point of view should now be made.

There are, for example, a number of nations which can, with not too great a stretch of the imagination, be called the Latin nations. Italy stands at the head of any such group, in spite of the non-Latin elements in the modern Italian population. France and Spain and Portugal belong in this group—again in spite of admixtures of alien blood in each case. Switzerland has a partial but only a partial share of Latin race in her population, and this is the case with Belgium likewise. Finally, the Latin-American states are to be included in this group in spite of the large masses of Indian and negro blood in their populations. The Latin nations regard themselves as heirs of ancient Rome and apostles of her true culture in a somewhat barbarian world.

There is no other racial group of nations as numerous or as well marked as the foregoing group. There is what might be called an Anglo-Saxon group, which includes Great Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, but no one needs to be told how far from purely Anglo-Saxon is the United States. There is what might be

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called a Teutonic group, which includes Germany and Austria; but whether The Netherlands belongs in this group is an open question. There is the Scandinavian group, including Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, and this group is both well marked and important in spite of its limited numbers. But all three of these groups would have to be added together into a sort of Teutonic bloc to balance the Latin group.

Beyond these racial groups lie Slavic nations—Russia, Latvia, Esthonia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Jugoslavia—and tawny Semitic nations—Persia and Arabia—and yellow-brown Mongol-Malay nations—China, Japan, and Siam. And two negro states—Haiti and Liberia. But among these peoples only the Slavic nations approach conscious racial unity, if, indeed, it may be said that even they possess any such feeling. The fact is that the nations do not seem to be as conscious of racial unity or racial distinctions in the ordinary give and take of international relations as are many pseudo-scientific students of these problems who look on from the library chair. Only when combined with other factors is international racial unity of any great importance—even where it can be imagined to exist. Race and color alone mean little.

Religion is another element of international similarity—or dissimilarity—which can be greatly overemphasized. True there are a number of nations which are officially or predominantly Roman Catholic Christian, such as Italy, Spain, the Latin-American states, Austria, and others, and

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whose people look to the Holy Father as the highest religious authority. True there are certain nations which are officially or predominantly Protestant Christian, such as Germany, the Scandinavian nations, Great Britain, the United States, and others. But there are also Greek Catholic Christian nations—Greece, Rumania, and others—, and Mohammedan nations and nations which are in whole or in part Buddhist, Shintoist, or Confucianist. And it does not seem to make very much difference in most questions of international relationships, even when religious unity is combined with the racial unity, as it frequently is. The cold fact of the matter seems to be that these supposedly “fundamental” factors do not in actual life play any very large part in determining the direction of national policy. More specific and what are seemingly more superficial factors are more influential, even if the racial and religious facts are interesting in a speculative sort of way.

Language is of far more practical importance than race and religion in world politics. Language groups among the nations are more important than racial or religious groups because of the connections between language and international intercourse and communications, and international jurisprudence. Language differences seem, moreover, to provoke international misunderstanding in actual life processes far beyond what seems reasonable or justified.

The French language serves to tie Luxembourg and also Belgium and Switzerland, to a certain degree, to France. French is the predominant language in Belgium, especially

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in financial and political circles in Brussels and Eastern Belgium. French is the language of Western Switzerland, is spoken widely in the capital at Berne, and almost exclusively at Geneva, seat of the League of Nations. It might be added that in many other countries in the East as well as in the West French is the recognized second language, the language of international intercourse and diplomacy. It might also be mentioned that Haiti is predominantly a French speaking country.

The German language group is small, like the French, and of less importance. It includes Germany and Austria alone. German speaking people live in Czechoslovakia, in Poland, and in all the states neighboring upon Germany and Austria, notably in Switzerland where German is spoken by a majority of the people in a large majority of the cantons. But German, despite its growth in importance in international circles during the latter part of the nineteenth century, still falls far short of French as a medium of international grouping.

The English speaking peoples are spread more widely. In the main Great Britain, the United States, Canada, Ireland, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand may be included in this group in spite of the use of Gaelic in Ireland and of Dutch in South Africa. What is almost equally important, English has come to rival French as the language of international intercourse, particularly in the Far East and Latin-America, thus bringing added strength to the English-speaking fraternity.

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The Spanish speaking nations are the most numerous of all, including, as they do, Spain and all of the republics south of the Rio Grande except Haiti and Brazil. Spanish therefore has great importance as a language of trade and travel in this hemisphere. If the Spanish American nations were more influential and Spanish leadership more effective this bloc would be of extreme importance in world affairs.

Beyond this line lies a linguistic chaos which it is difficult to reconcile with existing world unity in other directions. The Scandinavian states speak languages which differ markedly from the others already mentioned and among themselves—quite enough to make mutual understanding and sympathy something of an effort on all sides. The Slavic tongues vary widely among the eight nations of that group. And east and south of Constantinople is babel. No international linguistic unities emerge here and almost complete lack of international understanding, linguistically, exists. The case for an international auxiliary language seems particularly strong in these regions.

When we come to the social manners and customs of the nations we are confronted with a perplexing situation. On one hand we have to face the historic divergences to which Kipling referred when he wrote of the dissimilarity between East and West:

“Oh East is East and West is West,
And never the twain shall meet.”

In religious ideas and forms, in ethical standards, in the

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sphere of personal relations and the family, in clothing and art and in every other department of social life, this divergence between East and West, this variation among East, West, North, and South, appears and persists.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that two powerful influences bear against this feeling. Kipling added to his first thought a second:

“But there is neither East nor West nor North nor South,
Border nor breed nor birth,
When two strong men stand face to face,
Though they come from the ends of the earth.”

Contemporary humanitarianism insists upon regarding differences in social manners and customs as unimportant in comparison with the fundamental common qualities. Whether we like it or not, the set of contemporary thought and feeling is all toward social world unity. Second, the development of communications is all directed toward the same result. Clothes and table manners and art forms are becoming unified and the divergent tastes of consumers molded into world uniformity by the modern advertiser and the telegraph.

Economic and social conditions in a deeper sense still vary considerably among the nations. Industrial nations such as Germany and Belgium differ from agricultural nations such as Argentina and Denmark. Commercial nations differ from those which do not engage in world trade or navigation. Creditor nations, with money to loan, differ

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from debtor nations, nations which are mature economically from new nations which need capital for development of their resources. And so on and so on. Again it is necessary to consult statistical publications in order to discover at any given moment the industrial, commercial, and financial status of a given nation.

Now all this is a matter of easy measurement and its statement can hardly cause any legitimate resentment. But when we turn to what are called social conditions in a narrower sense the feelings aroused by a mere recital of facts of established accuracy may be somewhat bitter. Thus certain countries show a very high percentage of illiteracy, or of common crime, or of pauperism. Others show high figures for publication of books and magazines, educational facilities, public-health protection, and the development of communication facilities. In short some nations are "advanced" nations and some are "backward," measuring by standards commonly accepted as sound even in the backward nations—so long as the matter is considered in the abstract! Indeed, people who live in the United States or Canada or in Western European countries—countries lying west of a line drawn from Petrograd to Constantinople, to be quite liberal,—fail to realize how limited is the portion of the earth's surface within which social conditions are such as they take for granted and regard as necessary to ordinary human life.

Governments and laws have also to be reckoned with among the nations. Of governmental systems there was once

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a great variety. Empires, kingdoms, principalities, republics, and free cities were among the more common forms but feudal units of many various sorts remained. Constitutions were written and unwritten, were based on royal grant or on popular enactment, and provided for governmental arrangements as varied as the names they bore. Today we are more frugal and more monotonous. Empires are few and far between and are distinctly on the decline. Absolute monarchies are almost gone; Abyssinia and, conceivably—in point of principle at least—, Japan might be mentioned. Parliamentary monarchies are now less numerous than they were prior to 1918, in spite of their great increase during the past century; they now include Great Britain, Belgium, The Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, and, perhaps, Italy and Spain. Dictatorships of a more or less irregular and informal character and probably of temporary duration obscure the situation in the two countries last named, as well as elsewhere. The republic is the standard type of contemporary national government, well over half of the nations of the world having gone over to this system,—some of them, it is true, since the War. Despite variations upon that type of the fundamental fact remains that popular control of governmental action, including the conduct of foreign relations, is definitely preëmpting the field.

In short, kings are everywhere giving way to ward bosses or politicians of one grade or another and women voters and women's clubs are coming upon the scene as signs of the newest forms of public control. It is not, for the moment,

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our job to decide upon the desirability of all of these changes. It is not even convenient to discuss just here the effects of all this upon international relations. It is chiefly up to us to realize what has happened to the world of nations when the name of Carrie Chapman Catt often means more than that of the titular head of the British Empire and when Czar and Kaiser are merely unpleasant memories.

Private law or the law which governs relations among individuals is still another matter. The Latin nations and one or two of the Teutonic and Slavic nations, such as Germany and Bulgaria, live under legal systems derived from the law of ancient Rome, now denominated the Civil Law. Most of the English-speaking nations—South Africa excepted, that is—live under what is called English Common Law. In point of fact the latter has been considerably revised by judicial interpretation and statutory enactment in all these countries, and even in the Civil Law countries, where rigid codes of law are more common, legislative activity tends to alter the situation by progressive degrees. So it is also for Eastern Europe, for Asia, and for Africa; native legal systems persist, but large sections of Civil Law are imported from Europe, some slight amount of English Law is adopted, and piecemeal imitation does the rest. All over the world legislative activity, the comparative study of law and jurisprudence, and the pressure of economic and social facts and influences which are coming to be everywhere the same, are producing a considerable degree of similarity among the national systems of private law in force.

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In all of the discussion set forth above we have spoken or written as though nations were, physically and governmentally also, highly unified entities. In reality many of them sprawl all over the map. We have, therefore, to take account, if we wish to be accurate, of the phenomenon of colony-holding, and of colonial empire and colonial government. We all know that Great Britain holds many colonies in all parts of the world, governs them from a "Colonial Office" in London, and ranks where she does among the nations largely as a result of her colonial possessions—even if we disregard the now autonomous Dominions. We may forget that the Dutch rank very high in the same class because of their colonies in the East Indies. We may forget the French African colonies. We are still more likely to overlook the scattered colonies of Portugal, Spain, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Japan, and the dependencies of our own United States. Almost the whole of Africa, large parts of Asia, and patches in all of the other continents except Europe are held in colonial subjection by the powers named. This may or may not be a good thing; where it means monopoly of opportunity for development and exclusive economic privileges it has many unsalutary consequences; but it is a fact. And while, through the Mandates system under the League of Nations, an attempt is being made to correct the evils of the older type of colonial administration in certain limited areas, the students of world politics will see, for a long time to come yet, the phenomenon of national colonial empire in its present form and principle.

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Finally, in our survey of the nations we must recognize the preëminence held by a few of the Great Powers and the relative helplessness of—the others. Again this may or may not be pleasing to our ideas of what is just and good. It is a fact. It may not be permanent and signs multiply that change is coming. But still today it is a fact. Let us appreciate it at its true worth.

The United States is today, actually or potentially, the most important nation in the world. The test is power. It is not area or population. It is not any one form of economic resource. It is not existing military or naval force. It is aggregate national competitive power, expressed or latent. It derives from geographical location, population—quantity and quality—, climate, resources, industrial and commercial and financial development, social and political unity, and all the remaining factors which may contribute to national strength.

Judged by this standard the United States is today cock of the walk—and perhaps tempted to be somewhat too cocky at that. Great Britain seems clearly to follow next in order in spite of her losses during the War, thus maintaining a position of leadership which she has occupied in one degree or another since the fourteenth century. France follows closely and thus maintains a place among the nations from which she has slipped on only two or three occasions in the same period. The United States, Great Britain, and France certainly outrank all other nations in power and prestige today.

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Next in order come Italy and Japan. Italy makes a strong claim to inclusion among the Great Powers because of her national spirit, her military prestige, and her geographical location. If her economic resources were more plentiful and her voluntary social and political unity more certain there would not exist the doubts which do exist today in many minds concerning her true rank in world affairs. Japan likewise seems to be somewhat out of her depth but holds vigorously to her position among the leaders. Her location in a region remote from the main centers of world politics, the fact that her arrival in such circles is still rather recent—only since 1895 has she been rated even as one of the more important nations—, and uncertainty concerning her economic and social soundness, all cast doubts upon her true position.

With regard to Germany and Russia the same things must be said. Germany was a Great Power prior to 1918. The loss of her colonies, of her armaments, of certain of her European territories, and her financial obligations to the victors in the War, all incline one to deny her classification as a Great Power today. Unquestionably she should be so considered if these factors were to be altered or other nations were to surrender armaments or colonies along with Germany. Russia was considered as a Great Power prior to 1917 but always with reservations such as have here been expressed in regard to Italy and Japan. At present the reservations are more pronounced still. The ambiguous diplomatic relations subsisting today between Russia and the Western

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Powers, and uncertainty concerning her economic present and future, to mention only two questions, prevent us from confidently including Russia along with the three nations named first in this discussion.

Beyond this point again lies chaos. Powers of secondary importance are numerous: China, Turkey, Spain, Belgium, The Netherlands, Brazil—to mention only a few. But that category is vague and elastic. Third rate powers are still more numerous. And there follows a rabble of fourth, fifth, and sixth class powers. Not that the people of these latter countries, or some of them, are not as fine as any in the Great Powers. Merely that under the present territorial organization of the world of nations the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan are dominant, Germany and Russia potential participants, and the rest far behind.

Of course this is all slowly changing. Empires rise and fall. Three erstwhile Great Powers are such no longer. Autonomy for the British Dominions means a considerable decline of British dominance. And “the others” are growing more powerful yearly. The “far” behind of the end of the preceding paragraph is already too strong and yearly the second and third class powers approximate more nearly the position of the Great Powers and exert more and more restraint upon the latter. But still today the domination—psychological domination in large part, or political prestige merely—of the Great Powers persists.

Such are the nations of today. Such a review should give

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us some idea of the kind of an international world in which we live, and of the attitudes taken by the nations in world politics or in their dealings with one another. A nation which is a new nation, an agricultural nation, a borrowing nation, one whose political organization and military power are still relatively ineffective, must look at the world with views very different from those of the old, mature, industrial and financial nation which has occupied a position among the Great Powers since a time when even the name of the former nation was unknown—when, indeed, its present territories were still undiscovered by civilized men. No factor is of anything like as much importance in a study of international affairs as the factor of dissimilarity and inequality among the nations.

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Chapter IV

PRIVATE WORLD LIVING AND WORLD ORGANIZATION

THAT, the reader may well have exclaimed by this time, is all very well, but it is rather vague. And the exclamation would be quite natural and largely justifiable. The larger aspects of national and international life are bound to seem rather vague. They are none the less unescapable, though they may fatigue the mind or the imagination. Much more vivid and palpable are the facts and activities lying at the other extreme side of our problem.

It may or may not be thought appropriate, but unquestionably it is a fact, that in many parts of the world the United States of America has come to be symbolized by a high square tin can, an oil can, to be quite exact. All through the outer world, in hither Asia, in the Far East, in Africa, and in Latin-America, the cans in which the products of the Standard Oil Company are retailed are used for many purposes of human living and serve to remind native and tourist alike of the land from which they came.—It might be added that the appearance of the Anglo-Dutch Shell Oil filling stations on street corners in Middle West villages has given many of us a start and a reminder of a similar character.

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If a further illustration were needed of this sort of thing the cherry blossom would serve as effectively as the oil can. Japanese cherry blossoms around the Potomac Basin draw thousands of Americans to their capital city every year. Japanese cherry blossoms at home in Japan draw thousands of tourists to that part of the world each Spring. Oil and cherry blossoms unite the world.

What we are now discussing might be labeled "the world-wide life of the individual in our day" if we wished to be quite accurate and somewhat literary at the same time. It has often been called "international intercourse" or "private internationalism"—by the present writer as well as by others—but neither of those titles is strictly accurate. What we are talking about is neither "international" nor is it "intercourse." It is an activity which is not carried on by nations or states or Governments at all. It is not intercourse with other people,—commercial, intellectual, or social,—necessarily. It is simply the practice on the part of individuals of living with the world as their field of thought and action. Those individuals may or may not be grouped into associations or companies; they are, at all events, for this activity not necessarily grouped into states. "Private internationalism" is a contradiction in terms; nations being official bodies, no international activity can be private or unofficial in character. Of course the significance of this sort of activity for us lies in the fact that it is carried on across national boundary lines; and it is, it must be admitted, regulated to some extent by national and international action.

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But it is distinctly not carried on between one nation and another; in itself it is wholly unnational in character, it is individual life on a world scale.

Now this practice is not entirely "of our day." It is not entirely new in the world. But it has grown enormously in recent years. It has been on the increase for centuries but the increase in this type of human activity during the past seventy-five years has changed the situation in the world beyond any changes ever experienced before. It is not saying too much to declare that we have, as far as individual living is concerned, its range of action and reaction, a new world, that we have, as far as the world is concerned, a new type of human life of a scope never dreamed possible before.

And the causes for this revolution in human living are to be found primarily in the accidents of scientific discovery and invention. Only in a secondary way have the systematic applications of Watt's steam kettle and Franklin's spark to industry and transportation been responsible for the results of today. The original causes for the revolution in the range of human activities were causes which operated with little calculated thought of the results which might follow. Curiosity is said to have once killed a cat; it has in our day created a new world. Curiosity is never "idle," it is ever busy. Its creative faculties, its faculty of blind creativeness, is probably not yet moribund; television will probably anticipate practical telepathy by only a short interval.

There were, of course, already present many human tastes or inclinations waiting to make use of the scientific

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inventions and engineering achievements just mentioned. Curiosity takes the form of desire for consumption as well as creation. People are ever ready to see, to hear, to feel, to taste, and even to smell—as Parisian perfumers know well—on a wider and wider scale. “More life” is life’s motto, and the innate disposition of all healthy human souls and bodies. The expansion of the range of human living has come not because the nations or their Governments said that it should come. It has come not because of any conscious theory of world life. It has come because of spontaneous desire on the part of men and women everywhere to live broader and deeper lives. This desire appears, moreover, to grow as a result of being satisfied; it is still on the increase, not on a decline.

Concretely this larger life means travel and trade and many other forms of personal activity. Persons desire to move from one country to another for visit or residence, and they now do so move in large numbers and with increasing frequency. People desire to obtain consumable goods—food, clothing, furniture, and everything else under the sun—from foreign lands. They also desire to send goods which they possess here to other lands for sale. They desire to send messages to friends and relatives in other countries and to receive such messages—by post, by telephone and telegraph, by radio—from abroad. Ships and railways make much of this possible. Financial transactions follow in the wake of travel and trade, and news messages for public press services parallel and anticipate private exchanges of

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information. The aggregate result is a machinery and an activity of world life which overlays and obscures the nations beneath.

Such an assertion may easily appear to be too extreme. It may provoke resentment. It at least suggests that we at last have before us something which is quite distinct as a life-form, which is not wholly unfamiliar as an idea, which has been put forward many times in world history, but which has hitherto never been quite realized. We are face to face with cosmopolitanism or the mental attitude which leads an individual to think of himself as a "citizen of the world."

As we are all aware, the cosmopolitan idea is not new. A Greek philosopher spoke of being a citizen of the world some centuries ago. A Roman writer declared that nothing human was foreign to him. And during the Middle Ages and later during the eighteenth century people thought and spoke of being at least good Europeans, rather than Frenchmen, Germans, or Poles. The cosmopolitan idea is not the invention of a modern radical age.

Nor was it formerly a term spoken with some suggestion of condemning that to which it refers, as is often the case in our day. It was an ideal, an ideal of unity above the disorder of the time, an ideal of breadth above the narrowness of local life. It was not something to be resisted but something to be achieved, if possible, in spite of its difficulty. Only in the past century or century and a quarter has nationalism become so powerful as an idea as to lead to disapproval of the ideal of world unity.



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Crowds bidding farewell to a giant transatlantic liner. The liner is equipped with signal and safety apparatus regulated by international agreement, and all her operation and navigation is similarly regulated.

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At the same time, important changes have come over the scene. Cosmopolitanism was once an ideal but it was an ideal which was very difficult to put into practice. Hence it remained very abstract. Ancient and Medieval cosmopolitanism was a cosmopolitanism of ideas, of religion, or of law, or of culture. Greek racial unity was stressed as against the barbarian, but obviously the Greek world was a very narrow "world." Roman provinces remained provincial in spite of ubiquitous statutes of the Divine Augustus. And Europe remained chaotic in spite of Pope and eighteenth century scholar alike.

Today when the ideal of cosmopolitanism receives less honor actual developments render cosmopolitanism inevitable. We prate about nationalism, but the technique of modern life produces an opposite result. In other words contemporary cosmopolitanism is objective, not a thing of the mind. It is a matter of scientific and economic activity, not of theory. People live a world life without intending to do so and even without knowing it. The pen with which this is being written—now that the question is raised—is made out of rubber from Brazil or the East Indies, the jacket which the writer is wearing is Scotch tweed, this building is Spanish in its architecture, and all about this spot, in all human certainty, are elements contributed from many foreign sources of which the writer is entirely unaware. Cosmopolitanism today is not so much a beautiful ideal as it is a brutal fact.

It might be added that even in the regions of religion,

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law, and culture, in terms of which the older cosmopolitanism was stated, our own day sees results unattained and unattainable hitherto. Religious and legal unity was sought in Roman and Medieval times as a result of the adoption and even the imposition of one system of law or religion upon a number of communities from without after which world unity would prevail. Today we are actually attaining world unity in many such fields by a process of gradual and voluntary adoption of common ideas and manners by imitation, comparison, and emulation, and by joint or concurrent legislative or social action. In the fields of science and art, including literature, in particular, is this true. Discoveries or inventions, engineering devices and methods, the same types of railroads, ships, and buildings, are constructed and used in San Francisco, London, and Canton. The same scientific publications circulate in all scientific circles the world over. The same moving picture films, theatrical troupes, and opera singers are familiar in all capitals and even in provincial cities all over the earth. We are attaining rapidly and easily to a cosmopolitanism of thought and feeling such as was vainly sought in older days by a vigorous and very hazardous exertion of personal effort. We think nothing whatever of world-wide unity of style in dress, world-wide interest in some artistic event, world-wide attention to some scientific discovery. Yet these phenomena mean that the circumstances which produced the "British," "French," and "German" nations are gone forever.

The problems of social value involved here are serious.

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People denounce nationalism and people denounce cosmopolitanism. Patriotism and world citizenship seem to be hard to reconcile. What is to be said of it all?

Of course, we do not need to decide such problems all at once and right at the present moment. The conditions which produced nationalism have largely disappeared, but they have not disappeared entirely, and for many years to come the results will be with us in any event. Many of the people of the United States—as of other nations—are not touched by this cosmopolitan movement or at least are not aware of it. For a long time things will remain outwardly as they are and they will change only very slowly and so gently as to cause us little pain.

On the other hand, if we try to set ourselves up against this sort of thing we are in for trouble. To ignore the facts of developing world unity in human living is sheer idiocy as it is to ignore fact anywhere. To attempt to invoke extreme ideas of nationalism—independence, sovereignty, and so on—which were formulated on the basis of a totally different set of circumstances is to try to regulate present life by abstract rules evolved from conditions existing only in the past. To attempt to hold out of this cosmopolitan current of today is for the individual and the nation alike to lose much of life and to retire among the backward peoples. World life is richer than national life and even if the judgment of value were reversed it is technologically impossible today to prevent nationalism from being forgotten by many many people all over the world.

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The process does not stop here. Aristotle or some other Greek whom the schoolmen are fond of quoting said that man was a political or a gregarious animal. Birds of a feather are said to delight in one another's society. Certain it is that people who are interested in the same thing appear to find interest in one another. At all events they "organize." And the people who engage in the world-wide activities cited above constitute no exception to the rule. From them arise a huge network of private associations which sustain, embody, and recapitulate the commercial, personal, and cultural activities which go on in all lands and among all peoples. Private world organization is the immediate consequence of private world living. Again the individuals and the organizations concerned are significant because they transcend national boundaries, and it is true that they take some account of these national state organizations, even calling themselves often enough "international" associations rather than "world" associations. But they do not always regard the national state as having any inherent significance in relation to the activities with which they are concerned.

These activities have already been named and the organizations might easily be named also. In the field of travel there is the International Touring Alliance, in trade the International Chamber of Commerce, in communications the International Radiotelephonic Union. In religion the Roman Catholic Church might be mentioned, ancient organ of non-national world unity, or any other Christian

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denomination. International Rotary is world-wide in its interests. In philanthropy we have the International Red Cross, and in science the International Mathematical Union. It would be gratuitous to continue with such a catalogue. There are, literally, hundreds of such organizations. They have their headquarters in every country in the world. They cover every familiar field of human life and many which are not so familiar. They seem to spring up and flourish as naturally and easily as though they did not by implication contradict the cardinal dogma of nationalism in an embarrassing manner.

Finally, these associations are organized in all sorts of ways. Individuals in different countries adhere directly to a unified world organization. Organized groups of individuals in different countries are federated into a world organization. All sorts of mixtures and combinations and modifications of these arrangements are made. Permanent world headquarters are set up. Conferences are held more or less frequently. Studies are made by committees composed of individuals from different countries and the reports circulated among all constituent units. Information is collected and printed in periodical publications, or the views and contributions of learned scholars are read at conferences and then published in "proceedings" thereof. At times museums or libraries are maintained, educational or religious activities carried on—not to mention the Olympic Games—, and all the activities of world life undertaken not by mere individual action alone but also by organized

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associated enterprise. At this point something more serious is likely to happen.

If the truth were told we should learn that all of this world-wide activity on the part of private individuals is somewhat embarrassing to the national Governments who are assumed to be more or less responsible for these individuals and their activities. These Governments are compelled to take account of this growing body of world life in many ways, and they are hard put to it to do so.

For these activities, in their simplest forms,—all the foreign trade and travel of the world—constitute the main reason why national Governments are compelled to concern themselves with one another. If people would only stay at home and be content to eat home-grown food and wear home-made gowns the whole business of “foreign relations” would be greatly simplified. It is because of all of these activities that the nations must consider their future course of action toward other nations and formulate programs of foreign policy and principles and rules of international law. It is for this same reason that they must create and maintain consular and diplomatic services, especially the former. It is for the same reason, indirectly and directly also, that the nations must conclude treaties of all kinds, including the important and numerous treaties of commerce which define the rights of foreign traders and foreign residents. And it is for the same reason, further, that the Governments of the world must go into conference, set up international administrative arrangements of various kinds, and provide facil-

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ities for arbitrating or adjudicating international claims of one sort or another. This body of world life constitutes, in other words, the general foundation for international relations and international governmental activities of all varieties.

More important still, these private activities and organizations concretely and deliberately lead the way for official international organization and action. The Government is proverbially slow. Governments do not ordinarily go out of their way to increase their services to their own subjects or citizens. And in this field they are particularly reluctant to branch out. Hence private world organization runs ahead of official international organization and sets the pace for the latter. Not a few official international bureaus and conferences have been built out of preëxisting private organizations. The private organizations have first been subsidized, then given official approval and coöperation, and finally taken over entirely. Private world life and organization very definitely and formally leads the way for official international action.

And that is not all. As is perfectly natural, the enthusiasts who have built up the private world activity and its organs are not inclined to wait too long for governmental action. At times they feel the official eye cast upon them rather suspiciously. At times they are explicitly rebuked by the Government or by private patriots who profess to be speaking for the nation. And their reactions are the same in all of these cases. Their reply might be stated in something

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like the following words: "Very well, then, if you are disposed to neglect and even to try to thwart the development of this new and admirable sort of activity we shall go ahead ourselves; without you if we must and over your opposition if we can." The potential conflict between private world activity and official national authority is more than merely potential. It is a conflict which colors much governmental action—and inaction—today, and it is a factor to be borne in mind at every stage of contemporary international evolution.

There are two or three additional forms of private world organization which call for attention, however, before we pass over to the Governments. These are the world business houses, the world labor organizations, and world fairs or expositions.

With the existence of the former we are all acquainted, at least by hearsay. Manufacturing concerns set up branches in countries where raw materials are to be found or where sales markets are to be supplied. Trading companies set up sales agencies in all parts of the world and shipping companies or tourist agencies set up branch offices in ports and harbors along all the familiar routes of travel. The tourist agency will sell you a ticket from any place in the world to any other place in the world, broadly speaking, and will follow quickly on the heels of the explorer and the moving picture camera man in facilitating visits to the outermost parts of the earth which the reports and the films of the former have made familiar. The banking houses interested

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in international finance trade upon foreign exchanges or float in the exchanges in their own countries the securities of foreign countries, foreign cities, and foreign corporations. There are, of course, the exporters and importers also, who are naturally interested in foreign trade and in foreign industry, but entirely apart from these we have today many business houses which take the world as their field.

Now these concerns at times run afoul of the activities of the national Governments. They encounter customs barriers or laws relating to the flotation of foreign securities or navigation laws or what not. They find themselves doing business under several sets of laws and they have excellent opportunities for comparative study of national systems of industrial and commercial legislation; the results are not always pleasant. They interfere or attempt to interfere in national governmental action, legislative, administrative, or diplomatic, from time to time. They attempt to circumvent national governmental restrictions. Other private world associations may at times come into conflict with such restrictions, but the business house which is conducting its activities on a world scale is almost certain to encounter such restrictions.

Some attention has been given—in a rather sensational way, usually—to the international bankers, so-called, and the international armament firms, as manifestations of anti-national action and supra-national unity. The threats to national welfare—or to the welfare of the people who live in individual nations—involved in such activities are ex-

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aggerated, as is natural, but it is quite obvious that financial transactions, and manufacturing and selling activities, which are conducted on a world scale may very easily run counter to nationalistic considerations. The alternative is quite definite: prevent world organization of business concerns or expect to see these concerns act with some degree of indifference toward national groupings. It is not difficult to find cases where bankers have floated foreign loans with results not entirely welcome to the local Government; it is not impossible to find cases where armament firms have sold arms to both sides and even to the enemy country. These anomalies are certain to result from a situation where nationalist and cosmopolitan elements are so badly intermingled.

The manufacturers and the bankers are not, however, the only ones to act on a world-wide scale. Labor likewise has adopted this method of extending and strengthening its position in industry. The world labor organizations are in actual fact organizations of the type already described and they are largely federalistic and quasi-international in character; that is, they consist of federations of national organizations. It may or may not be the sort of thing which one should expect, but the fact is that the world labor organizations seem less compact and less effective than world-wide business concerns. It is not merely that there are more persons concerned and that it is therefore more difficult to manage a complicated federalistic world labor association than a unified business concern. It is not merely that the element of potential profit holds together the business

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organization and is somewhat less obvious in the case of the labor organization. The labor people, for reasons too complicated to be studied here, do not seem to be readily able to combine their interests and their demands so as to present a united cause. This may not be avoidable but it is none the less striking.

Perhaps the best embodiment of all that has been discussed in this chapter is the world fair or international exposition. The use of the two names is itself significant. At times private interests organize such activities. At times national Governments take charge. In any case both private interests and national Governments send exhibits. All the culture of the contemporary world is exhibited. Science and art, business and pleasure, all compete. For here nation competes against nation in the arts of peace. Nation competes against nation in activities which for the most part have been developed without much governmental assistance. The national Government is placed in a false position at such expositions and made to seem something which it is not. An individual might appropriately attend a world fair with the aim of seeing the best which contemporary civilization had to offer whether in mustard sauces or micrometer gauges or in works of art and science. But a Government enters such a scene either to interfere or to claim credit which is not due. It is therefore rather as an epitome of our contemporary civilization with its conflicting elements of nationalism and cosmopolitanism that we must regard these "international" expositions and "world" fairs.

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It might be concluded that the wholly desirable thing which the world fair might be but is not is seen in the museum or art gallery in any individual nation where the management of the collections is entrusted to unbiased scientists or art critics. Perhaps this is too much to expect until the national Government realizes that the time is coming when it is to be not so much the defender of a national community and a national interest against the world outside as a force for exercising control over or direction of the national community in the interest of world society. What we have today is something curiously combining both of these contradictory elements.

This brings us to the threshold of official international action. From this point onward it is not what people do as private individuals but what groups of people called nations do toward one another through their Governments that will concern us. International politics and international law, diplomacy and treaties and all the higher forms of organized international action, flow from the world-wide activity of private individuals described in this chapter, but they cluster about the national states into which those individuals are organized. They will occupy us to the end of the present volume.

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Chapter V

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: WHAT, WHENCE, AND WHITHER?

IN the preceding chapter there was much large talk about the strength of private action in world intercourse. The private trader or traveler was discovered engaged in a mass of activities which had arisen without much stimulation from public authorities and which were carried on without much support or even approval from these authorities. The Government came off a poor second in the description of their relations.

Now this is all sufficiently accurate to justify its having been said. But there is another side to the situation and that other side deserves to be brought to the fore also. The private trader and traveler while he is successful and prosperous in his enterprises takes a rather haughty attitude toward the Government. But when he gets into trouble he sings another song and that song is a wail. He cries out for help. His goods are being taxed or seized unreasonably! His friends and relatives are being maltreated! His books and papers are being held up by a dastardly foreign Government! Has his own Government nothing to say and do about such outrageous happenings?

And then the Government does what it can to protect

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him and aid him. It has been thinking of him all along. It has been appealed to in like manner many times before. That is what it is for. Its public officials—its President or Prime Minister, the Secretary in charge of foreign affairs—have been working upon a program of principles and demands and actions to be taken toward other nations which aim precisely at the protection and assistance of its nationals. It has, in other words, evolved a program of national foreign policy, even as other nations have been doing the same. And from the relations among these programs of foreign policy,—relations of agreement and of disagreement, of coincidence and conflict,—arises that most fascinating form of international relationships, “international politics.”

More frequently it appears that national foreign policies conflict rather than agree. It seems that oil and cherry blossoms, when expressed in national foreign policies, divide the world as much as they unite it. In actual fact they do neither, primarily. Like all the items in which nations are interested they will either unite or divide the world, depending upon what is done to regulate or adjust the interplay of individual and national interests in regard thereto. But this all demands much more leisurely explanation.

Of course, the main reason for the appearance of the international scene as a concert of Kilkenny cats lies in the fact that we hear the loud discords but not the quiet harmonies among the parts played by the various interests involved. Day after day and year after year nations go

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along without serious disharmony, their views corresponding fairly well regarding the treatment which should be applied to various persons and interests in different circumstances and we hear nothing of it. Let an American be arrested in Sweden and we are likely to hear the explosion clear across the Atlantic. In part this is the explanation of our impression that international politics is one long squabble. The bulk of international contacts are quiet and congenial but they make no impression upon our attention.

Another reason for the appearance of conflict in international relations lies in the fact that this earth, spacious as it may seem, is, after all, limited in extent. It is not that nations follow such divergent policies but that even where they follow identical policies they come into conflict. Protection of travelers and promotion of trade are policies on which all nations agree, as policies. But they not infrequently lead to competition for the same trade. Or the protection of its nationals abroad leads a nation into conflict with another nation which is trying to control all aliens within its borders, a policy with which in itself the former nation would have no disagreement. Again the difficulty is not in divergent views but in the difficulty of adjusting relations among nations which are forced to coexist on the same planet.

Then we come finally to real divergences of policy which are more serious. Great Britain is following a policy of free trade and France a policy of protection. Italy encourages emigration and the United States restricts immigration.

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Other examples might be given in great numbers. After making all possible allowances for the false appearance of disharmony in international relations and for disharmony arising not out of divergent policies but out of the limited field of international activities we come finally to the real conflicts of divergent national policies and demands.

The most informing discoveries are made, however, when we ask for the causes of these differences between national aims and demands. Why is it that Germany holds to one purpose and Russia to another? Is it mere caprice? Can we fairly complain because the nations differ so widely in their policies? Can such divergent policies possibly be explained or reconciled?

One idea which we ought to get out of our heads early in our thought upon this sort of thing is the idea that diplomatic relations constitute merely a game played by certain gentlemen who enjoy fighting. These national demands are not in the main invented by diplomats in order to have something over which to squabble with another nation. Foreign policies are not capricious inventions of diplomacy. In the main, that is. From time to time in the past and even in this more sensible age, perhaps, the diplomats of one nation have taken a position toward the diplomats of another nation solely because of the feeling that they should insist upon a distinctive view on the part of their own Government. But in the main the diplomats do not make foreign policy and they frequently disagree sharply with the policies which they are compelled to execute.

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Foreign policies originate in the conditions of national life. A country needs settlers and it encourages immigration. It is a maritime nation and it demands freedom of navigation at sea. It needs foreign capital and it follows a policy based upon that need. In short, the divergent conditions of national life described in a preceding chapter dictate divergent national policies. The national representative assemblies and the national executive officials are the first to feel the pressure of such conditions; the diplomatic agents of a nation feel that pressure only when it is embodied in the instructions issued to them by their superiors. They are the tools, not the masters, of the nation in its attitudes and demands toward other nations.

At this point it would be desirable to review the foreign policy programs of some of the leading nations of the world if time and space permitted. The American foreign policy program will be summarized in a later chapter. But we cannot do more than summarize here the programs of such leading countries as Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Germany, and Russia, and add a few general observations upon the policies of different types of nations among the remainder.

British foreign policy has played an important part in international relations from the fourteenth century onward. To maintain her maritime supremacy in order to protect the British Isles against invasion and interruption of food supplies as well as to protect British commerce and provide a weapon of offense against foreign nations and their com-

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merce in case of war; to help maintain a balance of power among the European nations and prevent France or Germany from securing the Lowlands; to insist upon freedom of navigation in time of peace and open doors to colonial trade in all parts of the world; these are three cardinal items in British policy. Many items of more concrete application might be cited such as the policy of friendship for Portugal, of coöperation with the Turk, of control in Egypt and at Gibraltar. But the first was part of the policy in support of the balance of power, the second was part of an anti-Russian attitude, and the third connects, as does the anti-Russian attitude, with protection of the route to India. British policy is quite understandable, at times not greatly inimical to general international welfare, and only at one or two points sharply nationalistic—chiefly in connection with possession of India.

French policy is less stable. Possession or domination of the Rhineland has not always been a practicable aim for Parisian statesmen-generals. French policy has been opportunistic. Protection of the Christians in the Levant and cultivation of French political interest and trade there seemed compatible with a policy of friendship for Turkey. Both seemed compatible with a fluctuating relationship with Britain which has ranged from open warfare to a cordial understanding. Friendship with the United States has been a mixture of republican idealism and anti-British (in 1917 anti-German) international politics. And French interest in the Orient has been largely a colonial interest. If British

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people seem unhappy at home but fortunate in their dealings with other peoples perhaps it may be said that in their foreign relations the French frequently manifest qualities not to be expected from the quiet fineness of French national life——.

Of Italian policy still less may be said. Italy became a nation only in 1870. Her policy has been to try to hang together as a nation and build a place for herself in the international world outside. Protection against secular enemies to the north and east was still felt necessary, and revindication of Italian soil still held by Austria. Building up a national army and navy was undertaken. Later colonial holdings were obtained. Today Italy seeks a voice in all world affairs, and her voice does not go unheard.

Likewise for Japan. A newcomer in world politics, she now seeks an important place for herself in the international scene. She does so quietly but effectively. She has at times scared Europe by her threatened advances toward China and Russia in Asia. She retreats to advance again. At present friendship with the West seems her method. Equal treatment for her nationals abroad she desires but not any great immigration of these nationals into other countries. Her general attitude at the present moment is one of quiet but effective maintenance of her national interests whatever they may be in any given case.

Germany, of course, has more or less dropped out of the larger international game at the present time. She, like Italy, sought national unity after 1870, colonial holdings

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everywhere, national military and naval power, and a voice in the larger world. She tried to secure her aims by military strength too largely and she ran afoul of British, Russian, and French power and foreign policy, between which and her own there was not much to choose. Today she seeks national economic recuperation, political unity under the republican régime, and return to world influence. She has been very skillful since 1920 or at least since 1923 in gaining her aims.

Bolshevist Russia still struggles with lack of full diplomatic recognition in the West. Czarist Russia once sought ice-free ports at Constantinople and Port Arthur. She sought to mother the Slavic nations of the Balkans. She sought to influence the general course of international politics in central Europe and hold Poland in subjection. Bolshevist Russia professes little attention to such aims. International peace and friendship, and abolition of racial, class, and imperialistic discriminations—the coming of a world communistic state or society in the end—are her professed aims. It is, of course, difficult to feel sure how sincere are such professions. Externally as well as internally Russia is an enigma.

And the rest is silence, or only a low murmur. The other independent nations of Asia either drift along in a state of low political vitality and profess no foreign policy or have as their chief aim merely to resist Western imperialism. The same might be said of the free African nations. South Africa, like the other British Dominions, is concerned chiefly in securing recognition as a nation. Latin America is

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concerned with resistance to domination from the North, with Pan-American coöperation in various social, economic, and even political activities, and with internal national development. Even the smaller nations of Europe, that home of national foreign policies, content themselves with modest and largely defensive programs. So Belgium and The Netherlands, in spite of efforts on the part of the former to play a part in French plans, and an effort on the part of the Dutch to maintain their former grandeur in colonial trade and world finance. The Scandinavian states are chiefly concerned in seeing Europe quiet and prosperous. The Baltic states and the new succession states from Poland to Jugoslavia are trying to win secure independence and internal political and economic stability. All in all we may as well end by recognizing that international politics is a game for the Great Powers chiefly, and that the best we can do is to discern some of the more general aspects of the attitudes of the other nations.

Thus the policies of the newer nations of the Western Hemisphere are notably simpler, more general, and more idealistic than those of old Europe. They have not acquired the complicated programs of policy which have been produced by a long history of international relations. They are not crowded together on a small continent and densely populated to boot. Moreover, they are most of them small or weak, and weak nations cannot afford pretentious programs of foreign policy. In a variety of ways, therefore, their policies diverge from those of the European powers.

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It might be added that newer and weaker nations are nevertheless more likely to stick to the more immediate national interests—economic and social interests of the people—in their policies, and less likely to develop programs of a highly political character—colonial policies and policies of international domination—than are the older and more powerful nations. This leads to a quite different topic, however.

A review of the foreign policy programs of a number of nations, could we have made such a review, would have revealed the presence of a certain number of critical problems upon which nearly all important nations are led to take one attitude or another. Such is the problem of raw materials—how to get them or how to protect them. Such is the problem of migration—how to encourage it or restrict it. Such are the problems of freedom of navigation, of customs tariffs, of debts or loans or foreign investments. Most of these critical problems are economic in character; international politics like national politics derive mainly from sources in economic interest. Such also, however, are the problems of national boundaries, of territorial security, of the balance of power, of peace and justice among nations. Of these latter problems we shall hear much more as we go along.

There are two other types of international political controversy which should be labeled while we are making this survey. Those are the great historic quarrels and the troublesome regional disputes. Controversies of the sort which we

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are considering at this point are sometimes definitely settled. If they are very deep-rooted, however, they may have an amazing span of life. They last for decades and even for centuries. The French and the Germans have been quarrelling over the region west of the Rhine ever since the break-up of Charlemagne's empire in the middle of the ninth century. China and Japan have been at odds over Korea for as long as Japan has existed as a separate nation. These secular controversies are regional in character also, but certain regional problems, such as the issue of control over the Caribbean Sea, is of relatively recent origin. History and the map of the earth are spotted with such epic and geographic controversies in international politics.

One controversy not primarily of a regional character might be added. The United States, along with other new countries in this hemisphere, once encouraged immigration of aliens into their territory. We now restrict such activity. Older European powers once resisted emigration in order to retain industrial and military man-power. They later encouraged it for the purpose of disembarassing themselves of surplus population. They resisted the naturalization of their emigrants by the United States and other immigrant receiving nations in this hemisphere, later they permitted it, later still one or more of them have sought to hold the allegiance of their nationals even after these latter have become American citizens. They have tried to protect these individuals after immigration and have claimed some control over them upon their temporary return to the father-

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land. And out of these conflicting national policies have arisen controversies of principle, controversies over legal rules, and controversies in individual cases literally without number. The immigrant receiving state happened, by force of circumstances, to be in a position where it could enjoy a great tactical advantage in all such controversies but the conflict has been none the less troublesome.

We are now prepared to ask what is the solution for such problems and their future in history.

Let us examine one or two such problems in detail in order to get a somewhat closer view of the nature of national policies as such and of the nature of their inter-relations, and in order to pave the way for a conjecture as to the future of international politics as a type of activity.

Let us take, for example, the problem of the Rhineland. This region was allowed to lie more or less detached between Germany and France at the dissolution of the empire of Charlemagne in 843 A.D. France has, generally speaking, desired to possess it in order to protect herself from invasion from Germany and to provide her with a jumping-off place for power and influence in central Europe. Germany has desired it as being peopled mainly by Germans and as a defense against French invasion. Belgium and The Netherlands have been affected in their national security and prosperity by this conflict between their two greater neighbors, as has Switzerland, to a less extent, in view of her need of the Rhine as an outlet to the sea. And Great Britain has desired to prevent either France or Germany from using

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this region as a means to control or seize the coastal regions—Belgium and The Netherlands—and threaten her safety across the narrow seas. Thus all nations within radius of the Rhineland have been affected, the Great Powers, in the main, seeking positive advantages and the smaller nations fearing injury.

In the Caribbean the situation differs in detail and in its novelty but not in its essentials. The United States more or less unconsciously and involuntarily seeks to dominate or at least to control this area. Spain and France and Great Britain sought such domination earlier, before the problem assumed its present aspects. And Cuba and the Dominican Republic and Haiti, the Central American republics, and even Mexico, for all her size, and still more distant Venezuela, fear the consequences. That the natural activities of American trade and navigation flow into and across these waters may explain and make inevitable these developments but it does not lessen their danger.

Finally in the Far East Japan seeks to secure a more extensive foothold on the Asiatic mainland and to control the waters and islands west, east, and south of her island empire. European and American nations, including the United States, are concerned for their trade and shipping, for their territorial positions, and for their privileges of a territorial character, in China. And while Japan is here described as the principal actor in this scene the Western powers might equally well be regarded as the aggressors.

Now for an analysis of such conflicts of policy. Exactly

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what do we mean when we say that a certain nation seeks some end as a matter of national policy? We mean that such a nation seeks such an end out of a desire to attain that end and without reference to any other considerations than are involved in calculating how best to attain it. That means primarily the ability of the nation to induce or compel other nations to satisfy the demand made. The demand is not made as a matter of law; if the law provides for satisfaction of the demand then in principle the satisfaction must be expected automatically, even without formal demand, and there is no question of seeking the end as a matter of policy. On the other hand, because a nation is seeking satisfaction of a demand does not mean that it will have recourse to the use of military force at once or even ultimately. It may have other quite adequate means at its disposal for use against the other nation, such as diplomatic pressure—really this means merely a threatened use of more serious measures—economic discrimination, or similar means. Thus national action on the basis of policy is action outside the limits of international law, and action by means of an exchange of national advantages and pressures which may ultimately extend to the use of military force.

Obviously, the fact that the subject in question is not regulated by international law is the fact of principal importance in such situations. International law does not regulate international migration or the distribution of raw materials or the rationing of food supplies. Hence these vital matters are left the playthings of international bargaining, the foot-

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balls of international politics. It is the absence of any accepted principles and rules upon these topics which makes it possible for the nations to take divergent attitudes and seek advantages in connection with these matters—in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, and in America—by the exchange of concessions and even by pressure, intimidation, and war. International politics fill the space left untreated by international law.

It ought to be just as clear that the failure to adopt general rules of international law on certain matters is traceable partly to the very insistence of the nations upon their divergent views or “policies” and their refusal to see these matters subjected to general international rules. The process works both ways. No law on a subject makes it possible to play politics with it; playing politics with it makes it difficult if not impossible to secure any general rule upon the matter. After a certain point of national and international self-consciousness has been reached the very fact that a given matter—such as migration—has so far, or so long, been kept out of the field of international legal regulation makes it doubly hard to secure the extension of such regulation to cover that matter. It is not then merely a question of demonstrating the advisability of international regulation but of eliminating one more bargaining point upon which the greater or more powerful nations can play the game of politics for national advantage.

This brings us to several very deep-reaching questions which lead into the discussions of the succeeding chapter.

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When is a topic, if ever, likely to reach such a situation in point of fact that general international legal regulation will appear to be more advantageous than leaving it within the field of international politics? Do the larger and the smaller powers diverge notably on this point? Many topics have in the past been transferred from one field to the other. When and under what circumstances did this happen? Is it still happening? And what is likely to be the course of events in the future? Will the great topics of current international political discussion be subjected to international legal regulation so as to sensibly diminish the scope of such free action? To these problems we turn in the chapter on international law.

It might be added that whatever the expansion of international law in the future may be it is quite probable—to put it mildly—that we shall have much international politics with us for some time to come. It might be possible to guess that no matter how far the law of nations goes in regulating international life, international life is likely to keep ahead of the law and leave much to political negotiation. This raises still other problems to which we shall return in the chapter on international conference.

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Chapter VI

INTERNATIONAL LAW

WE have, probably, all heard of the rural gentleman who, when a visitor at the zoölogical garden in the city, refused to believe in the reality of the animal which his eyes beheld. Many people were inclined, during the years 1914-1918, and some people are still inclined, to repeat that gentleman's remark, and to apply it to the to them mythical entity known as international law: "there ain't no such animal!" Well, isn't there? Then what is it to which public officials and publicists and all sorts of people frequently refer in using that phrase?

The phrase "international law" was coined by that fertile spirit known to history as Jeremy Bentham, and it comes to us from the memorable year which saw the fruition of popular revolution in France and constitutional reorganization in America, 1789. But it had been preceded by another phrase, namely, "the law of nations," and this second phrase or the idea which it expresses is somewhat more involved than our modern idea. Where and when was "international law" born, and how was it related to the older "law of nations"?

Communities capable of dealing independently one with another existed, as we have seen, in Greek and Roman times.

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We should expect to find something like international law making its appearance in those days. We are not surprised, therefore, to learn that a scholarly English gentleman has written two learned volumes under the imposing title of "The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome." Nevertheless, if we examine the materials surveyed in Mr. Phillipson's treatise we shall find that the concept of independent statehood was not very clear in men's minds in antiquity, that the idea of interstate relations was still less clear, and that, as has been pointed out already, the Greeks were singularly unselfconscious about this nascent interstate activity and the Romans naturally opposed to the whole thing. Hence the period of Greece and Rome did not witness the birth of true international law.

The Medieval period—let us say from 400 A.D. to 1400 A.D.—saw about as much or as little growth in this direction. Feudal law regarding the relations among various urban and rural and more extended territorial units developed. Principles of imperial control were proclaimed by Carolingian and Hohenstaufen and Hapsburg Emperors. Some rules of diplomacy and of territorial authority and of allegiance were observed. But not until the period of the Renaissance did the states of Europe begin to acquire sufficiently normal size and independence to generate a system of true international law.

That law as we have it today was born between 1400 and 1600 A.D. Rules of military art and etiquette had been observed for some time among the orders of chivalry. Certain

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rules of diplomacy had come down from Roman and Greek times. Certain elements in feudal law were taken over for application to interstate relations. Rules of allegiance or nationality and other principles affecting individuals were taken over from the Roman law, the study of which had recently been revived in Italy and France. All of these materials—together with much commercial law and maritime or admiralty law—were drawn upon to build the new system. By 1600 A.D. the time was ripe; by 1650 the job had been done.

Now this may all still seem to many to be a very obscure and even mysterious process. It may seem to amount to only another explanation which needs to be explained. "Feudal law"—"admiralty law"—what is it all about?

The situation is really very simple. The individuals who make up the various nations insist—to repeat—insist upon traveling in foreign lands and upon trading and otherwise communicating with people in those lands. On this account and because of the necessity of demarcating the portions of the surface of the earth held by the nations and of regulating formal communication and even formal hostilities between their Governments, rules of law appear desirable. They, these Governments, feel that such rules are desirable. Their people, who depend upon these Governments,—their own and foreign Governments—for protection, feel that such rules are desirable. Students of the art of national government and international coöperation feel that such rules are desirable. And all set about devising such rules.

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Reference has just been made to certain "students of the art of international coöperation." Who are these and whence come they and what is their work?

They are, if the truth must be known, the humble professors. They have no official standing or authority. They are unknown to Governments and peoples, usually. But, largely for the same reasons which actuated Watt and Franklin in another field, they inquire concerning the rules, if any there be, which regulate or describe the working of international relations. The Governments are busy; they press for satisfaction in the instant case but they do not work out complete systems of law in advance. The people also are busy; they demand protection in the case which affects them but they likewise neglect the law as a science or an art. If it were not for the professors the development of the law would move slowly indeed. And this the Governments come to realize; they leave the field to these unauthorized jurists, and then later turn to them for help and quote their writings in the conduct of interstate relations!

Thus it was in the later Middle Ages. The treatise of Hugo Grotius, private Dutch jurist, on *The Law of War and Peace*, published in 1625, gained for him the title of "father of international law" though he had many precursors. Since Grotius many private scholars in many lands have contributed to build up the fabric of the law of the nations. The Governments get their international law in a roundabout way, it seems.

In actual fact the process is even simpler than that just

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described. One Government deals with another in a given case. It demands as good treatment as it can get, of course. But because it is not always sufficiently powerful to get all it wants, and because the other nation is seldom sufficiently powerful to deny it some degree of satisfaction, and because nations are never quite sure of the extent of their power, present or future, and prefer not to stand rigidly upon it, the solution actually reached will fall somewhere between the extreme positions of both parties. What both will demand will be a form of treatment equivalent to that accorded or promised by and to the other, treatment as good as that received in a similar previous instance, or treatment as good as that accorded by or to another nation in similar circumstances. Reciprocity, uniformity, and equality seem to be the three cardinal principles of international justice, as reflected in the demands of states upon one another. And the presentation and satisfaction of these demands, particularly the first, leads to the almost automatic development of a body of law even without the conscious efforts of the jurists mentioned above. Law, like social and international life, of which it is a part, grows spontaneously at first.

At least two further questions emerge from this picture of things. We are leaving aside the national rights created by treaty agreement. They rest at the time upon the principle of reciprocity—the treaty must be regarded by the parties, at least, as a fair exchange—; and in the future they rest upon the signed text, observance of which is demanded on the basis of the former principle. But what about ques-

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tions for which there are no precedents and cases in which great disparity of strength exists between the parties? Suppose it is impossible to say "give me as good as I gave you" or "as good as you gave me before" or "as good as you gave our neighbor"; what then? Suppose it does no good to say "give me" anything because the other fellow will do as he pleases; in any event isn't the use of the formula "give me" a confession that might makes right among the nations?

The case in which it is impossible to find some sort of a precedent is rare. Few things happen for the first time, paradoxical as that may sound. Or, rather, nothing that happens is so entirely different from what has happened before that it is impossible to discover from the treatment adopted in the former case the treatment which should be adopted now. Thinking by analogy, as it is called, even though the analogy be always imperfect, takes care of almost all cases for which there can be found no exact precedent—and it might be added, parenthetically, for it is of little practical moment, though of considerable theoretical interest, that these last-named cases are sufficiently rare also.

Now in this case, for which no exact and likewise no close precedent can be found, the demanding state—and both states will have their own demands, of course—will get as much as it can and will use any arguments which it considers to be calculated to make an impression upon the other state. One such argument is—leaving the use of pressure,

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economic or military, extraneous to the controverted matter, aside—the promise of equal treatment in the future. But such a promise is implicit in every settlement in any event. And the other state may not be impressed by such an offer in view of the possibility that it may never need to profit by it. In short both states will usually prefer to reach a solution without going beyond the circumstances of the immediate case, and that for purely selfish reasons. Hence this argument avails little.

The result—still considering supposedly unprecedented issues—is a recourse to arguments about “equity,” “reasonableness,” and “justice” in the abstract, which it is very difficult to analyze. Probably a belief in the practice of reciprocity—apart, still, from a definite precedent or future reward—unconsciously bulks large in the composition of this idea or feeling. Perhaps an instinctive inclination toward absolute conservation of human life and happiness plays a large part. Perhaps the idea of earned reward, of the distribution of benefits in accord with services rendered—a sort of reciprocity idea in itself—plays its part. Our analysis of the concept of justice is still incomplete.

This we know, however, that the concept does enter into the formation of international law. It is a common retort of the cynical student of international affairs that international ethics are even lower and scantier than international law. He finds international law to be based upon national and international practice, not upon principles of sound international ethics. He finds nations demanding of

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one another not what is right or what is legal but what they want or at least what they can get. The foregoing analysis should dispose of a certain amount of this criticism. Because they demand what they want does not mean that international law contains no justice; it is by the demands and counter-demands of the nations that justice, either justice based on precedent, the justice of reciprocity, uniformity, and equality, or abstract justice, whatever that may be, is injected into the law. Because nations are not usually able to demand what they want they demand what seems to them reasonable—even when this exceeds what they confidently hope to get. The evolution of a precise standard of international ethics and a sharp definition of international justice remain to be achieved but this does not mean that no justice exists in the law at present.

So for the sensational contention that international law is the rule of the powerful, and that, after all, might makes right among the nations. In any general sense and as respects certain types of situations this is flatly nonsense. In other types of situations it is quite true. In any event it is an oversimplified way in which to state the relation between national power and either ethical or legal right in international affairs.

Thus in certain limited situations—limited in point of time—great disparity between the powers of the disputant nations, and lack of interest leading to interference by the others, will permit one party to exact what it likes of the other. Does the settlement in such case receive either ethical

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or legal standing as a rule of law for the future? Except in one situation—that of complete annexation—where the nation upon which the demand is made disappears in whole or in part, obviously it does not. The victimized state doesn't admit the righteousness or legality of the treatment. The other states—motivated in part by fear and jealousy of the victorious state no doubt—will deny it. Even the victor will probably not insist upon the justice or legality of his acts if he is satisfied. Such actions, and they are few in number in comparison with the vast bulk of international dealings, prove nothing against the view presented above.

On the other hand, where the more powerful nations insist firmly upon a certain rule of international law through a long period of time it will prevail. It will be admitted to be law by the other states. It is imposed upon them as a matter of fact and they impose it upon others in return. Perhaps in the end they even come to see its reasonableness! This is, indeed, the rule of the strong. Might makes right—with the assistance of the two factors not yet emphasized, viz., the consent of the weaker and the fact that the stronger are able to make national and international life go on working according to that rule. So it is in the exception cited in the preceding paragraph. Annexation by force is admitted to be legal and perhaps reasonable in so far as it is based upon acquiescence—if only a tacit cessation of resistance—by the annexed state, and in so far as the annexing state can hold its conquest and make things go along according to the new scheme. What this amounts to is that the law

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recognizes the facts of life, those of economic, social, and human action no less than those of geology. Perhaps the ultimate principle of social justice in the international field is what it is elsewhere, namely, that the powerful seek, secure, are given, and retain control of the activities and life of the community.

Much more space might be given to a description of the way in which international practice makes international law and of the way in which national action enters into international practice. Setting aside law made by international agreements, this is the great source and foundation of international law. The practice of no one nation can make law for others but international acceptance of that practice will.

A peculiar and difficult but very important problem arises in this connection. Suppose the individual nation adopts a provision as part of its Constitution, or enacts a statute, contrary to international law. Which is superior in authority, national law or international? Or, if the situation be visualized from another angle, may a nation enact a statute or a Constitutional provision contrary to international law so as to impair the rights of other nations?

To ask the question is to answer it. A nation may not legally impair the rights of other nations by statutory action or adoption or revision of a national Constitution any more than by action of its executive or administrative officers, including its soldiers and sailors. In case of conflict

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between national law, including the Constitution, and international law, the latter is of superior authority.

Practically what does this mean? It means that the national legislative organ is under obligation to carry on its activities within the limits of international law. It means that a national Constitutional convention—or national organs revising the Constitution—must do the same. It means that if this is not done and the rights of other nations are impaired as a result of the execution of such laws the nation guilty of such action will be liable to make adequate satisfaction to the latter. In short it means just what it says: the nation is bound to observe the rules of international law even in its Constitution.

One reason for emphasizing this point so strongly is found in the attitude commonly taken by national courts when called upon to apply national or international law. This is involved in the whole question of the enforcement of international law and to that we will return presently.

So far we have had much talk about international law but little description of its content. Of what does it consist? Granted that it exists and is on the whole just and is superior in authority to national action and national law, what does it say?

It says many things in a voice which ranges from the deep bass of general principle to the high tenor of very detailed rules. It speaks of peace and it speaks of war. It contains rules governing the acquisition and tenure and exercise of sovereignty over territory by the nation. It deals

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with the bestowal of nationality upon individuals by the state and the degree of authority which the state may exercise over its own nationals and over nationals of other states. It finally stipulates the forms of procedure to be used by states in dealing with one another, whether by diplomacy, treaty negotiation, or war. International law covers an extended terrain in which are found a variety of subjects.

The international law of our day is open to criticism on several grounds, however. Or, rather, it must not be taken for what it is not and be expected to provide more than it intends. We should be aware of these deficiencies whether we note them in a spirit of criticism and blame or in a detached mood of scientific observation.

Thus international law is inter-national law. That is, it is created by international action and in the main it lays down the rights and obligations of nations as such. Occasionally we find a rule stated in another form, thus: a person is a national of the state in which he is born. But such a statement is full of hazard. There are many cases in which it is not true and the individual may not be in position to claim anything. It would be better to say that a state may claim as its national a person born in its territory. Even to that statement there are some exceptions, but the point for us is that public international law is and should be regarded as primarily a statement of national rights and obligations. This limits its usefulness, as we shall see later, but after all we should not demand that international law try to be something which it is not.

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Worse than this, international law is at certain points deficient in its statement of national rights. It is too general in many matters, not having been worked out in sufficient detail. It requires much interpretation and argument by inference from its principles in order to secure a rule on the question at issue. Thus the law says that a state may claim territory which it has occupied for an extended period of time without effective opposition; but it does not say how long that occupation must last in order to give title.

Worst of all, the law fails to cover at all many matters of international importance. This deficiency leaves much room for the play of international politics upon such matters as the access to raw materials, the size of national armaments, and like subjects. Now this deficiency, like the deficiency of detail just mentioned, can in part be attributed to the failure of the national Governments or the private jurists to work out the law more fully. The law develops to some extent by spontaneous growth, but unless the Governments and the scholars take note of and record the growth of international practice the law will not be perceived or declared. This was the point at which the Greek states failed so notably. And the law itself can hardly be blamed, so to speak, for this failure. But the fundamental cause for the deficiency of law in such matters lies in the fact that there is or has been little or no uniformity in national or international action in a given matter in the past. The circumstances of national and international life vary so greatly from place to place and from time to time that different

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countries react differently to certain contingencies at one time and another. Here is the most serious and fundamental shortcoming in the foundations of international law. It is for this reason ultimately that we have no more international law and no better international law than we have.

And finally the existing law is today still defective in form in that it lacks complete official statement and is only to be found by searching through the many official documents and private treatises in which it is recorded. A student of the law must examine many diplomatic documents, many treatises, many judicial decisions, and many private treatises in order to discover the rules of the law. That is because of the lack of what may be called codification, for which we hear so many demands today.

By codification of the law we mean its statement, or re-statement, in comprehensive and systematic form. Such a task is an extremely difficult labor from the intellectual or scientific viewpoint. To reduce the existing multitude of rules to the form of a systematic and harmonious code is extremely difficult. Scholars have been engaged upon that task for centuries, ever since Grotius' day and before; every private treatise on the law is in some degree an attempt at unofficial codification. But only by the joint labors of many men and the official agreement of many nations can true codification be successfully carried out. Certain attempts at codification of parts of the law in international treaties or conventions have been made in the past fifty years, notably at the Hague Conferences in 1899 and 1907. But it is chiefly

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the law of war which has been codified hitherto. We still need a codification of the law of peace and we are only now in sight of a real beginning on that task.

We return in conclusion to the question of the authority of international law and its enforcement.

Concerning the former there need be little question to-day in principle. Once upon a time men were inclined to doubt the true legal character of international law and its binding authority. International law was said to lack certain qualities necessary in any system of law. It lacked the authority of a law-giver such as stood back of other law. It lacked a policeman or other community authority to enforce it. It was merely a code of ethics or a set of rules of comity or courtesy. It was not law at all. Today these objections are seen to carry little weight. Much of our national law is not dictated directly by a sovereign or a state but rests, like international law, upon usage. The necessity for a policeman to enforce the law in the name of the community may be real but it amounts to a need for international Government rather than a doubt of the binding authority of the law; we do not doubt that traffic laws are legally binding even in absence of a policeman at the street-corner. The consideration most decisive for the present question lies in the fact that the nations of the world, who are the parties supposed to be bound by the law, actually admit its legal obligation. That is, they admit that it is not merely a matter of courtesy to obey the law. It is not, in their view, less binding because its enforcement is still left in rather an

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unorganized condition. They admit that the rules of international law are legally binding in the sense of admitting, further, that if they do not obey these rules the nation aggrieved will be in a position to demand adequate satisfaction which they (finally) admit is to be satisfied. And if the Governments recognize that the law is legally binding who are we to deny it on theoretical grounds?

Nor does the fact that the law does not itself contain a fixed schedule of penalties or damages impair the soundness or the importance of this conclusion. In most matters regulated by national law, indeed, the fixing of the penalty or the satisfaction to be given the party whose rights have been injured is left unsettled by the law itself. It is a part of the process of law enforcement to fix the damages to be awarded, or, more generally still, the satisfaction to be decreed. The problem of penalties or damages for breach of international law is part of the more general problem of its enforcement.

Enforcement of international law takes many forms. We shall review them only briefly here.

International law is enforced partly by litigation in national courts. That law is in force in each nation—as part of the law of the land, as it is sometimes put, although this statement involves one or two dangerous ideas. At all events the national courts are bound to enforce it where rights of parties in litigation depend upon its rules. And in hundreds of cases in all countries it is so enforced day after day.

Where this is not possible or justice is denied in the

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courts, as where a national court follows national law at the expense of international law, a nation may have recourse to diplomatic protests and demands. These demands may take various form but observance of the law is their chief point. This is the commonest form of international action for enforcement of international law.

If this step fails the nation may proceed to other measures. If it can cite a treaty agreement providing for arbitration of the dispute it may demand such action. The execution of the award in arbitration may then be demanded under the treaty providing for submission of the dispute.

Finally a nation may have recourse to forcible means of coercion. It may undertake reprisals against the guilty state. These may include seizure of property, arrest of nationals of the offending state, or any other means deemed suitable and effective, within the limits of a fair retortion for injuries received. Such actions may lead to war or war may be declared at once as a means of securing compliance with demands for observance of the law. Recourse to war for such a purpose is rare, and wars usually originate in the political disputes already discussed, but war is still available in support of legal demands as well, in absence of treaty agreements to the contrary.

Each of these methods of national action for enforcement of legal rights has its defects. Litigation in national courts is very useful where only private parties are involved but nations do not generally allow themselves to be sued even in their own courts. And most of the rules of the

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law are not formulated in such a manner as to make this form of action very convenient. What is still more serious, national courts, acting upon what is coming slowly to be recognized—by students and courts alike—as a mistaken conception of their functions, refuse to apply international law when in conflict with national law, though they admit the continued liability of the nation under the former. Diplomatic demand is very simple and easy to make, and is much more effective than might be supposed, but after all it is rather weak unless met by a conciliatory attitude on the part of the other nation or unless backed by force or threat of force. Agreements for submission to arbitration are still today less effective than could be desired and without them arbitration cannot be had. And recourse to force is difficult or expensive and is dangerous as will be appreciated without further statement; in addition many nations have now bound themselves not to resort to war under such circumstances.

The main defect in all this procedure for enforcement of international law lies in the fact that there is little or no provision for enforcement by the international community. The city or the nation, not the individual, enforces the national law in our national communities. Such an arrangement is in harmony with the whole theory of law and government, although it is quite true that in the making of the law and its enforcement also conflicting interests and powers determine the actual outcome. But the nations have been so reluctant to create an international Government

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that such an arrangement does not exist in the international field. Whether it can be provided we shall inquire later. Even if international courts could be provided the establishment of an international constabulary to enforce their decrees would be a tremendously difficult undertaking and one which the nations would be sure to resist strongly. But until that is done national action for enforcement of national rights under international law alone remains.

In conclusion it must again be asserted that even without such international enforcement international law has a secure and an effective position in the world. With all its shortcomings in content, in form, and in the provisions for its application, the law is instinctively respected, constantly given attention looking toward its extension and improvement, and universally regarded as ultimately the most clearly reliable basis of international order. The very absence of any complete or effective system of international government, while it weakens the force of the law somewhat, compels reliance upon the law by contrast. There was much foolish talk in the years 1914-1918 about the bankruptcy of international law, its destruction, and so on. The years since 1918 have seen a development of the science of international law more extensive and important than any which had taken place previously. The science of international law stands higher today than ever before. We are on the verge of serious attempts at codification which are bound to give the law a status never enjoyed in international history. If the structure of international government is also on the

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verge of tremendous development we may be sure that one of its two chief tools will be this historic and dynamic body of international law.

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Chapter VII

DIPLOMACY

THE villain is well recognized as being the person who, for a great majority of observers, lends most interest to any drama, no matter how laudable the hero's purposes or how noble his achievements. Indeed, in the absence of an appointed villain it is not uncommon to find that rôle bestowed by the audience upon one player in the scene against his will and almost unawares. It is not, therefore, surprising to find that the diplomat has been commonly cast for that rôle in the tragi-comedy of international relations by its observers and critics, he being the most available individual personality in the scene.

Yet the diplomat has also been canonized and ever deified on occasion. Certainly the ambassador, the messenger from one prince to another, from one people to another, has always been regarded as surrounded by an aura of sanctity. He must be given hospitable reception, protected from all evil, allowed to pass inviolate in person and goods. His family and suite are covered by his mantle of dignity and security. This status accords strangely with the picture of the diplomat as a deep-dyed villain.

We should have been able to decide about the true character of the diplomat long before this. He has been with us

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for centuries. He is, in fact, the oldest personification of official international relations we know. He represents the oldest, the simplest, and the most persistent form of international official action we have today. In the earliest days of international relations, before international law had been developed, and even before there had developed much intercourse in trade or communications among the peoples of various countries, the diplomatic agent was employed to conclude treaties or declare war or make peace. By the times of Greek and Roman ascendancy he was a familiar figure and had come to occupy a most honorable position in public life.

Not very much change occurred in the office of the diplomat for another thousand years. All through the Middle Ages the diplomatic representative passed up and down the land, speaking in the name of Pope or Emperor or King or Prince and sometimes of the Free City. He was respected, he was protected, he was immune. He was employed by Pope and Emperor and King for the promotion of personal and royal power, but still he was not himself regarded with disfavor. Some of the most serviceable functions in the history of diplomacy were performed during this period.

The plot had, however, as we might say, begun to thicken. The fifteenth century saw the appearance of more powerful kingdoms and principalities in England, France, and Italy. The Renaissance was a period of powerful political personalities and of political activity of a most intense kind. Machiavelli taught princes who needed no teaching

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that the way to triumph over a rival prince was to seize all means of advantage promptly and securely. Diplomacy was the game for which their talents were most obviously suited. In written diplomatic communications, in personal negotiations, in the whole range of diplomatic procedure, the fine Italian hand set the pace for other princes and other nations.

Yet it was precisely in Italy in the very middle of this same fifteenth century that the most important and valuable element in modern diplomacy was introduced, namely, permanent representation. Hitherto the diplomat had been a fugitive figure, crossing and recrossing the stage but not occupying a permanent place thereon. Now it became important to a prince to be represented permanently at Florence or Venice or Paris. There was much more business to be transacted than formerly and there was a constant need for reports of happenings at the foreign capital. The first stone was laid in the structure of modern diplomatic organization.

The rest of the story may be briefly told. As time went on more and more Governments established diplomatic posts in foreign states. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the game of international politics was played with vim and vigor. Dynastic rivalries were keen. Colonial empires were being built up, many wars were being fought, travel and trade were somewhat on the increase, and in all of these activities the diplomat was called upon to play his part. Ambassadors and ministers and a host of agents carrying all sorts of flowery titles were sent out to take part

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on behalf of their royal and princely masters in this fascinating game. French supplanted Latin as the language of diplomacy and elaborate rules of precedence and ceremonial were worked out by a thousand hands. By the end of the Napoleonic period modern diplomatic representation had been established on bases wide and deep.

Today every nation of importance is represented in every important foreign capital by a diplomatic mission. At its head is a chief of mission who carries the title of Ambassador or Minister,—diplomatic ranks were simplified and standardized at Vienna in 1815,—and who has charge of the post. Beneath him are diplomatic secretaries, attachés military, naval, and commercial, and clerks in varying numbers. In each capital there is, thus, a “diplomatic corps” consisting of the heads of all foreign missions stationed therein; the corps concerns itself chiefly with the privileges and immunities of its members and the status at that capital of the individual missions. These establishments constitute a network of personal representation which binds the nations together in a fabric of instructions, communications, and reports which is constantly increasing in complexity and strength.

Of the general utility of this system of activity there can be no doubt. Any attempt to dispense with it would instantaneously reveal its serviceableness in the protests from private persons which it would arouse, to say nothing of its utility to the Governments themselves. There are, however, a number of points upon which diplomacy may be

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criticized and upon which it has been bitterly criticized in late years.

Diplomacy is still to some extent involved in eighteenth century ceremonialism. There has been a great simplification of diplomatic costume, language, and procedure in recent years, however, and it is easy to exaggerate this criticism. The highly personal character of diplomatic representation and of diplomatic methods has decreased with the advent of the impersonal republican state. This uncereemonious age now dispenses with much of the etiquette of the age of lace and perukes. And there still remains much justification for the elaborate diction of diplomatic communication in international political transactions where precision is more difficult precisely because certain matters are still left to settlement by delicate negotiation rather than by fixed law.

The extent to which the diplomat employs secrecy, intrigue, and similar unsavory methods has likewise always been exaggerated. There have been too many elements of this type in diplomatic practice in the past, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and even down to 1914. But the conduct of international relations today certainly rests upon a plane higher ethically than ever before, and this not merely because of any change of heart on the part of Governments or diplomats. The fact is that the older diplomatic methods are being put aside by the increasing resort to public discussion, scientific investigation, and all sorts of newer methods in the conduct of public affairs.



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The German Embassy in Washington, D. C. A relatively simple specimen of the sort of establishment maintained by all important powers in Washington and by the United States in foreign capitals.

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The increase of public interest in foreign relations is responsible for many changes in this direction. Once upon a time foreign affairs were the concern chiefly of the prince. Today the Government must think of the interests of traders and travelers and many other private persons or groups of persons in carrying on relations with other countries. National governmental organs are assuming and are being given by express stipulation a share in conducting these relations. Newspaper readers are watching foreign relations and writing to their public officials to express their views in these matters. It can be said without hesitation that the peoples of the nations, the people of any nation, can find out all they seriously want to know and can exert all the influence which they seriously want to exercise in the field of foreign affairs. The problem today is not to open up diplomacy and thus automatically cure it of its ills but to secure for international relations the attention which they deserve from the people who are affected thereby! Even that problem is in a fair way to solution. It is hoped that these pages may contribute something in this direction.

There are many prosaic details concerning the conduct of diplomacy which are indeed prosaic and even tedious but which must not be passed over in silence. How does the diplomat carry on his work day by day? What is his position and what are his rights in the post at which he is stationed?

We might be in a better position to understand how the diplomat carries on his work if we knew in what that work

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consisted. And yet that is just the nub of the whole problem. To say that the job of the diplomat is to "represent" his Government is to say both too much and also too little. He does not spend any very large proportion of his time in carrying on negotiations in the name of his Government although this is the most important task which he has to perform. On the other hand, he has many other things to do besides, such as running the embassy or legation—managing the personnel and equipment thereof—and extending protection to fellow-nationals in distress, not to mention making reports on all sorts of matters to his Government and fellow-nationals at the request of his Government. In the course of these protective and reportorial activities he will do what he can, of course, to promote and advance the interests of his country and its people, although this is a dangerous venture. The diplomat seeks logically and fundamentally, therefore, both to protect and possibly to promote the rights and interests of both his Government and its people.

How? By negotiation and report as already suggested. By interceding with the Government to which he is accredited in cases where violations of treaties are detected. By interceding with local Governmental officials—through the central Government of the country in which he is stationed—where injustice has been done to fellow-nationals. By more mechanical means such as maintaining the embassy or legation files and keeping a register of transient and resident fellow-nationals, a lost and found department, and a

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list of good hotels! By presenting ladies at court and inquiring concerning the local market for soda-fountain equipment!

The diplomat, as may be imagined, is often confused concerning his proper functions and the proper range of his activities. How shall he know whether to bestir himself in an effort to prevent the marriage of a local nobleman to a wealthy young lady whose irate father demands assistance, or to refuse to intervene in such a delicate matter? To what sources must he turn for light in such a predicament? The answer, while it may seem to involve an unduly swift jump from the ridiculous to the sublime, is: to international law. To the general principles and customary rules of international law on diplomacy which, as we have seen, have been growing up for centuries. To treaty agreements, if any there be, between his own country and that to which he is accredited, dealing with these matters. To the instructions, general or special, which he has received from his own Government, and to the laws and regulations of the local Government. The first should control the second, third, and fourth. The fourth, the regulations of the local Government, he must, however, obey first of all, making complaint if those laws or regulations violate international law or treaty agreement. Finally it may be added that the diplomat must be guided largely by his own good common sense, without which, under the name of tact and discretion, no diplomat can be regarded as of any earthly use.

The statement that the diplomat is required to defer to

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local laws may cause surprise. All of us have heard something about diplomatic immunities. The fact is that the diplomat is in the position of a highly privileged person who is nevertheless—or perhaps on that account—expected to behave himself rather exceptionally well. He is immune to taxation and arrest and to action by the local courts, not to mention military service or witness or jury duty. His person is inviolable and even sacred, the premises of his post and his home closed to local authorities. But he must behave himself so as to justify such a privileged position. He must not break the laws or a demand for his recall may be made upon his Government and in serious cases he may be dismissed and even expelled from the country. He must most distinctly keep out of local politics. And he must not use his embassy as a place of asylum for fugitives from justice but only to protect human life from illegal violence under extreme circumstances.

In these days of change and revolution the diplomat has, like all established institutions, been threatened with abolition. Some of his alleged vices have predisposed people to inflict upon him such treatment. It hardly seems appropriate to intrust the conduct of public business today to a highly personal representative operating more or less by old style personal methods. But more than all this, newer methods of rapid communication and more mature forms of international coöperation make the diplomat seem somewhat antiquated as a device for international action.

There seems to be much truth in these suggestions. It has

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been argued, it is true, that these very methods of rapid communication also make for more international intercourse and hence more business for the diplomat, which is, of course, accurate, as we have seen. It is also argued that no President or Minister for Foreign Affairs at home in his national capital can visualize the situation in the distant capital well enough to dispense with a personal representative on the ground and try to deal with the distant Government by telegraph or telephone. Nevertheless the effects of frequent or even continuous communications between the Governments themselves, and the effects of continuously renewed and repeated instructions to the diplomatic representative in the field are noticeable in diminishing the importance of that gentleman in the world today.

What is still more important is the effect of the development of international organization of a more mature type, such as international conferences, commissions, and courts. Why do not the States in the United States maintain diplomatic representatives in one another's capitals? Is it because, instead, the Governors and Secretaries of State of these States deal with one another directly? Obviously not; it is because the manifold matters of common concern to the States are treated in another manner, namely by Federal legislation, administration, and adjudication, in so far as they are not left to individual State action under relatively similar systems of law and without interference from the other State. The implication for the international field is obvious.

In our preoccupation with the diplomat in his white spats

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and the spotlight we have, however, overlooked one of the most faithful and useful members of the international community, if not, indeed, the most industrious and useful of all. He is the consul. He deserves also to have his story told and his horoscope cast.

It is both true and not true that the consulate is an older office than the diplomatic mission. Greek city-states, we must admit, utilized a certain type of agent for protection and promotion of persons and property in one another's territories, an agent called a proxenus, who has been compared to the modern consul. But the consul as we know him in London and Nanking and Rio today is a product of the Crusades. By that token, of course, he dates from a period long after the diplomat was utilized in all parts of the world. At the same time he antedates the modern permanent diplomatic mission. From 1150 A.D. onward, in various cities of the Mediterranean, especially in the Levant, the consul became a familiar figure. By the time of the establishment of permanent embassies the consul was well in possession of the field. Thus in the broader view the diplomatic office is the more ancient and more dignified of the two, while in the closer modern view the consulate is more stable and more secure.

The essential differences between the two offices, of course, are not merely historical differences. The essential differences are those of structure and function.

The consul, for one thing, is more numerous, so to speak, than his colleague. He is more ubiquitous. He is to be

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found, literally, all over the map. Every nation of importance maintains consular representatives in every other important country and that not merely in the capital but in every city of industrial and commercial importance. There are thus scores of consuls and dozens of consular posts to every diplomat or diplomatic post. And there are four, five, or six well recognized consular ranks—consul general, consul, vice consul, consular agent, and others—instead of the two, three, or four diplomatic ranks. Finally, while there may be forty or fifty or more persons in the staff of an embassy of a Great Power in the capital of another Great Power there may at the same time be forty or fifty persons in the consulates general of the former in as many as a half dozen cities in the latter. All of this necessitating a much more complicated organization of the service, the diplomatic branch appears at times to be rather elementary and fragmentary beside the consular.

The same sort of ambiguous relationship appears when we compare the two services in point of function. The consul deals chiefly with commercial matters in contrast to the political questions with which the diplomat is concerned. Frequently the consul serves merely a private individual—a traveler or a trader or a ship-owner—while the diplomat acts in the name of his state and Government. But that is not the whole story. Commercial matters are coming to be,—have long been,—matters of state. The consul is charged with watching over the way in which or the extent to which treaties between his Government and that of the

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country in which he is stationed are observed by officials of the latter and with interceding with them to obtain observance of these agreements if need be. He is charged with seeing that quarantine regulations, navigation laws, customs requirements, immigration restrictions, and other laws of his own country are observed by persons and ships leaving the port at which he is stationed for ports in his home state. He acts as judge in disputes between seamen on ships of his nation. In short he performs many functions which are, in point of fact, just about as vital to his home state as any performed by the diplomat.

Again it may be said, therefore, that the job of the consul, like that of the diplomat, is to protect and as far as possible promote, the rights and interests of his home state and its people. The main difference lies in the fact that the diplomat has the power to speak to the central Government of the state to which he is "accredited" in the name of his home Government—he has the "representative capacity," as we say,—while the consul has not. The consul deals with local officials—municipal or provincial—and much of his work is semi-diplomatic in character; in all his work he is acting directly or indirectly on behalf of his home state, even where the immediate object is protection of an individual fellow-national; but he does not deal with the other state as a unit.

For the rest the activities of the two services resemble each other closely. Both diplomatic representatives and consuls report on conditions in the country in which they are

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stationed, the latter dwelling only somewhat more fully on economic conditions. Both engage in protection work, the consul being somewhat better situated for rendering such services because he is stationed out in the provinces where more protection cases are likely to arise. With the changes that are coming over international relations in general—greater national interest in international intercourse, closer regulation of such relations by treaty agreement—the activities of the two tend to become almost identical.

On the other hand, the consul does not enjoy that position of sanctity or at least immunity which is accorded to the diplomat. He was originally invested with some such dignity but that was when he also exercised certain diplomatic functions. With the growth of modern diplomatic services, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the consul descended in scale until it came to be doubted whether he could be regarded as a public official at all! He has recovered from that low position today but he still enjoys few or almost none of the immunities of the diplomat. He is free from any obligations which would not fall upon any alien resident, and he is free from interference in the conduct of his business, just as the consular premises and equipment are free from interference, but that is about all.

All of these matters are regulated, in the case of the consul, by international agreements called consular conventions. The general rules of international law being less useful here it is necessary to regulate matters by treaty. There are scores of such conventions in existence today and only

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the conclusion of a general convention signed by many nations, fixing consular powers, privileges, and immunities, a step desirable in many ways, could render them superfluous.

It may well be asked whether an amalgamation of consular and diplomatic services is not indicated by the circumstances recited above. In many ways the consul appears to act as a provincial agent of the diplomat in the capital. By the regulations of many consular services the diplomat is given definite power of supervision over the consul. In view of such facts and of the way in which diplomatic and consular functions are becoming more and more similar, why not transform the consul into a subordinate agent of the diplomat?

This is bound to draw howls of rage from the consuls, of course. Many of the consuls are men of ability superior to that of most diplomats. Most of them have had better training. Almost all of them work harder. All of them pay less attention to form and style and ceremony and more attention to the substance of things. If diplomats are appointed for personal and political reasons—although this is less and less frequent—consuls usually are not, in these days. Diplomats in the eyes of many consuls are idle, useless, even silly people. Subordinated to them? Never!

We may leave that question for settlement in the future. If there is to be any unification of the services, however, we may be sure that it will come by subordinating consuls to diplomats. The improvement of the caliber of the diplo-

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matic services, now going forward, must be remembered in considering what may happen. The possibility of transferring better men from the consular to the diplomatic side may also be borne in mind. Time and the changes it brings may smooth the way for a logical simplification of structure here.

At the present moment a more acute problem is facing the consul. As international trade becomes more active he is asked to bestir himself and help in the development of such activity. He is asked for reports of all sorts and even introductions to local business men and contracts for home merchants. And the results are bad, quantitatively and qualitatively. The consul, burdened with this trade promotion work, hardly has time for his protection work and the functions which he must perform in the name of his Government in connection with execution of treaties and its commercial and other legislation. Forced to play the part of commercial salesman or drummer for home industries he cannot enjoy the confidence of local officials as he should in order to perform his more official functions.

The remedy would seem to lie in the development of commercial foreign services by national governments distinct from the consular services—if foreign commerce promotion they must have. This is already being done to some extent under national departments of commerce. There are already commercial attachés in the diplomatic posts. Although, paradoxical enough, the consuls may be loath to surrender their commercial work—which gains them popu-

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larity and support back home—to any one else, this may be the best possible solution of the whole difficulty.

The future of the consular service is therefore largely a problem in the relations between that service and the diplomatic service. In part, however, it is a problem such as arises also in connection with the diplomatic service, a problem, namely, of the growth of international administration and organization on a larger or higher plane. If such matters of emigration and immigration, of export and import regulations, of navigation, of health, of taxation, are to be settled by international agreement, as is increasingly being done, the consul will not have so many purely national laws to enforce. If, in addition, international bureaus and commissions are created to apply such agreements the consul may have nothing to do at all! The same menace which confronts the diplomat confronts the consul, the menace, namely, of seeing the world of nations outgrow the capacities of a system of personal representation. Those individual agents, appointed by national governments, were all right, and are all right, so long as the regulation of international relations be left to national action and international negotiation. When regulation of these matters is taken over by international legislation and administration the place of individual personal diplomacy in the world will be gone.

That time has not yet come. It may never come. Meanwhile the problems of organizing and conducting the activities of the diplomatic and consular services remain. In a day when we hear much of Leagues of Nations and renun-

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ciation of war it seems deplorable that the simplest forms of international organization are as seriously neglected as they are. We hear much concerning popular control of diplomacy. The evidence indicates that the populace doesn't care a whoop about controlling its diplomacy. When trouble comes the diplomat is blamed. In normal times he gets no support. The public attitude toward the diplomat and the consul is nothing less than stupid. It is worse still when we come to treaties and international agreement of all kinds.

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Chapter VIII

TREATIES

NEXT to the diplomat himself the international agreement or treaty probably takes rank as the most romantic feature of official international relations. We are inclined, when that term is mentioned, to conjure up visions of a time-yellowed parchment to which are appended huge irregular chunks of red sealing-wax and binding ribbons of faded blue. Most treaties today are typed upon foolscap by a gum-chewing stenographer, but the picture still holds. And what is more to the point, the treaty is even more important than it is romantic. It deserves attention on both grounds.

Treaties began, of course, as the bargains of princes and kings. They date back into the mists of dim antiquity. We have texts of treaties—bricks with scratches all over them—from Biblical times and from Greek and Roman periods in abundance. At this time the treaty was a personal contract between personal sovereigns. It concerned personal affairs. It was an act in which only the signatory sovereigns participated and about which most of the people knew next to nothing, even when their rights and interests were seriously involved; they were abject minions of the prince, why should he not sign them into alien rule or slavery at his will?

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Later, when cabinets and ministers began to replace personal sovereigns treaties began to be signed not by princes but by prime ministers or foreign ministers and this has gone on to the present time. Today treaties are seldom signed by reigning sovereigns, largely because there are few reigning sovereigns left, and mainly because even these few must allow their ministers to act for them in such matters of state. Treaty-making is no longer a sport for kings.

A treaty is a written agreement between two or more nations. An "unwritten treaty" is almost a contradiction in terms; unwritten international agreements there certainly are, but the very essence of a treaty or at least its most distinguishing secondary characteristic is found in the fact that it is a written agreement. The treaty proper is anticipated by various types of memoranda in which oral agreements are recorded without being formally stated and signed, but the treaty itself is something more than such minutes or records of agreement.

The "nations" between or among which treaties are signed vary considerably from the common or garden variety. Many such agreements, for example, have been signed with native tribes or Indian nations in the Americas, in Africa, and in Asia, on the part of European powers and the United States. In such cases the European power has acted politely and solemnly and has pretended that the "treaty" was as much a treaty as though it had been concluded with a powerful rival. The chief of the native tribe, however, hardly looked the part of the "consignatory state."

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He usually signed by making a cross where he would have written his name if he had known how to write. He had been flattered and impressed by the dignified atmosphere of the occasion or satisfied by the more or less personal inducements held out to him. But such "treaties"—though there have been several hundreds of them signed first and last—are clearly rather peculiar and somewhat disingenuous.

The agreements signed with the Papacy by Roman Catholic nations constitute another peculiar variety of treaty. They are cast in treaty form and have been regarded as treaties by Governments and by the courts in many countries—including the United States—. They are not, however, exactly identical with treaties upon secular matters such as boundaries and patents. They tend to decrease in numbers as time goes on.

Many other cases might be mentioned of treaties signed with peculiar parties. Treaties with piratical communities are not unknown, treaties with now dead nations, treaties with still unborn nations or colonies as we call them. But these curiosities are of little importance except in the case last named. The increasing practice of allowing colonies to sign international agreements foreshadows national independence for those colonies or at least decentralization in the conduct of foreign affairs. French and Italian and other colonies are allowed to take such action in a limited class of cases. The British Dominions have been given the treaty-making power in full. And some years ago a committee of hard-headed lawyers in this country suggested that impor-

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tant commercial states in the Union be allowed to sign commercial treaties in their own names. Such developments are very suggestive.

Frequently it is the prime minister or the foreign minister who signs on behalf of a nation, as already noted. But occasionally a head of state, a King or President, will still perform that function. More frequently still the diplomatic agent of a state in foreign parts will act in this connection, perhaps in combination with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the state in which he is stationed. Special agents may be sent out to negotiate a treaty. Consuls or anybody else might be used, for that matter. And when it comes to signing postal agreements or other agreements in which colonies are concerned administrative officials of all sorts—colonial ministers or postmasters general—may sign. Any agent given authority to sign in the name of a state may, indeed, so act.

Boundaries and patents have been mentioned. Shipping and church worship might as well have been cited, or education, or landscape architecture or quinine. The fact is that in subject matter treaties today not only run the whole gamut of human emotions but they satisfy the whole range of the human imagination as well. They began as agreements dealing with highly personal or highly political matters—marriages between members of royal houses, or alliances. There followed treaties of peace, boundary treaties, treaties regarding nationality, navigation, the conduct of diplomacy, and a variety of subjects. They have now

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developed into arrangements concerning governmental, legal, commercial, and every other sort of interest. Treaties dealing with legal and economic and social problems have increased greatly in recent years. Treaties dealing with international coöperative organization and procedure have made their first appearance and grown in numbers. And the older treaties of marriage and alliance have almost disappeared. He who will may see the significance of such a change.

The conclusion of a treaty is a rather complicated proceeding. First one nation asks another whether it is "willing to enter into negotiations looking to the conclusion of" a treaty—one of those diplomatic formulas which mean just what they say but which seem to irritate the laity so greatly. Perhaps it has been driven to take this step by private interests. An old treaty may be about to expire. A treaty already in force may seem to need revision—treaties, like other laws and the pavements on city streets, seem constantly in need of repair. There may not yet have been concluded any agreement at all between these two nations upon this subject. At all events the inquiry is made and nothing is done until an answer has been received.

If a favorable response is received the negotiations begin—in the capital of one of the powers or in both simultaneously, in a neutral center, or by written communications. Proposals, consisting of desires and offerings, are made and met by counterproposals. Divergences of view and policy and demand are ironed out and agreement reached after days, weeks, months, or even years of negotiation. This

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business of finding positions of agreement between nations desirous of settling matters by treaty is one of the central functions in the art of conducting international relations.

The agreement must now be drafted in full and final form. Many of the critical phrases will have been hammered out in the course of negotiation; "finding" the happy "formula" to express the agreement of the parties is one of the chief tasks in this stage of the work. But the various items will now have to be ordered into some sort of system, numbered and paragraphed, inconsistencies will have to be ironed out, and the whole given logical form. Articles concerning purposes and personnel must be prefixed to the treaty and articles concerning signature and ratification added to the end and the whole document made ready for signing.

The signing of the treaty is a more or less dramatic moment. Cameras click and the gold pen is presented to somebody. In these days of ratification and refusals of ratification mere signature, however, doesn't always mean a great deal. The world saw the millennium arrive when a certain treaty was signed in October of 1924—and it saw the millennial treaty thrown on the scrap-heap three months later. Nevertheless the act holds much of its former significance and we may get back to the position where we allow signature to have its old importance again. At times a treaty is merely initialed after drafting to permit more formal ceremonious signature later.

The agents sign the document in their capacity as agents

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of the various governments and affix their own seals thereto. The seals are added now out of considerations of style and ceremony; originally they were intended to identify the signers but handwriting has improved in recent centuries and they are not needed for that purpose now. At all events they are not national seals and the agreement is not yet an international agreement. It is signed and sealed but not delivered.

And now the document—one of the duplicate original copies in the case of a bilateral treaty—is handed over to each signatory Government for ratification according to the rules governing that act in the national law and Constitution. This act of ratification must be performed by the head of the state—King or President—and consists in confirming the identity and the authority of the signatures of his agents. But he may be required under the national Constitution to consult some representative assembly before proceeding to that final step which makes the treaty binding upon the state. In no case does such an assembly itself ratify the treaty and this is important beyond the mere question of phraseology, for the chief executive may refrain from ratifying even after the representative assembly has given him power to do so.

Needless to say, representative bodies empowered to participate in the conclusion of treaties make the most of their opportunities. They take their time about it. They debate the matter at length. They refuse their consent. Or they impose conditions or reservations upon their consent. In actual fact they seldom do any of these more extravagant

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things, but they may do any or all of them and they may do them at any time, in relatively unimportant or in vitally important cases, and that for political or personal reasons as well as for substantial reasons of state. What is to be said of all this?

No one would object, probably, if a representative assembly should refuse consent to ratification of a treaty on serious grounds after due consideration. One would then wish that the Executive had taken account of the views of that body in the process of negotiation. But when a representative assembly delays its action needlessly or acts out of personal hostility to a chief executive or for partisan political reasons the situation is different. The only thing one can wish in such a case is that the people would let their representatives hear from them. Alas, they are too frequently unaware or unmindful of what has happened.

It is not, perhaps, out of place to suggest that the time has come for the adoption of a new rule to deal with sheer delay in this connection. Would it not be valuable to agree in treaties henceforth that the agreement should be regarded as ratified and binding at a date six months from date of signature unless expressly repudiated by one of the signatories before that time? That might require a change in the governmental arrangements in individual countries but no such case is known today and this objection is certainly not insuperable. It might lead to greater hesitation in signing, or to the signing of fewer treaties, or even to the express repudiation of some. If it helped to focus attention upon the

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sort of treaty which was being concluded, and upon the whole business of treaty-making this would be a great gain. The result could not be to coerce any nation into acceptance of a treaty against its will, for duly accredited agents of the nation would have already signed the document. It would merely prevent undue delay and neglect of treaties which have been not only drafted often after months of difficult negotiations but signed in the names of the respective states.

If or when a representative assembly adopts a reservation in approving a treaty there is more trouble on hand. The other nation has, perhaps, heard of the affair through the newspapers, but must now be officially apprized of what has happened and invited to acquiesce. That is, the chief executive of the first state must say to the officials of the second: I am authorized to ratify our agreement if you will agree to certain changes or additions in the document. Ordinarily no textual changes are made but additional articles or stipulations are inserted in the act of ratification which take care of the situation. The chief executive may, of course, feel that the assembly has over-stepped its part in the whole transaction and refuse to go further. But if he seeks and obtains the consent of the second state to the reservations he may proceed. No chief executive would, of course, attempt to proceed in absence of such discussion and consent and if he did the second party to the projected agreement would certainly decline to go further.

Reference has been made to agreements less formal than treaties. Chief executives or their ministers may in certain

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situations resort to diplomatic understandings or executive agreements which are left in sub-treaty form, so to speak. In such matters as would cause trouble if submitted to representative bodies this device may be regarded as useful by hasty Kings or Presidents. The device has its deficiencies—the defects of its good qualities. The people and the members of the popular assembly are likely to rebel. And the other nation is likely to hesitate to undertake such an evasion. Even where the sub-treaty form of agreement is adopted without any thought of evading constitutional requirements for approval by the representative body the second state is likely to hesitate to place its reliance upon a mere diplomatic settlement in a matter of real importance.

In short the treaty is justified of its existence. It makes matters more definite and provides for the future. It deals with many cases, potentially, in general terms. It both strengthens the diplomat in the conduct of his future work and removes from his burden many questions which in absence of treaty agreements he would have to thresh out by themselves as they arose,—even if it also at times hinders his freedom of negotiation. It is the finest product of diplomacy and the most definitive. It leads on to other things very much more important than the diplomacy from which it springs while it still remains the central device in organized international action.

There has been much talk of late years of the sanctity of treaty obligations. It has been suggested that nations are not at all times as loyal to their treaty obligations as could

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be expected. This is primarily a problem in international law but it has certain interesting and dangerous implications in connection with treaties themselves.

Contrary to the innuendos of the cynics the nations are not commonly false to their plighted word. In the vast majority of cases nothing like deliberate or brazen repudiation of treaty obligations occurs. The nation which took such an attitude would lose too much both in the instant case and in its inability to secure such agreements in the future. Nations need treaty arrangements with their fellow nations too badly to risk such a result.

Moreover, there is not any serious amount of the milder sort of evasion of treaty obligations which might easily be understood and even expected in view of all circumstances. Circumstances of international life change so rapidly and the difficulty of stating obligations clearly in treaties is so great that a considerable amount of misunderstanding and alleged evasion of obligations might easily arise. It does not arise. In the main treaties are carried out faithfully and satisfactorily.

It is when the treaty is spoken of as a contract that this line of discussion becomes most misleading. Treaties in earlier days did indeed closely resemble contracts. The phrase "the contracting parties" is still employed in the phrasing of treaties. But the analogy is a very loose one. The essence of a treaty like the essence of a contract does lie in the meeting of the minds, the mutual consent of the parties. But there the analogy ends. Treaties are no longer

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narrow bargains in which one concession is exchanged against the consideration of another. They have become far more general in character and the logic of the contract has little application to the treaty of today. A typical modern commercial treaty, for example, consists of a complicated system of arrangements between the parties mutually acceptable to both but in which it is not clear just what one party conceded or what it obtained in exchange.

In short treaties have come to resemble statutes or laws passed to regulate a given situation without clear reference to the gains and losses of all concerned. They are made by nations to regulate the activities of individuals or groups or individuals very often and not as exchanges of rights among the Governments themselves. With the appearance and multiplication of treaties signed by three, four, and even many nations the contractual character of the document disappears still further. Beginning as contracts the treaty has risen to the level of a law or a statute of much more general character.

Finally the treaty has risen still higher and taken on the character of a Constitution. Treaties are concluded for the establishment of international governmental institutions such as international courts, commissions, conferences, and even confederations. The Covenant of the League of Nations, a World Constitution, is only one such document; there are many others. When this stage is reached the contractual element disappears almost entirely.

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There persists and there increases at this point, however, another difficulty which needs to be remembered constantly. Words seem at times chiefly to hide thought instead of conveying it. Interpretation of the language of the treaty becomes a serious task. Interpretation of contracts is an old problem. Interpretation of constitutional documents is a familiar task in modern government. Interpretation of treaties is just as important. Rules to be followed in such interpretation have been developed by the international law jurists but if we were to attempt to go into the matter here we should probably be confused rather than enlightened. Suffice it for our purpose to notice the existence of the problem.

Reference to statutes and constitutions serves to raise another feature of the situation as concerns treaties. The nations are understood to be subject to the limitations of international law in concluding treaties. They may by treaty concede to one another rights which are not granted by general international law. But they may not thereby impair the law for other nations and they may not set up arrangements forbidden by the general law. No nations could legalize piracy by treaty. If they made such an agreement an international court would be justified in disregarding the agreement in appropriate circumstances and probably the parties themselves could be said to be free from any binding legal obligation. They might continue to act in accord with the agreement but this would be voluntary extra-legal action. There are other legal problems involved

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in this situation but enough has been said to indicate how the land lies.

If any nations bind themselves by treaty to abstain from making other agreements of any kind in the future they must be regarded as surrendering that power likewise. If Cuba agrees not to cede territory to foreign powers she surrenders part of her treaty-making power. All Members of the League of Nations agree to abstain from making treaties inconsistent therewith. This is an important but by no means a solitary illustration of what we have in mind. In absence of such a pledge a treaty may be made at any time which repeals a former treaty, but an express surrender of part of the treaty-making power would prevent this from being done readily.

The effect of treaties on non-signatory states is very slight. They are not, of course, bound thereby directly. France and Germany could not by treaty impose obligations upon the United States. But the third state may be obliged to take notice of the acts of the signatories as between themselves. We did not ratify the Treaty of Versailles but we must recognize the transfer of Alsace-Lorraine from Germany to France thereunder. By what is called accession we might accept the obligations of a treaty originally signed between other states—many non-signatory states have acceded to the recent treaty for renunciation of war—but this must be wholly voluntary and based on national interest in taking such action.

The results of treaty-making by modern nations in re-

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cent years are seen in the thousands of treaties now in force between and among the seventy nations of the world. These agreements are held in the archives of the national Governments but transcripts thereof are published in many forms. Most of the nations publish their own treaties in official documents. Many private collections of such agreements are made and published in all languages. Indexes and finding lists are published whereby the student may locate a treaty on a given subject signed at a given place on a given date between any two or more countries. The League of Nations publishes what is becoming the most important collection of treaties in the world, namely the *Treaty Series of the League of Nations*. Here thousands of treaties among all sorts of nations are published in the original languages and in French and English translations for the use of Governments and students alike.

The negotiation of treaties calls for far more thought and study than has been given to it hitherto. It has grown by leaps and bounds in recent years; the rate at which treaties are being concluded today exceeds the rate of treaty-making at any other period in world history. The nations are bound together in a network of agreements which grows more complex and more substantial monthly. But therein lies a certain danger. All this activity is induced by the fact that the community of nations lacks a lawmaking body. Many treaties are mere duplicates of one another. One nation may be compelled to make many treaties by reason of the lack of facilities for concluding or enacting one gen-

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eral arrangement for many nations. In many matters a general treaty or convention would have very marked advantages over the many single agreements. A certain drift in the direction of such general conventions has been noticed. But the establishment of an international legislature seems a radical proposal. We shall have to wait until we study the international conference before saying the final word on this matter.

At this point we reach the end of international action by the efforts of single nations each acting for itself. In the last instances this action created a single product, the international treaty text. We come now to international action by bodies which in themselves are co-national, so to speak. Before studying such bodies we shall examine the activities of the United States in diplomacy and treaty-making.

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Chapter IX

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

THE legendary "Pig-Iron Kelly" cried out in Congress: "What have we to do with 'abroad'?" Today not many of our people would go quite as far as that in implications of isolation but there linger traces of the same mental attitude in many quarters. It might be well, therefore, before going any further with our survey of general international relations to find out where this country of our own has stood, how it has organized its share in the practice of diplomacy, and what are its aims in international relations.

The Department of State is, of course, under the President, the headquarters for the conduct of American diplomacy. The Department was created by Congress in 1789 and has been reorganized and enlarged by the same authority on several occasions since that time. The Foreign Service is technically a part of the Department of State although it may better be considered separately.

The Department of State is headed by the Secretary of State who is appointed by the President, with the approval of the Senate. The post is regarded as the post of honor in the Cabinet and commonly goes to an important leader in the political party of the President rather than to a profes-



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The Pan-American Building in Washington, D. C. The interior is finished as a tropical patio and is hung with the emblems of the American nations.



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The State, War, and Navy Building in Washington. From the office of the Secretary of State, on the second floor of this building, the diplomacy of the United States is conducted.

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sional diplomat. Many of our most distinguished public men have held the post—Jefferson, Webster, Root—and a number of Secretaries of State have later become President. In general strong Presidents prefer weak Secretaries and weak Presidents strong Secretaries, but of this more later.

Beneath the Secretary come an Under-Secretary, four Assistant Secretaries, a Solicitor, a Chief Clerk, and a large number of Chiefs of Bureau, heads of Divisions, staff personnel, and clerical employees. The Under-Secretary is intended to be a non-political appointee of the President, conducting the Department under the Secretary and carrying over from one Presidential administration to another. The Assistant Secretaries have charge of certain major branches of work in the Department. Thus one has charge of commercial matters, one of political and administrative work, one of ceremonial matters, and one of foreign service. The Solicitor is the legal adviser of the Department. He is assisted by a number of persons trained in the law, and must be prepared to advise on any problem of international law, American law, or, indeed, the legal system of any country in the world. The Chief Clerk has charge of the mechanical services in the Department, including personnel in purely formal matters. The Bureaus and Divisions and Offices deal with problems of policy in economic matters, treaty-drafting, issuance of passports, endorsement (visa) of passports issued by foreign Governments to persons coming to this country (including immigration control), foreign service administration, budget, and so on. A number

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of boards supervise admission to the Foreign Service, efficiency and promotion within the Service, training for the Service (after the candidate has been accepted), and retirement.

The structure of the Department changes almost constantly, partly in response to orders issued and rearrangements made by the Secretary, partly in response to Congressional statute. The Rogers Act of 1924 was very important in its reorganization of the Department. Over and above all of these controls hovers the influence of circumstances in the world and in our foreign relations. If more passports have to be issued the Bureau of Passports will expand and this almost whether Congress provides for it or not. Any important movement in American foreign relations will be reflected in the structure of the Department of State, which must be studied as it stands at any given moment if an accurate picture thereof is desired.

The relations between the Department and other organs of the Government are important and very interesting. Congress creates and maintains the Department and may reorganize or abolish it at will in point of law,—the Constitution doesn't even mention the matter. The President appoints the Secretary and the subordinate personnel and may instruct all these persons as to their duties at any time. Further than this, the Congress and the other Departments, in spite of the historic prestige of the Department, rather look down upon it as a half-foreign branch of the Government. The Department is habitually starved for appropria-

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tions. It collects some eight millions of dollars a year in fees and other revenues and as a result its net cost is about two millions per year, whereas many many times that sum is spent on Army and Navy and other Departments.

From the Department of State the members of the Foreign Service go out to their posts. They are controlled from the Department, to it they report, and finally by it they are retired.

Appointment to the Foreign Service of the United States is made by the President. At the top are some fifteen Ambassadors and some thirty-five Ministers who act as the diplomatic representatives of the United States in foreign capitals. To the more important posts are appointed men who are in sympathy with the political views of the President, but a number of Ministers are now being selected from persons who are at the time holding offices lower down in the Service. It is to be hoped that this practice will be continued and expanded.

Below the heads of diplomatic posts fall two main branches of the Service, the Diplomatic and the Consular. Within the former are included Counsellors, Diplomatic Secretaries, and Attachés—Military, Naval, and Commercial. Within the latter are Consuls General, Consuls, and Vice Consuls. All of these are also appointed by the President directly or by the Secretary of State under him but they are all selected from persons who have passed examinations for admission to the Foreign Service except the Attachés, who are selected by the War, Navy, and Commerce

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Departments and then appointed by the President and accredited by the Department of State. Women may be, and are, appointed to the Service as well as men, but in very small numbers. Finally there are large numbers of clerks in both branches of the Service, also appointed after examination.

A typical diplomatic post of the United States will include one Ambassador or Minister, perhaps a Counsellor, one or more Diplomatic Secretaries, one or more Attachés, and any requisite number of clerks. The diplomatic posts vary from posts such as those at London and Paris, which include upwards of a hundred people, to posts at capitals in small countries where only a half-dozen persons are to be found.

A consular post may contain a Consul General, one or more Consuls, one or more Vice Consuls, and any number of clerks. Consulates vary from the larger posts (consulates general) in capital cities or great commercial centers such as Liverpool or Hamburg, with a Consul General, two or three Consuls, a half-dozen Vice Consuls, and thirty or forty clerks, to small consulates with only a Consul, a Vice Consul, and one or two clerks, or even smaller posts (vice-consulates).

The activities of American diplomatic and consular representatives are those of diplomats and consuls in general, as already described. Upon these persons depend in large measure the national interests of the United States in our relations with other countries, and the safety and happiness of

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thousands of Americans travelling or resident abroad. Out of sight and out of the range of attention of most of us here at home these public servants labor ceaselessly for our national and at times our individual welfare. The Foreign Service of the United States was formerly an object of ridicule on the part of many foreign Governments and critics among our own people and not unjustly so. Today the Foreign Service of the United States compares favorably with that of any other country; indeed it is the object of respectful attention and study by foreign Governments. Particularly since the World War has the Service been improved until today only the still somewhat inadequate salaries and expense allowances cripple the Service and prevent it from being a thoroughly admirable arm of the Government.

The conduct of American foreign relations lies largely in the hands of the members of the Foreign Service. It will be possible, however, to study the ultimate control of American diplomacy best if we examine the procedure for negotiation of treaties on behalf of the United States.

The President may negotiate and sign treaties in the name of the United States. He seldom does this himself. He instructs the Secretary of State to do this at times, but again rarely. More frequently treaties are negotiated and signed for us by our diplomatic agents or special commissioners appointed for the task.

When the treaty is signed it comes back to the President. He sends it to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification by him. The Senate does not itself ratify the treaty.

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It may advise and consent to such action by the President, with or without conditions or reservations. It may refuse to consent. The treaty then goes back to the President for such action as he may care to take. If he decides to ratify it he will do so in a distinct document signed by himself and the Secretary of State. If the other country ratifies he will exchange with an agent of the foreign Government a memorandum of the ratifications and then proclaim the treaty as being in force for the United States.

This precise procedure is not prescribed by the Constitution which says merely that the President may conclude treaties by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. It has not, however, been found generally advisable to consult the entire Senate formally in the earlier stages of treaty-making, although frequently informal consultation between the President and leaders in the Senate, such as the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations in that body, has been found useful in avoiding opposition at a later stage.

In point of fact the Senate has not taken an attitude of opposition in many cases of treaty negotiation. The United States, in one hundred and fifty years of treaty-making, has concluded over seven hundred and fifty treaties apart from treaties with the Indian tribes. In only about seventy-five cases has opposition developed in the Senate. It is true that this tendency has been on the increase of late years, but we can only repeat what was said earlier, namely, that if the people of the nation will not watch the course of events and compel their representatives in the approving body to take

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a sound attitude in such matters they cannot complain over much of the result. Where Senate opposition is an accurate expression of public opinion in the country the criticism falls upon the President for signing the treaty in the first place.

In sum, the President, by the Constitution and by practice, has control of the initiative in all important phases of the conduct of American diplomacy. In appointments, in issuing instructions, in receiving foreign diplomats and thereby granting recognition to foreign nations and Governments, in signing treaties, and lastly in recommending a declaration of war, he is the leader. The stronger the President the more vigorous is likely to be his exercise of this function, as in the case of Roosevelt and Wilson. The weaker President is likely to leave matters to a strong Secretary of State, as President Harding left matters largely to Secretary Hughes. But the Secretary has only such power as the President is willing to leave to him to exercise.

The primary check or control, the Constitutional and legislative control, of the President lies in the hands of Congress and particularly the Senate. Approval of appointments and treaties by the Senate is an absolute check upon him. So is the refusal to pass a declaration of war or legislation appropriating funds for maintaining the diplomatic service or executing treaties, a power shared with the Senate by the House of Representatives. In all vital matters the President is thus effectively held in potential check by representatives of the people.

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Finally, the political check or control is held by the people themselves or their representatives in Congress. Both the Senate and the House may ask questions of the President and his Secretary of State concerning national foreign affairs and adopt resolutions urging him to do this thing or that thing in relation to another country. But these questions and requests can hardly be enforced if the President determines to disregard them. They have only a political value, that is, a value depending upon the extent to which they express public opinion and the extent to which they are therefore likely to be supported by the people. The final means for controlling the President through Congressional resolutions, for controlling the members of Congress in their attitude toward the President, and for controlling the President directly, are found in the various forms of expressing public opinion in individual or group action on the platform, in the press, or at the ballot box. Writing or telegraphing the President or members of the Senate is not without its effect. Talking to one's friends and thus helping to form public opinion is not without its effect. Studying the course of American foreign relations and thus preparing oneself for such activities might also be suggested—. Again let it be repeated: the people of the United States could control absolutely the conduct of their foreign affairs at any moment if they seriously cared to do so.

It may be added, before passing on, that what has just been said applies also to the participation of the United States in all the more elaborate forms of international co-

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operation which follow upon diplomacy and treaty negotiation, namely, international arbitration, international administration, conference, and international federation. Most of these activities are initiated at least by diplomacy and treaty-making. American representatives on international courts, commissions, and conferences are appointed by the President. Appropriations for the American contributions to the expenses of such organizations are made annually by Congress. The activities of Americans on such bodies are controlled by Presidential instructions. Again the people of the country can control what is done in these matters if they so desire. If the Government does not coöperate with other nations as fully as people desire they should bestir themselves to secure a change in the attitude of the Government. If they leave matters to the President and Secretary of State and to Congress these officials will, as in all the conduct of American foreign relations, act as seems wise to them, subject always to the efforts of interested individuals and groups—oil interests and also missionaries, commercial houses and also scientific or educational groups—to influence the conduct of American diplomacy in their own favor. It would be a salutary thing for all of us to assist the President and Senate in remaining true to the cause of the national welfare in this wide field of action.

American foreign policy must be studied in the light of the conditions influencing the formation of national foreign policies in general. Our own foreign policy program is distinctive and in many ways superior to the foreign pol-

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icy programs of other nations, but in its formation and application it resembles foreign policy programs the world over.

Thus the items in our foreign policy program did not come down from heaven or emerge from the thin air nor did they come out of political party platforms or the inspired thought of some great statesman. Politicians and statesmen, such as we have produced, have had a share in molding American foreign policy; the Republican foreign policy program in the past generation contains more elements of both aggressiveness and also of constructive international coöperation, the Democratic more ideas of isolation and also of peace by individual national good behavior, but in the main the items of that program derive from the circumstances of American national life, our geographic situation, our economic and social conditions rather than from purely partisan considerations.

In the second place our distinctive policies are only those which rise above the tenets of international practice common to all nations. Maintenance of adequate military and naval forces, defense of our territory against invasion, defense of our nationals and their property abroad, in China or Mexico or elsewhere, securing compliance with treaty agreements and respect for our laws by aliens in proper circumstances,—these are negative aims or aims which are common to all nations and which contain no affirmative or creative qualities.

The distinctive American policies may be divided into

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three groups. There are policies for removal of obstacles to world intercourse. There are policies for removal of obstacles to cordial international political relations. There are policies of international coöperation. The logical arrangement of these groups will be apparent at once; we desire to remove obstacles to world intercourse and to the cordial international political relations which should flow therefrom and then pass on to encourage the development of constructive international governmental coöperation. There is no group of policies for promotion of world intercourse because it is assumed that if the obstacles to this activity are removed those who stand to benefit by it may be relied upon to push it on their own account.

Among the policies for removing the obstacles to world intercourse are to be included our older policies for the opening of international rivers to free navigation, our efforts at suppression of piracy, and our opposition to discriminatory port and harbor dues and discriminations against alien merchants. The open door policy, or the demand for equal opportunity for trade in China, Morocco, and other colonial territories is aimed at the same result. So finally are the policies of securing equal distribution of facilities for international electrical communication; the narrowing down of the scope of, and of restrictive regulations imposed in, territorial waters, including gulfs and straits; and the restriction of belligerent power over neutral commerce in time of war. All of these policies look to freer and fuller private intercourse in all its established forms.

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In the second group are to be found policies for the simplification of diplomatic procedure—costume, ceremonial, language, and law; for the alleviation of feelings of national hatred and the development of international good-will; and for the maintenance of peace by voluntary national action—or inaction. Armaments should be kept at the minimum necessary for national defense; war should be avoided wherever possible, and conquest and reconquest of territory among nations should be abandoned as a form of national action. The position of this item—the maintenance of peace—in this group is significant. The American thought has been that each nation should preserve peace on its own account and thus contribute to the maintenance of general peace. As we shall see, an entirely different version of the policy of preserving peace is possible also.

In this second group likewise may be placed the policies of neutrality and no alliances and perhaps the Monroe Doctrine. The last is chiefly a policy for defense of our territory, along with those mentioned earlier; by it we declare that we will oppose interference by any non-American power in the territorial possessions or political life of any American nation. But it is also intended to eliminate causes of friction with other nations and the policy of neutrality is intended to keep us out of European or Asiatic wars and preserve friendly relations with both sides, while our policy of no alliances is intended to keep us out of European or Asiatic diplomatic alignments and preserve friendly relations with

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all nations. These three items may be regarded as forming the heart of the American foreign policy program.

At the same time we should guard against the exaggeration or misinterpretation of these policies. The United States has no policy of isolation as is sometimes represented. Washington and Jefferson and Monroe were too sound in their judgment of political values to take any such position. Indeed, what they aimed at in their policies was exactly the opposite of isolation, namely, a maximum of international contacts for this nation. And no President or Secretary of State and no Senate resolution has ever proclaimed any policy of isolation since that time. The legend of isolation is a gross caricature of the statesmanlike ideas of the founders. We believe in remaining out of European or Asiatic situations which do not concern us but not out of those which do—and the latter tend always to become more numerous. We desire a maximum of friendly and beneficial contacts with other countries, particularly in the world of trade and communication.

In the fourth group of American policies fall our policies for development, codification, and utilization of international law, the settlement of international disputes by arbitration, and the preservation of peace by such constructive and coöperative methods. Here also are policies for participation in international administrative activities, in international conferences, and in international federation. For decades we have fostered the development of the Pan-American Union and participated in other international

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unions devoted to various purposes. It might be said that every President of the United States since the opening of the present century has himself believed that we should participate in a general international league for the maintenance of peace and justice and the promotion of international coöperation. So-called patriotic politicians have opposed this, in reliance upon a misrepresentation and even a perversion of the no-alliance policy of Washington and Jefferson of a century ago, and ascribed their views to the people of the country at large. And Presidents have felt compelled to acquiesce in this attitude. Finally the issue has recently become so confused with personal and partisan considerations and opposition to a league intended to serve these ends by coercion applied to recalcitrant states that we hardly know where we stand today.

Many of these policies appear to be of a high-minded, altruistic type. It might seem that America had adopted policies calculated to be of benefit to the world at large rather than to herself. The fact is that these policies, as an examination of the documents surrounding their proclamation shows, were consciously intended to contribute to our national advantage. We needed trade and free navigation, we needed peace and justice, we needed coöperation from other nations. Hence we sought them. That these objectives were beneficial also to other nations was a fortunate accident. It was produced by the peculiar geographical-social situation of the United States which naturally led us to the advocacy of policies not invidious and competitive but gen-

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erally beneficial to all. Even in three items not yet mentioned, a policy of recognizing new governments based on popular consent, a policy of permitting free emigration and immigration, and of opposing transfers of people among nations without their consent, which may be said to contribute to general human welfare rather than to the preservation or advantage of existing national units, it happened that we were in position at the time to benefit by these principles as a nation, and for that reason we adopted them.

Circumstances of our national life may be changing. Many of these policies may now be brought into question. The nation, now strong itself, no longer needs the protection of socially helpful principles. We can go in for competitive international living along with the best or the worst of the other nations. If other changes had not also occurred in world conditions and world organization this possible change of American attitude might be potentially very dangerous indeed.

What has been the result of the advocacy on our part of such policies? When we first began our advocacy of neutrality and peace and freedom of the seas and the open door, not to mention the Monroe Doctrine, we were the objects of scorn. Our new and impertinent ideas of international relations were ridiculed by the older Governments of Europe. We have lived to see these ideas become established rules of international law in many cases. Our own influence has contributed in modest measure to bring about that result. The developments which have taken place in inter-

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national life in the past century—the increased need for peace among nations, for example—have had their influence. The intrinsic soundness of the American program or of its separate items has helped. At all events it can be said accurately and without boasting that no nation has ever lived to witness its own policies adopted so widely by other nations as has our own. The teachings—in a certain sense the pleadings—of the weakest and most naïve of the major powers have become the world law of the nations, by virtue of their inherent merit.

It would be a mistake to take leave of this subject without notice of two highly contentious problems of American policy, namely, our relations to Latin-America and the Pan-American Union and our relations to Europe and the League.

In South America today we stand substantially where we have always stood—as a leader and a friend though also as a rival and a possible dictator in this hemisphere. In Central America and the West Indies, not to add Mexico, we are regarded as perhaps leader and friend but certainly also as potential dictator in many phases of international life. In order to protect the Panama Canal and our naval defenses we cannot afford to permit disorderly conditions in these countries to provoke intervention from European powers who would be compelled to fly to the defense of their nationals' lives and property therein under such circumstances. We act in these areas by military intervention, by diplomacy, and by treaty agreement, to protect our own

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nationals and also to protect foreign lives and property and to help the established Government to maintain order—and maintain itself in power. Needless to say, this is dangerous business and a form of action easily abused; it seems unescapable, given all the circumstances. We shall discuss our position in the Pan-American Union later.

In the eyes of Europe today we stand as a nation which has reached the peak of economic prosperity and political power and which has since the War been very largely playing a lone hand. We did not identify ourselves entirely with either side in that struggle but we became involved to the extent of making victory for one side possible. We projected a League of Nations and secured its adoption by Europe, Asia, and Latin America, and then stayed out ourselves. We have attempted to collect in as full measure as possible the money we loaned our associates during the War and we have not, distinctly we have not, sacrificed ourselves to the general welfare since 1920. What shall the future be? It will be preferable to return to this question later, but at once we may note that no European power proposes to substitute world welfare for national advantage as its goal in life. If the Governments of Europe are surprised at our course it is only because they somehow acquired the idea that we commonly acted upon altruistic rather than upon selfish motives ourselves. It would probably be an advantage to us to enter the League—that is why we have entered so many of its organizations and activities already—but again this is for reasons of national welfare such as have

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informed American diplomacy from 1774 to the present day. Of this also, more later——.

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Chapter X

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

ALONG about the opening years of this century, as many will remember, arbitration was the sovereign remedy which was to cure the war-sick world. Many of us may have learned that back some thirty years before that time the same idea of a world cure by arbitration had been held. But by 1912 the world was quite ill with a local infection in the Balkans and by 1914 the world was very sick indeed, from the spreading of that infection. What, the obvious question arises, what was the matter with arbitration as a cure for the disease of war? So very much had been hoped from that particular remedy that it is perfectly reasonable to inquire concerning the exact powers which it possesses and the way in which it has been utilized or not utilized in international therapeutics.

Now arbitration is not by any means a new remedy. It was not invented in 1870 or in 1899. It was not even invented in the nineteenth century. It is a form of international action which was employed, as were diplomacy and treaty-making, in ancient Greek and Roman times and even earlier, and we have the records of those ancient arbitrations. It was employed rather extensively in the later Middle

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Ages; Rome had employed the method for settling disputes among subject peoples and even during the chaotic earlier Middle Ages it had been employed to a slight extent. And by the end of the eighteenth century our own country was already signing treaties for the submission of disputes to arbitration.

What had happened in 1870 and 1871 was merely that Great Britain and the United States had employed this method to settle a bitter dispute which had arisen over certain British actions or inactions during our Civil War. This utilization of arbitration by two Great Powers to settle a very serious dispute was what gave new impetus to the use of arbitration in the last quarter of the century. Treaties providing for arbitration and the submission of cases to arbitration increased noticeably as a result.

And what had happened at the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 was merely that an attempt was made to provide a permanent court of arbitration to which disputes might be submitted, and a set of rules of procedure according to which they might be tried. Prior to that time each new case called for a new court and a new set of rules of procedure. Arbitration consists in the settlement of a dispute by the decision of judges or arbitrators to whom the dispute is submitted for such a decision or award. The arbitrator or a board or court of arbitrators and the rules of procedure are the two essential elements in the process, and prior to 1899 no permanent or continuous courts or codes of procedure were available. It was the provision of a permanent

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court and accompanying rules of procedure which made the action taken at The Hague in 1899 noteworthy.

Back of these needs for a permanent court and settled rules of procedure lay another feature in the practice of arbitration which produced the situation just described. Arbitration or rather the submission of disputes to arbitration was—and still is, in principle—a voluntary matter. No principle or rule of international law required submission as a matter of right. Nations were perfectly free to resort to arbitration or to refuse to submit a dispute to this sort of treatment as they saw fit. This being the case it was felt desirable to create a new court and rules of procedure whenever they decided to avail themselves of this method. They could, of course, as was shown in 1899, create a permanent court and code of procedure and still preserve their discretion in submitting their disputes thereto, but as long as they preserved that discretion they were reluctant to create a permanent court.

There was another reason for this reluctance. In the choice of judges for arbitration in the past the nations have frankly tried to secure persons who would be favorable to their claims or at least persons who would not be clearly hostile. They desired to preserve this freedom of choice until the case should arise and they could know what persons to choose.

It must be clear that this was a very defective way of doing things. It meant that there was no continuity between different courts, no great sense of unity or consistency in

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personnel or procedure in the whole practice. It means, worst of all, that a court had to be created and rules adopted just when the atmosphere for such agreement was least favorable to fairness and willingness to compromise on the part of the disputants. It is true that there was some overlapping of personnel among succeeding courts, and some uniformity of procedure among them, but this was largely accidental. It is also true that by 1899 there had been signed certain agreements for submitting disputes to arbitration when and as they should arise in the future, but even such agreements left the agreement upon the arbitrators and the rules of procedure to be made at the time of submission.

The action taken in 1899 was to create a list of names of judges or arbitrators, four to be nominated by each nation signing the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, as it was called. From this list disputant nations might select tribunals of one, three, five, or in fact any number of arbitrators as the need arose. There was also adopted a code of procedure to be followed, in absence of agreement to the contrary, by such tribunals. There was still no general agreement to submit all disputes to such tribunals although a few special agreements to this effect were signed in the years following 1899. Thus it may be seen that the action of 1899 did not advance the resort to arbitration in very marked degree.

One other defect of earlier arbitration practice ought to be noticed. Arbitrators were commonly instructed to decide the disputes submitted to them according to the rules of

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international law or the terms of treaty agreements. Failing such bases for a decision they were to apply the principles of reason and justice as they understood them. And it cannot be charged that arbitrators very frequently departed from the established principles of law and justice in making their awards. But not uncommonly the arbitrators themselves were diplomats rather than jurists and there was always present a lurking suspicion that considerations of personal judgment and national policy were present in the minds of the arbitrators. All of this tended to discourage somewhat recourse to this form of action.

The absence of any method of enforcing the arbitral award except by action on the part of the nation winning the decision was not very important. In hundreds of cases of arbitration only a few awards were disregarded, and these for legitimate reasons such as fraud or flagrant error or action by the tribunal in excess of the power conferred upon it. The disputants pledged themselves in advance to accept the award and by the time they were willing to submit to arbitration they were willing to accept any fair award. It certainly was not this aspect of the situation which rendered arbitration of only limited value in preserving peace and doing justice among the nations.

Two or three other methods of dealing with international disputes which were associated with the practice of arbitration were also reorganized in 1899. These were inquiry, good offices, and mediation.

Ordinarily each nation is free to search out and decide

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for itself upon the facts of a case in dispute. That means that each party will have its own version of the affair. It came to be seen that an impartial inquiry into the facts, still leaving the parties to decide upon the principles which determined their rights in the matter, and to settle those rights by agreement, might be valuable. Such inquiries had been undertaken in a few cases already. In the same Convention of 1899, therefore, an effort was made to encourage the use of a Commission of Inquiry in such cases by providing for its creation and for its rules of procedure in time of need. But again all was left to the voluntary action of the parties.

Similarly provision was made authorizing a nation not party to the dispute to offer to bring together representatives of the disputant nations for further discussion. This might take place during war or in a situation where the outbreak of war was feared. This extension of "good offices" by a third state had always been possible but it had been a type of action calculated to bring suspicion down upon the head of the third state. Now it was recognized that such action was not only permissible but positively desirable in the interests of peace. The parties still retained the right to refuse such invitations and to decide on the merits of the case themselves.

Finally a third country might offer to suggest a formula or terms of a possible settlement between the parties. It might offer to act as mediator, in other words. The rôle of the peacemaker is proverbially difficult. He is suspected of suggesting a solution which suits him in some special way.

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Suspensions of all sorts fall on his head. Prior to 1899 mediation was not exactly forbidden but it was a very delicate action. Now it was encouraged and rendered quite normal in principle by the terms of the 1899 Hague Convention. The parties were, however, still to be free to accept or decline such efforts at will.

Obviously these three methods were and are of indecisive value. An arbitral award settles the dispute as far as the merits are concerned. Inquiry, good offices, and mediation leave settlement for further agreement between the parties. Good offices and mediation, indeed, are hardly more than extensions of rather ordinary diplomatic processes. It is only when the commission of inquiry is created that we reach what we also reach in a court of arbitration, namely, an international organ acting upon an international mandate. But, in spite of these facts, these same apparently indecisive methods may be useful in the task of preserving peace as even arbitration is not, for reasons incidental to the practice of arbitration.

The most important and the most difficult problem in the history of arbitration has been, as may be inferred, to secure the willingness on the part of the nations to submit disputes for such treatment. The logical solution of this problem has appeared to lie in the direction of what has commonly been called compulsory or obligatory arbitration. Let it be required by agreement that nations shall submit disputes to arbitration as a matter of obligation, as they arise.

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The idea of obligatory arbitration is not so simple as it appears, apart entirely from the difficulty of securing its acceptance. In the first place, it does not and cannot mean that such action is to be required as a matter of common or general international law. That law is built up by practice and the fact is that past practice all goes to deny the existence of such an obligation. It cannot be contended, and the nations would not admit that, as a matter of general law, any such obligation exists apart from the specific agreement. In the second place, such an agreement could not be phrased merely to provide that such an obligation should henceforth be recognized. Or, rather, such an agreement would do little or no good. Submission of a dispute to arbitration is a matter of governmental procedure, and in matters of procedure details are everything. Without a court ready in existence at every moment such an agreement would be of little value. And even with a court in existence there are other steps to be provided. A dispute arises: who is to take the step of bringing it before the court? The court itself? This might be feasible provided the court were by the text of the agreement given such power. But how is the court to know of the existence of a dispute? Is there to be created some international official comparable with a Prosecuting Attorney with power to set the court in motion and hale before it the disputants? Are third states to be allowed to take such action? It need hardly be said that no such radical steps are likely to be taken by any nations today. The only step

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which they are likely to take is to authorize one another to take the case before the court individually. But in such event is the court to be given power to summon the other nation to the bar of justice? Or to render a decision by default on the pleas of one party? And to enforce—when a case is brought in by one party without the concurrence of the other the question of enforcement becomes of paramount importance—to enforce the award? But enforcing its own award is not a proper function for any court.

The fact of the matter is that the proposal for obligatory submission goes to the heart of the whole practice of arbitration. It involves a discussion of the reasons why nations do not more readily submit their disputes to arbitration already. It involves the question of why the present strong movement for securing peace in the world does not, any longer, center upon the practice of arbitration. Treaties have now been signed, in some numbers, for submission of disputes upon their appearance; why do these treaties not operate—as they do not—to secure routine submission of many disputes today? What is the present status of international arbitration in the world?

It must be admitted that some of the simpler explanations of the reluctance to submit to arbitration are partly accurate. The stronger nations do, in part, desire to retain the freedom to exact from weaker nations by force or influence—by threats of force, more or less clearly made—settlements suitable to them. Justice is the protection of the weak, or at least we may say that settlement of disputes by gen-

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erally accepted law is what they have to demand most frequently in face of efforts of the strong to secure favorable settlements in each particular case, in disregard of any rules of general law. And the stronger nations are reluctant to bind themselves by such law even when they themselves have had, naturally, a large share in making it.

Secondly there is some fear of unfairness on the part of the arbitrators. As rare as that sort of thing has been in the past the fear is persistent and strong. It is particularly strong in connection with proposals for submission to courts created in advance and in connection with any court created for all nations. Such a court cannot or is unlikely to contain judges from all disputant parties. Submission of a case to a court on which there sits no judge from the nation a party to the dispute seems hazardous. The idea of arbitration as a settlement by judges chosen by the parties, an idea which seems to confess much mistrust of the whole process, does seem to be justified by the attitude of many nations.

But the difficulty goes deeper. We are today hardly any further ahead in arbitration than we were three decades ago. We have a new court—the Permanent Court of International Justice created by the League of Nations. We have a number of agreements for submission of disputes when they shall arise. But we get no more arbitration than we did formerly. What is the matter? Why is arbitration a failure as a remedy for international dissension and as a foundation for peace?

Arbitration is a failure as a remedy for international

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dissension largely because international law is still so inadequate. It will be remembered that international law falls short in several different ways. It fails to cover all topics of international relations, it fails to regulate in detail even those topics which it does cover, and it speaks only in terms of the rights of nations for the most part, public international law being what it is today. Each of these three defects of international law impairs the possible value of international arbitration.

The lack of any law at all on several important subjects means that the nations will not submit disputes involving those subjects to arbitration. If an arbitrator is to decide a dispute according to known and accepted rules of law that is one thing, and moderately safe, perhaps. If he is to decide according to his own sense of fairness that is an entirely different matter. The door is opened thereby to personal and national prejudice. Settlement according to law may not be as lofty an ideal as settlement according to justice, but settlement according to accepted and known law is felt to be safer than settlement according to the personal judgment of the arbitrator. The nations will not submit disputes to arbitration readily where there is no accepted law covering the question—or where, what is the same thing—they are by the law given or left the power and discretion to act according to the dictates of national policy. They will decide for themselves upon the fairness of their own action. It remains a matter of international politics.

Now it is just exactly these political questions that make

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for war. War does not tend to arise over questions already regulated by law and suitable for arbitration. Such questions have, by being regulated by law, been largely neutralized as occasions of dissension. Hence, to put the other side of the picture forward, arbitration or judicial settlement, appropriate for disputes regulated by law, is of little use for the very disputes, those not regulated by law, which make all the trouble. One might go further and admit that international law itself, based as it is on agreement, is of little use for the very disputes, those where agreement is impossible, which make all the trouble. But in any event it is certain that arbitration according to international law is of limited value considered only as an instrument for maintaining peace.

This does not mean that arbitration is a device of no value in international relations. If the questions susceptible of settlement according to law are not submitted to arbitration they also must be wrangled out by diplomacy and this is dangerous. Even where a question is regulated by law the interpretation and application of the law is a delicate and troublesome matter. Moreover, the regular and general practice of judicial settlement of even legalistic disputes among the nations by arbitration would so improve the whole tone or atmosphere of international relations as to influence also the handling of the political questions not submitted to such treatment. All that is meant by the criticism stated above is that arbitration is, almost by definition, of little

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or no value for the most troublesome type of international dispute.

The second defect, the lack of detail in the law, must be explained more fully. The sort of detail which is lacking in the law is, in part, the detail of procedure. The law says that national territory is inviolable except under certain circumstances. But it does not define those circumstances very closely, and it does not say what, exactly, may be done about it if territory is violated. Adjacent national territory may be entered by the forces of a state to ward off imminent danger. But what constitutes imminent danger? The gathering of a band of bandits, perhaps. But suppose they are gathering for a raid within their own country. How near the frontier may their gathering take place without giving a right of abatement to the neighboring state? And so on. And then, assuming that the territory has been violated without warrant, what is to be done about it? Even admitting that the parties have signed a treaty agreeing to submit all disputes arising between them to arbitration, and granting one to the other the right to begin action before a permanent court and hale the defendant before that tribunal, what shall the plaintiff state do or say? Demand damages? How much? Punishment of the military officers who carried out the expedition? A salute to the flag? A promise not to do it again? All these detailed questions of the proper and adequate remedy for the injury are left unsettled by international law. Shall the plaintiff state bring an action for trespass? If the foreign troops are still in the terri-

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tory shall it bring an action of ejectment? The fact is that all suggestions are so far from what is feasible in arbitration that the questions must seem ridiculous. International law lacks details defining closely what constitute breaches of the law, defining penalties for such breaches, and defining procedure for securing remedies, to such an extent that recourse to arbitration is almost an achievement in itself even where the right to have such recourse is granted by treaty agreement.

The remedy here, of course, is in part the same as that for the preceding defect, namely, the development of more law on the topics left unregulated. It may or not be possible to expand the system of international law to cover new topics and to include further details on the topics treated. Certainly we cannot be sure of the possibility of sitting down and spinning out the law at will, with these shortcomings in mind, but the law will have to be spun out by somebody some time if the situation is to be met.

The supplying of details of penalties and forms of procedure or forms of action for use in arbitration is quite another matter. Rome was not built in a day and codes of penalties and forms of procedure are not ordinarily built up overnight. They take for their evolution, ordinarily, several centuries. Such codes of penalties and forms of procedure have not grown up in international adjudication in the centuries during which it has been practiced mainly because of the fact that there have, after all, been so few cases submitted to arbitration when the whole stretch of

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time is considered. The lack of unity or continuity among the courts of arbitration has been important also. The inference is that very nearly the whole job still remains to be done, although it may also be true that progress may be much more rapid in the future with one central continuous court working at the task. Perhaps such efforts may be supplemented by deliberate legislation or imitation of arrangements already in existence in other fields of law and government.

The third great defect of international law and arbitration in connection with the prevention of international disagreement is found in the fact that international law is so strictly inter-national law. Now the actual units of international life are individuals, and groups of individuals much smaller than the states themselves—corporations we call them, though the state itself is a corporation. It is they who engage in world intercourse. It is they who should and do acquire rights against one another and against the states. And it is they who not infrequently make the trouble which takes the form of international dissension. It should be they who resorted to arbitration or who were compelled to submit to arbitration, so to speak.

The fact is that there is a good deal of such submission of private claims against foreign Governments to arbitration or settlement by claims commissions, so-called. For every arbitration at public international law, involving their majesties the nations, there are settled a score or a hundred cases of claims by individuals against a foreign Government.

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The volume of claims arbitration is already huge and is constantly increasing.

But the very special form of the present practice emphasizes the shortcomings of the situation. Such practice is kept distinct from international arbitration as though it were an entirely different thing. Such hearing and settlement of private claims can be had only after creation of a claims commission by the nations. Such settlement proceeds not according to the rules of public international law, in the main, but according to the laws of the states concerned which deal with such matters as property, judicial administration, taxation and what not. Such settlement is largely confined to claims by individuals against foreign Governments and does not include claims against foreign individuals.

In short, arbitration or international judicial settlement has been allowed to remain aloof upon a remote plane where there is, frankly, little business to be done and little good to be accomplished. This is true largely because international law has been allowed to remain upon the same plane. International law is mainly public international law. Private international law, the law which regulates, or which might regulate, the rights and obligations of individuals in world intercourse is not given official standing, so to speak. No general international courts are provided for its enforcement. It is to national courts that the individuals in question must turn for help. And these courts, it is held, are free to apply local law or foreign law at their discretion. The only

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truly international rule of law on the rights of individuals engaged in world intercourse relates not to the rights of individuals themselves but holds that national courts do possess this discretion! Obviously, as long as such a situation exists the potentialities of adjudication in connection with the real international life of the world are grievously limited. It is as though, in the United States, there were no Federal courts open to individuals and as though all Federal law related to the rights of the States against one another, the States being free, in their own courts, to apply as much and as little of the law of other States as they saw fit in matters of individual rights.

Now these deficiencies are not going to be remedied very soon. The task to be accomplished is enormous, even with vigorous coöperation on all hands. And such coöperation cannot be expected. Governments, diplomats, and members of national judicial bodies and the members of the legal profession are all going to resist the establishment of a unified world judicial system. It seems a very radical proposal. It is. The difficulty is that world life has grown very radically in the past half century and is still growing at an almost cataclysmic pace, while the judicial organization of the world is standing still. The facts demand a revolutionary reorganization of national and international judicial machinery and the United States sticks at becoming even a sustaining member of the Permanent Court! The situation is going to remain bad and become worse for some

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decades. We have lost for an indefinite time, certainly until we take up much slack, the chance to make of international adjudication an effective instrument for international pacification.

In the present discussion the general aspects of the situation alone have been under consideration. What has been said here might have been said twenty years ago. In one or two places references have been made to recent agreements for obligatory arbitration and a reference or two has been made to the Permanent Court of International Justice created under the League of Nations. We shall return later to further notice of that Court, which, it might be said in advance, is about all that could be desired as a court. Its creation, and the signing of numerous agreements to submit disputes to it, have not, however, brought the millennium. The same old shortcomings, or the most important of them, appear in connection with the World Court as appeared in connection with the Hague Court: a defective system of international law, a defective system of procedure or of actions before the Court—defective here means “absence of”—, and restriction of the law and adjudication before the Court to nations and national rights. With these numerous agreements for obligatory submission in existence the Court has decided only some twenty-five cases in seven years and we still have to see one nation hale another before the Court. International adjudication clearly leaves much to be desired as a means of regulating the course of international or world life.

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Chapter XI

INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

THE unescapable impression which the innocent bystander derives from listening to a discussion of international relations from public platforms or from reading of international relations in the newspapers is one of constant strife. It seems as though the international relations must all be cousins—. Such a picture is somewhat of an exaggeration. It is an impression connected with the practice of the international arbitration of disputes and conflicts among the nations. Much less controversial is the international administration of matters whose chief characteristic, as treated at the hands of international administrative bodies, is their non-contentious character.

International administration is an activity unfamiliar to most people. It consists in the action of an international bureau or commission in applying to a given segment of international life or world intercourse—travel by air, motion picture export and import—rules and regulations adopted by the nations themselves. It differs notably from arbitration and it differs also from international conference.

International administration is usually applied to some selected section of world intercourse or private human

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activity in trade or communications or what not. It is not applied to such matters as nationality or territorial sovereignty or jurisdiction or other legal and governmental problems which are suitable for arbitration. Nor is it provided for the treatment of questions arising in time of war, for the regulation of which diplomacy and treaty-making are still requisite. It is provided for regulation of the activities of individuals and groups of individuals in time of peace which go to make up the life of the modern world. Concretely, those activities include trade and travel and communications, health and morals, and navigation and finance and all sorts of interests and activities constituting parts of the general activities of communications and social welfare.

There are no insuperable reasons why international administrative facilities should not be provided for treatment of questions of national sovereignty over persons and territory and questions arising in time of war. Indeed there have been created from time to time international administrative bodies such as boundary commissions which have been charged with functions indirectly connected with problems of state sovereignty. And there have been international commissions for inspection of prison camps in time of war or repatriation of prisoners of war. But the nations hesitate to establish such arrangements in connection with such subjects. They are much more willing to establish bureaus to deal with matters of interest to individuals only. There are not many occasions for the creation of administrative facil-

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ities applying to state rights or war conditions directly. The development of international administration begins, therefore, with those matters which, in the individual state, were the first to be taken up for state action after the primary functions of preserving internal and external peace and safety had been discharged, namely, communications and hygiene.

The application of the law to the appropriate situation by an international administrative bureau is not the stiff and formal sort of action with which the arbitral tribunal is satisfied. The arbitral tribunal declares the law and the rights which flow therefrom and lets it go at that. This is usually sufficient under the circumstances. But it would by no means be sufficient in connection with the operation of through trains between Ostend and Constantinople. Merely declaring the law—or adopting a code of rules—would leave to others, primarily to national railway officials, their application, as in the execution of an arbitral award. This might or might not be satisfactory, but if the object be to provide international administration it is not enough.

A similar comparison might be made in connection with international conference. The function of an international conference consists principally in the making of new law. Again that process leaves things in the air. If it is desired to have the law actually applied, and applied by international agents, it must be intrusted to an international administrative bureau or commission.

International administration consists in action by inter-

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national agents acting under an international mandate or authorization in administering directly upon the world life itself the regulations applicable thereto. Arbitration and conference operate at a distance, from a remote chamber in the capital of some nation, and they depend on national agencies for execution. International administration operates in direct contact with the subject matter through international personnel in actual field service.

This Bureau or Commission or these field agents are, of course, created by international treaty agreement, just as is a court of arbitration. Ordinarily, however, there will be not two but a large number of nations signing the agreement. These nations thus form a loose federal union for this one purpose, and we have in this field the Universal Postal Union, the Metric Union, of both of which the union of states known as the United States is a member, and others. The agreement or Convention is the Constitution of the Union, and is revised in Conferences of Member States held every five years or oftener.

Ordinarily the permanent administrative Bureau is subjected, in its operations, to the control of a sort of Interim Commission which meets annually and enacts Regulations or By-laws which supplement the Convention as the statutes enacted by the legislature in a single nation supplement the provisions of the national Constitution. There are all sorts of variations among the international administrative unions in regard to details of structure and the relations among various organs in the Union.

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The functions of the International Bureau include many detailed activities. To apply the law or the provisions of the Convention and Regulations involves just what sort of work? It involves internal administrative work of the simplest variety, such as the collection of the contributions of Member States whereby the Union is financed, the expenditure of these funds, and the keeping of accounts. It involves hiring and firing the employees. The Convention may provide that the Delegates of the Member States shall select a Director who in turn shall select his staff subject to approval by the Interim Commission. There are supplies to be bought, quarters to be occupied, equipment to be housed and operated, and the whole establishment, plant and personnel, to be managed. If there are field agents operating outside of the central office their activities likewise must be supervised.

Then comes the work of the Bureau upon the subject matter intrusted to its care. Perhaps it is the conduct of agriculture, or sanitation of ships, or passports. What has the Bureau to do? Sometimes only to collect and distribute information and opinions upon some topic such as the facilities for telegraphic communications in Eastern Africa. Sometimes the enactment of rules additional to those adopted by the Conference or Interim Commission; it is very undesirable that this task should be conferred upon the bureau, for various reasons, but it is, perhaps, unavoidable within certain limits. Finally the Bureau may actually collect tolls on ships passing up and down a river, fumigate

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railroad cars, feed refugees, or operate a light-house. The bureaus intrusted with mere statistical work are more numerous than those which have actual executive work to perform but not so much more numerous as to imply anything very serious. The situation is not simply one wherein the nations hold off from bestowal of executive authority upon administrative bureaus because they are afraid of them or opposed to them. There is some of this hostility present but the situation is more complicated than that.

Another feature of the work of the International Bureau is characteristic and important. That is the continuous character of such work. International conferences meet and adjourn. International arbitrations are held and then there are long gaps between. Conference and arbitration are intermittent, episodic,—even spasmodic! International administration is continuous. World intercourse, human life, life in general, is continuous. The stars revolve and bacteria vegetate through twenty-four hours each day and human beings live and act across state lines in a similarly continuous fashion. An international iceberg patrol must be maintained at every moment to be of any service at all, and is so maintained by the United States in agreement with fifteen other nations.

The most striking quality inhering to the work of the international administrative bureau, however, is its non-political character. Moreover this is the feature which most frequently attracts the notice of commentators, and it sometimes leads to misunderstanding of the work of the bureau.

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It is easy to exaggerate or misunderstand this feature of the situation. It has been said in scorn that no subject is intrusted to the care of an international administrative bureau which has any political significance. To a certain extent this is true. The nations have not yet intrusted a bureau with reallocation of national territory in accord with economic conditions or social facts or factors, although they have intrusted commissions with the drawing of boundary lines in accord with economic or ethnological agreements previously made. But the general assertion that no matters of political importance have been handed over to the International Bureau is nonsense. There are, indeed, no subjects which can not take on a political character if nations disagree upon them, from tulip bulbs to archeological excavations. It is not the nature of the subject matter which determines the political character of the subject but the attitude taken toward it.

The true fact is that the international administrative bureau depoliticalizes—if that term may be coined for the purpose—any subject after that subject is intrusted to it. In part the topic is depoliticalized by the nations by the action of intrusting it to a Bureau. They adopt a Convention containing provisions regarding fumigation of ships coming through the Suez Canal. This topic might well have been the subject of bitter controversy. But by adopting certain provisions regarding it, by common agreement, the nations shut off, temporarily at least, debate on what ought to be done or what may be done in the matter. It is now handed

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over for administration to the Bureau and debate on policy postponed until the next Conference.

It is therefore undesirable to give to the Bureau the function of adopting additional rules upon the subject matter itself. Such work involves discussions of policy. The members of the staff of the Bureau should be free from such considerations. They should not be converted into Delegates of national Governments.

As a matter of fact the members of the staff of the Bureau continue the process of depoliticalization. The subject has been settled temporarily, for them at least, by the agreement. They may deplore the failure of the nations to give the Bureau more authority but they want to keep out of politics and they go ahead with their work with no attention to nationalistic or political considerations. And thus it is that the subject intrusted to them seems to be "of no political importance." It is a great beneficial achievement to remove a subject from the field of international politics. Now it is true that this occurs rather by the adoption of commonly accepted rules of law upon the subject than by turning it over to a Bureau for administration, just as it occurred in the making of international law, as a preliminary to arbitration. But it is in connection with international administration through a continuous period of time that the phenomenon is most marked.

The personal factor in the situation counts for a great deal, likewise. Ordinarily the members of the staff of the Bureau are technicians of one sort or another—transporta-

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tion experts, physicians, or statisticians—rather than diplomats. They are chiefly interested in the subject matter of the activities of the Bureau—rather than with considerations of national policy or even considerations of making a record in the work of the Bureau. They do not desire to formulate national policy particularly and they certainly do not desire to become involved in political controversies at the expense of the success of the work.

These technicians may go so far as to be forgetful of the supreme value of national sovereignty and independence! They may labor under the wild illusion that to accomplish an improvement in human welfare is more important than to preserve national pride and prestige, in case of conflict between the two. They are the objects of fear and suspicion on the part of the diplomats in the Conference and the Interim Commission. They are looked upon askance by the Governments. They are, however, regarded by all common folk who have anything to do with them and by all right thinking men everywhere as the most promising servants of the growing international unity of the modern world.


It is interesting also to note the origins of some of these international administrative bureaus, and the results, direct and also indirect, of their activity.

Most of the international administrative bureaus are the results of private world organizations or private international organizations which existed previously. That is to say, a private organization, such as a world traffic associa-

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tion, will set up a central headquarters somewhere,—in Paris, Brussels, or elsewhere,—and the bureau will begin its work as an entirely private office. Then the members of the organization, the national associations, perhaps, will seek official approval and support for their enterprise. Subventions may be forthcoming from the Governments. Supervision may be exercised. And finally the bureau may be taken over or the association as a whole converted into an international union as above described. Even where all of these steps are not taken separately in precisely this manner the creation of international administrative services is traceable to private initiative or private demand as are neither international arbitration nor international conference, generally speaking. The administrative service resembles the consul and like him comes into being chiefly to serve private needs rather than national interests—in so far as that distinction is sound at all.

On the other side the results are just as important. International administrative service has the effect of facilitating the carrying on of that increasing volume of world intercourse which is so extensive already. That is its chief object. But the indirect consequences of this are to minimize the importance or the human significance of the national states! These states, at the instigation of private travelers and traders, create international bureaus which facilitate travel and trade and as a result people engage in those activities to such an extent that they cease to think in terms of national states exclusively. The cosmopolitan mental atti-



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Meeting of the Malaria Commission of the International Health Organization. The combination of scientific talent and inter-governmental cooperation is peculiar to international administration.

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tude results from such activities, and this attitude of mind, the death knell of the national state—as an exclusive, dominant, absolute loyalty in men's minds—, the nations actually promote by creating international postal bureaus, river commissions, bureaus, and commissions of all kinds in the field of world communications! They dare not do otherwise: refusal to create such bureaus would lead, if need be, to action by private interest, in defiance of national states. But the result is to compel the national states to assist in preparing for their own retirement and eventual elimination.

The future development of international administration is fraught with several interesting problems. How far can this sort of thing be carried? What fields are likely to be invaded by international administration? What proportions are such services likely to assume?

It must seem most remarkable to a student of law or government who has been told that law depends for its effectiveness upon enforcement from above that this practice of international administration can be developed as far as it has been, in view of its purely voluntary character. None of these international bureaus could do anything effective to compel compliance with their regulations or their decisions or requests in case of defiance by Member states. They have no more power of enforcement than courts of arbitration. Yet they succeed in getting things done. How can this be?

The explanation lies, in part, in the fact that they are not given a great deal of authority to regulate, decide, or de-

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mand, in any case. If they were given greater power of dictating to, or ordering about, the nations, they would, perhaps, have to be given serious powers and facilities for enforcement of their will, if that were feasible. The explanation lies in part in the fact that such bureaus are only created by unanimous agreement and hence enjoy a certain measure of general support from the start. But explanations do not alter the fact. The fact is that here we have a branch of international government which operates without enforcement. How far can this be carried? In view of the extreme difficulty of organizing any means of enforcement in connection with international government of any kind this is an extremely important question.

The answer is: possibly further than could be expected. It probably will soon appear impossible to carry the development of international administration very far without providing, or trying to provide, means of enforcement, to carry forward this development on the present bases of low power and voluntary agreement, in so far as bureaus are allowed to operate upon the states as such. If much is to be accomplished bureaus will have to be given more authority—not merely authority to collect and publish statistics, to make recommendations, and to issue requests, but to give commands. (Such powers some bureaus now have.) If these commands are issued to states sanctions will have to be provided, or defiance will result. But the bureau may be allowed, as some bureaus are today allowed, to deal with individuals directly, and this would be much simpler. If

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international administration is to develop as it should it will be necessary either to confer powers of enforcement on international bureaus or to produce a willingness to submit to the exercise of administrative authority on their part without enforcement by substituting the bureau above the individual in place of the Member states.

What fields are likely to be invaded by international administration? Are all departments of modern life to be preempted by such service? In a limited sense it is distinctly up to the peoples of the nations themselves whether anything of this sort happens or not. In a certain sense, however, international administration grows because of the facts of life operating like the natural forces of time and matter. The creation of a new bureau is a matter for deliberate choice only in so far as there is such an element in political life at all. People—the nations—will get as much international administration as they create and no more. If the facts seem to “compel” them to decide for more, that is another matter. They may feel the need for international passports, currency, postage stamps, and other such things before very long (they feel such needs now!), but they still have a chance to decide for or against their adoption—as much as they have such choice in the development of national government. They are, indeed, very likely to decide in favor of such extension of international administration into all fields of human life—education, science, and art, and all other fields. Just because they are likely to discover

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that such international administrative organization and action promises benefits more valuable than its costs.

But what will the results be upon the size of the administrative bureaus? What is likely to happen to the size of such bureaus in any event? Today almost all of the work of international administration is carried on in the central offices of the bureaus. Field agents of such bureaus are few. Field services are not extensive. Sanitary organizations and navigation commissions and boundary surveys must be carried out on the spot, but the bulk of the work of international administration today is carried on in Paris, Brussels, or London as the case may be. This is likely to change. If these services grow they are going to grow out of doors. If actual administrative work and not merely the collection of statistics is what has to be done it must be done where the doing is needed. You can't fumigate a ship in an office in Geneva, or administer Chinese famine relief in a bureau in Vienna. Field services, up to the present time very restricted in numbers and extent, will have to be expanded. International administrative agents may become familiar figures, instead of entire rarities as at the present time.

This might mean the creation of an international civil service system. We have had talk of an international police force or an international army and navy. Such things seem remote. An international civil service corps lies much nearer to the boundaries of what is possible and probable. With the coming into existence of such a service, however, there would arise all of the familiar problems of departmental

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organization, overlapping and duplication of functions, purchase of supplies, recruitment and discharge—the spoils system—, pay and retirement, which are familiar in national, state, and municipal life. These problems or their solution may be left for other times and other heads. However, all of these questions, every single problem of the art or science of administration which has bothered political scientists, public officials, and business men of late years in these United States, has already made its appearance in the field of international administration at Paris and Geneva.

There is also a still more radical concept which lies hidden within the depths of this seemingly innocent thing called international administration. To all outward appearances international administration seems less pretentious than international arbitration or conference, diplomacy or treaty-making. Yet it contains the germ of something more radical than anything yet mentioned. Not merely the cosmopolitan habit of mind. Not merely the idea of a super-government resting upon the national states. But the idea of a world state. The keynote of such a state would be found in the fact that authority would be applied, acts of authority would fall, upon individuals or groups of individuals throughout the world without passing through the national states. True national government exists in the United States where and only where the Federal Government acts not upon or through the States in the Union but directly upon individual American citizens. Now in the international field it is precisely in the activities of the world administra-

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tive bureaus that such direct application of governmental authority to the individual takes place. The national states create the bureau, it is true, but they give to it the power to act upon the individual without coming back through the national state organizations. If this sort of thing were to be expanded we should have a world government and that not a government of states but of the individuals who go to make up the people of the world considered as a unit. This exists today in several cases. The sanitary councils and river commissions apply their measures of sanitary restriction and regulations of navigation to all individuals who come within the area of their operations, irrespective of nationality—even where the individuals are not nationals of Member states—and without acting through any national state. But this is of positively revolutionary significance when analyzed from the point of view of theory and principle.

International administration, like all administration, often seems to be a tedious subject for consideration and discussion. It has been unduly neglected in the past, neglected for more spectacular performances such as arbitration and conference and diplomacy which take place out in the glare of the spotlight. Yet it is the most practically useful for form of international coöperation. It presents some of the most interesting problems concerning the origins and influences controlling the creation and development of international government. And it leads to forms of action infinitely more radical than even an international constitution or a surrender of national treaty-making power therein.

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The opponents of the development of international government might better forget their opposition to entangling alliances and Article X and concentrate on river commissions.

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Chapter XII

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

THERE appeared in *Punch* on one occasion lately a very amusing cartoon. Mr. Lloyd-George, British Prime Minister, was pictured dragging an elderly lady, who much resembled Queen Victoria, and who evidently typified Great Britain, in her wheeled chair, away from the latest international conference which had just been held at Genoa, while still another conference, which had recently been held at Brussels, disappeared over the horizon. The good lady plaintively inquired: "Where to now, David?" To many, indeed, it has seemed that we have had a perfect plague of conferences since the historic meeting at Paris in 1919.

What has happened, of course, is that there has been a notable increase in the use made of this type of international action while observers have also become more conscious of what is being done in the field of international coöperation, apart from any such increase. In part there has been a simple quantitative increase in the number of conferences held. But there have also been taking place a number of changes in the conference as an institution without which such an increase would hardly have been possible or desirable.

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Conferences even more than arbitration take their start in simple personal diplomacy. Whenever two diplomatic agents—an Ambassador and the Foreign Minister of the Government to which he is accredited—confer upon a matter of public business there, by definition, occurs an international conference. There occurs, namely, a meeting of representatives of different nations for discussion of matters of common interest to their Governments. From this point onward to the most spectacular gathering in Paris or Washington occur merely changes in degree.

A conference does not, however, happen, like a bolt out of the blue, by the operation of impersonal and incalculable forces. If conferences have increased in numbers in recent years it is because, so to speak, somebody has increased them. A certain number—an indefinite number—of meetings of the simpler type, mentioned above, have taken place and would have taken place in any event. But for an international conference of the more formal type rather formal action is needed before the event can take place.

The fact is that some Government must call the conference into existence. Or, to be more exact, some Government must invite other Governments to send individuals to represent it at a meeting which the inviting Government suggests should be held at a certain place at a certain date for the purpose of discussing a certain subject. The inviting Government can, moreover, only issue such invitations to a meeting to be held in its own territories. If the Power instigating the conference desires to have the meeting take

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place in the territory of another state it must prevail upon that state to issue the invitations. Thus while Russia instigated the Hague Conference of 1899 it was the Dutch Government which sent out the actual invitations.

Of course, this state of affairs has changed somewhat in recent years. By special agreements signed or accepted by a number of powers, series of conferences—such as the meetings of the administrative unions—have been provided and meeting places named in the agreements. Even in such circumstances the state in whose territory the meeting is to be held may send out the actual invitations, and certainly must be consulted before her territory may be so used. But it is possible by such agreements to provide for the actual meeting of the conference and also to delegate to an administrative agent the mechanical task of calling the conference at the agreed time and place.

The phrase “calling the conference” is itself a misnomer. The invitations sent out are invitations in the truest sense of the term. That is, acceptance is wholly a voluntary matter. There are not in existence any agreements which require nations to attend international conferences. They may not be summoned to attend. They are given a right to attend or are persuaded to attend, but they may stay home if they choose.

There is clearly implied here a distrust of the whole idea of international conference. In absence of an agreement the assumption is that no conference will be necessary. Any Government proposing a conference is suspected. It must

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have some ulterior objectives in view! This assumption is the product in part of the lack of long and frequent practice of conference in the past, in part of instinctive hostility to a new form of procedure, inertia, and the dislike of the professional diplomat for anything that smacks of reform in his profession. But whatever its cause it is made possible only by an extensive unawareness of the necessity for conference for regulation of international affairs in these days.

As international law is mainly inter-national in character so an international conference is an inter-national conference. It is a conference of Governments. It may be desirable—it may seem desirable to some—to hold or to have held a conference of peoples or a Parliament of man, to use a poetic phrase. Such an action would be very difficult to organize but doubtless it could be done. It is not likely to be done in any near future. Indeed no official world gathering is at all likely to be called except those in which the nations or Governments are represented as such.

The inviting Government, as the host of the occasion, now has two or three tasks to perform in view of the approaching meeting.

It must prepare the mechanical facilities for the meeting, the auditorium, the potted palms, the offices for delegates, press accommodations, and accommodations for the public. Hotel accommodations are important and even a certain amount of social entertainment will add to the success of the gathering. A conference may be ruined by bad ventila-

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tion and saved by a gala luncheon. The physical facilities for the conference are of much practical importance.

Settlement of the program of discussion, or the "Agenda," is next in order. This is not a task for the inviting state alone. Adoption of a satisfactory agenda is indispensable if the Governments invited are to be expected to accept, and they must therefore have much to say in this matter. But it is the part of the inviting Government to take the lead in proposing the program of discussion and conducting the preliminary discussion of this program. Needless to say, there may be a great deal of maneuvering upon this matter and later victories lost and won at this stage. Where conferences have been arranged by treaty and are called under auspices of an administrative bureau or commission the drafting of the agenda may lie in the hands of that body subject to counterproposals by members or the introduction of new items in the conference itself, by unanimous consent.

In order to be successful an international conference must be held under certain rather definite conditions. Adequate mechanical facilities and a satisfactory agenda are only two of the necessary prerequisites for a successful conference. The conference must be provided with a definite issue with which to deal. Discussions on too general topics are almost certain to lead nowhere and to provoke unwise utterances of all sorts. The issue must be one upon which it is possible to secure some degree of unanimity, seeing that any agreement signed must be accepted by all. A conference on sup-

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pression of all trade in alcoholic beverages would be a waste of time. And adequate preparation must be made in the collection of data for the use of the conference. Increasingly international agreements turn on problems of fact which should be thoroughly investigated in advance of any attempt to secure international agreement with regard thereto.

The collection of data might much better be intrusted to a central bureau if that be possible. The work will be done better under these conditions. It is not possible, of course, to follow this method except in the case of conferences held as a result of agreements concluded in advance. In default of such facilities each delegation or participating Government must collect its own data. In that case the facts relied upon by different delegations may vary considerably and retard rather than promote agreement, but this cannot very well be helped.

The individual participating nations may do one or two things further which will contribute to the success of the conference. They may appoint persons as delegates who have some talent both in the subject matter of the conference and as conferees. A conference on railroad transportation made up of diplomats is a pathetic sight. So is a conference on social welfare made up of fanatical reformers. The nations may instruct their delegates in advance of the meeting but should not instruct them too closely. A delegation which does not know what its own Government wants is a weak unit in an international conference. A delegation

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which is so closely bound by instructions that it cannot compromise at all is a positive hindrance.

After the delegates have gathered together, in other words after the conference has convened, the next step is its internal organization.

The chief delegate of the inviting Government will automatically preside at the opening session, in the very nature of the situation. He will also, as things go now, be selected as permanent chairman of the conference. This courtesy will not be followed in the conferences held in series as a result of permanent agreement, but it is an amusing remnant of the days when conferences were strictly diplomatic events of the highly ceremonious type.

There the organization of the conference ends, or at least may end. The inviting Government may provide a secretary and interpreters. Committees may be created, including a committee on credentials, arrangements may be made for plenary sessions and committee meetings. A few rules of procedure may be adopted—to be later ignored perhaps. But the fact is that international conferences are pitifully simple in their internal arrangements. In the selection of the chairman, in the organization and procedure of the conference, at every point, indeed, emerge indications that the international conference operates under conditions very different from those which obtain in a national representative assembly.

Those conditions pertain to the functioning of the conference not on the side of subject matter but on the side of

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procedure. A conference is called ordinarily to deal with a given problem and is given as much time as is needed for its work. Hence the necessity for efficient and expeditious procedure is not so strongly felt. All participating nations demand full opportunity to be heard in debate. Hence the presiding officer has little power to control debate. The action of the conference takes place by individual agreement, rather than by vote. Hence parliamentary strategy—the whole game of motions and substitute motions and motions to amend and all sorts of points of order—is of little or no importance. All this being true the conference is in the main a great big get-together to talk things over and it is not restricted in its procedure as it would be otherwise.

For the conference not only cannot legislate, it need not even agree. No conference has any power to make general international law; it can make law only for its participants. No conference can, in absence of special agreement—of which there are very, very few in existence today—make law for its participants except by their unanimous consent in signing the agreement which results from the conference. But, further than this, a conference always starts with no further object than the discussion of a given topic in order to discover whether or not it be possible to reach any agreement on the matter. The discussion is the essence of the action, indeed; the signing of the agreement carries on to something further, namely, treaty-negotiation, which is no necessary part of the phenomenon of conference.

Conferences, therefore, produce fruits which are not all

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of one kind. They do not produce laws or statutes, in point of form. They do not "enact" anything. They may—it is to be hoped that they will—lead to treaty agreements. But they also tend to produce resolutions and "wishes" and protocols of record, and also, not by any means least in importance, greater understanding of the subject matter of the conference. In their later days national representative assemblies have become rather mechanical devices for registering opinion formed outside of their walls; in their earlier days they were devices for acquiring information and understanding of a social problem on the floor of the assembly; international conference is still in this stage. Resolutions mean that effective, unanimous agreement has been found impossible,—but that a considerable degree of agreement exists. *Voeux* or "wishes" are much the same. Protocols or minutes of record, wherein two or more nations go on record regarding some matter not made the subject of formal agreement by the conference itself, reveal the imperfect integration of the process of conference with the international situation which it is meant to regulate. In these various ways, however, the conference serves the international community.

The subject matters of international conference discussion range all the way from astronomy to zoölogy. The circumstances under which they are convened and the results aimed at—in terms of subject matter now—control their subject matter in the main.

Thus conferences originate in close connection with

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ordinary diplomacy, deal with highly political problems at first, and do not, within this range of action, reach any very high level of effectiveness. It may become necessary to hold a conference of three or four states on some such problem as recognition of a new Government. Such a conference will be most difficult to secure and will be held under all of the special handicaps upon the practice of conference which have already been described. It is here that conference is, also, least effective, and the agreement at the end most likely to be seriously restricted in scope and effectiveness.

It is here that the "peace conference"—so-called—is to be ranged. The peace conference is held, of course, in time of war—at the end of war—to reëstablish peace. As a matter of fact, no institution ever so treacherously belied its name. The world has had peace conferences for centuries; it has had as many peace conferences as it has had wars, for the reason that wars lead to peace conferences. But it might almost as well be said that the world has gone on having wars just because it has had so many peace conferences. At all events the peace conference is distinctly the sort of conference which grows directly out of the political relations among states and which reflects those relations very closely. It is not so much an organ of international government as a diplomatic incident.

The conference which sets up certain administrative machinery for carrying into effect the dispositions of a treaty upon a political matter such as a boundary line provides a connection between the political conference and con-

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ferences of another kind. In a peace conference such action may be taken and the conference to that extent rises above the level of most of its work. Or a separate conference may be held on the question—as for setting up a commission to regulate navigation upon an international river. International administration often grows directly out of political problems in many instances, and the international conference serves to bring it into being from those circumstances.

It is still easier to see this, perhaps, in the conference for establishing a tribunal of arbitration. Two states become involved in a dispute. If the matter is to be submitted to arbitration it must be submitted as a result of a conference which will partake somewhat of the nature of the diplomatic conference and even of the peace conference! The court of arbitration is called into being directly out of the circumstances of that dispute and it is called into existence by a conference which is distinctly a conference in the old style.

A third set of circumstances may produce the conference and give it its character. Private individuals and groups of individuals may be so deeply concerned in some matter of international relations—say labor legislation—that they bring pressure to bear upon their Governments to take action in the matter by international agreement. A conference called under such circumstances is less likely to carry the high political coloring of the conferences just described, without, however, getting away from this note entirely. It

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is likely, instead, to take on certain characteristics as a result of being concerned with social problems and perhaps problems of class relationships.

All three of the conferences just mentioned serve to build a bridge from diplomacy to international politics and they rise to the ground floor of international organization. International organization does not rise from general ideas or theories; it rises from national political interests and individual economic interests, and it rises through the channel of international conference. International conference is not merely diplomacy nor is it entirely international government. It begins as one thing and ends as another or it may be at one and the same time part one thing and part another.

In the end international conference rises out upon the plane of being an international constitutional convention entirely. An administrative commission is to be created or its constitution revised not because of inter-state political interests or individual economic demands but because of a general international desire for common administration of some matter. An international court is to be established not in order to settle some acute conflict but because of a general international program for establishing and maintaining peace in the world. The conference which is convened for the drafting of a convention creating the bureau or the court is a constitutional assembly, and nothing less. Traces of the political elements of the primitive diplomatic negotiation

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remain, but the conference is for the most part something very different indeed.

Now it is the increase in the number of occasions for international conferences of the latter type, or meetings intended to satisfy the need for international administrative arrangements, which has led to the increase in the number of international conferences in general in recent years. There was, indeed, a marked decline in the number of such gatherings dealing with purely political problems in the period from 1875 to 1914, and there has been a decline of the same sort in the past five years as a result of the activities of the League of Nations. Where the great increase in international conferences has taken place in recent years is in the field of conferences not, indeed, upon non-political matters, but of meetings called with the purpose of taking some matter out of the field of international politics for the future by turning it over to international administration or adjudication. And with this increase of gatherings of this type has come a tendency to regard conference not as the political action which it originally was but as a sort of quasi-administrative action in itself.

There persist today three or four features in the international conference which will prevent it from becoming as useful as it might as long as they persist. International courts and bureaus, once created and given work to do, are capable of performing their functions with a reasonable degree of satisfaction. As courts, as bureaus, they are about what they should be. But international conferences, even when con-

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vened, are somewhat defective for reasons which go to their very foundation.

The individuals who act in international conferences are hampered in their work by being merely the instructed delegates of national Governments. This being the case, it would be well to have them fully, though, if possible, flexibly instructed—so to speak—in advance of the meeting. But it would be much better for the success of the conference if the delegates were given a good deal of discretion to act for the best interests of the nations which they represent according to their judgment as the facts and implications of the situation are brought out in the course of the conference. It would then be possible to treat the problem before the conference on the basis of data and interpretations made in discussions by the delegates and it would not be necessary to hold up the discussion for reference to the Governments back home. The utterances made in discussions would not be as charged with hidden meanings as they are at present. It would not be felt that there was something unreal about the conference itself, and that the real centers of powers were located elsewhere. The whole proceeding would take on new and added importance and effectiveness.

No such change can come about, however, until another factor in the situation changes. The nations instinctively insist upon the present procedure because of the intensity of national demands or policies. National policies being as vigorous, not to say as violent, or as virulent, as they are,

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no opportunity will be omitted to press them, as in the debates—or, rather, the negotiations,—of an international conference. Now what is needed is not simply a relaxation of the intensity of national policies out of hand; that could hardly be expected or demanded with any hope of success. What is needed is an appreciation on the part of the nations that national policy is not everything in such situations. The practice of acting on the basis of national policy alone presupposes that other nations will do the same, but it also assumes that national benefit is to be had by pressing the national policy through to successful fruition by any resources of power necessary and available for that purpose. It does not assume that any benefit is to be had by one state from the policy or action of other states or even, primarily, by exchange of benefits with other states. And it does not assume such a degree of equality of power with other states that trying to force the national policy through by diplomatic or military power is a dubious proceeding.

In short, conference, as a form of action, rests upon a set of assumptions which differ rather widely from the assumptions which underlie the ordinary conduct of international relations. It rests upon the assumption that there is a community interest, a community viewpoint, a certain degree of solidarity in interest and demand among the members of the international community. And it rests upon the assumption that the members of the international community are sufficiently near to equality in power to make dictation impossible and exchange of benefits the normal method of

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procedure. It ought to be possible, in conference, to evaluate proposed steps in accordance with a standard of community welfare and to secure their adoption by free consent. The nations do not act as though any of these views were sound. In the past they would not have been sound; perhaps there is going on a change whereby these views tend to become sound; and perhaps the nations are slow in perceiving this change. The present writer thinks that such a change is going on, and that the nations are slow in perceiving it. But it is more important to notice the presence of this problem in the field of international conference than to try to solve it offhand. If substantial degrees of international solidarity and equality do not develop, it is certain, conference will never develop far as an international method.

A number of details connected with the conduct of international conferences depend for their treatment upon the course of things in the matters just discussed. If the social or coöperative view of international relations be adopted then the holding of conferences more frequently becomes imperative. The collection of data by a central bureau becomes imperative, and the organization of the conference with considerations of efficiency alone in view. The question of securing action by vote, and by majority vote at that, becomes a practical question. The question of securing ratification of any agreements concluded in conference, so long as agreement remains the form given to the action taken by international conference, becomes important. If the individual nationalistic or competitive view of international

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relations be retained then the opposite of all of these statements tends to be true. Conference more than adjudication or administration cuts to the heart of inter-national relations in the issues which it raises in connection with mechanical procedural problems.

The writer believes that we are certain to see a great change in the conduct of international conferences in the future. Unless all signs fail there is going on an enormous increase in international economic and social solidarity in point of fact. The facts will make themselves felt eventually. There is going on a considerable tendency toward greater equality of power among the nations and this fact is already being felt; it is the most important single item in the whole range of present-day tendencies in international affairs. These developments are going to make international conference and international regulation, or legislation, more and more imperative. They are going to compel the abandonment of many cherished views concerning national sovereignty and independence—although what is needed is not so much abandonment of those views as restatement of them in line with the facts as they come to exist. They are, especially, going to demand the revision of many cherished limitations upon the conduct of international conferences. No other international institution, probably, is destined to experience as much of a reorganization, or as much of an expansion, in the coming years, as the conference. But what we shall see is not merely a quantitative increase in con-

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ferences held but a qualitative development of the institution as a whole.

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Chapter XIII

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION

ALL good Americans, all good citizens of the United States of America, that is, know that alliances are very bad things. They have been told so repeatedly and they know—probably unconsciously—that the United States has contracted no alliances since the day when the French alliance made so much embarrassment for President Washington and Secretary Jefferson alike. They have been warned against entangling alliances so frequently that the word “alliance” has come to signify something sinister in international relations, nothing less and nothing more. Because of this we fail almost entirely to understand one of the commonest phenomena of international life and the problem of international federation generally.

For the alliance is nothing more nor less than a simple league of nations. It is or it represents the beginning of international federation. Like international conference, it begins at the very bottom, and it rises to the very top, of the scale of international practices. It is not an inaccurate phrase in the Constitution of the United States that refers to the “treaty, alliance, or confederation” as steps all of which are of the same general character.

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Not, of course, that alliances are always helpful and hopeful arrangements. No nation in the world but the United States refuses, on principle, to make alliances, although this curious situation may have its own cause. And there has been a vast deal of misunderstanding and more or less deliberate misrepresentation in describing the operation of international alliances. But from one particular standpoint, and a very important standpoint at that, the alliance is the most objectionable form of international arrangement possible. Alliances are not, therefore, to be defended and justified in their entirety but they do seem to have a certain position in the general scheme of international constitutional growth.

An alliance is, at bottom, merely a combination of two nations for joint or common action. It can hardly rest on anything less formal than a written agreement, the treaty of alliance, though it might conceivably be based on oral agreements. It does not ordinarily involve any organized governmental union of the contracting parties or even the creation of any common governmental organ to act for the allies, although provision might be made for unified military command in appropriate circumstances. The joint action contemplated might be merely diplomatic in character, although as military action is the natural final form of national action it is therefore the final form of possible international coöperation or of action by an alliance. And the purposes for which the allies agree upon joint action

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may vary widely from defense of their rights to conquest of the world.

It is here that cynical students of international affairs condemn the alliance most freely. Alliances, it is said, are never truly defensive in character but are invariably intended to be used, and invariably are used, for offensive purposes. This is another phase of the assertion made in the same quarter that the idea of "defensive war" is a delusion and a snare. These assertions reflect chiefly the state of mind of those who make them. It is historically perfectly true that many alliances are made sincerely with defensive action alone in mind and are carried out faithfully in that spirit. It is sheer effrontery to disregard such facts.

In actual practice there develop many formal and legal aspects in connection with any alliance. Alliances are or have been family alliances, natural alliances, equal or unequal alliances, and a lot of other things. All of these varieties are, after all, varieties of the same basic device. The alliance between two states very unequal in power presents some interesting special political problems but the problems are problems of diplomatic tactics chiefly. So for the various legal problems concerning the duration of the pact, the circumstances which will bring it into operation, and other legal phases of the situation: they are interesting but relatively unimportant. In alliances as much as, and rather more than, in the case of treaties in general it is true that the effectiveness of the agreement depends upon the continuing desire of the parties to carry it into execution rather

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than upon the technical bonds of the document. It is the fundamental interests, not the formalities, that count.

Now just what is the poison involved in the alliance? Why should it be condemned by forward looking students of international affairs? Because it is based upon and exaggerates the competitive spirit in the relations among nations. Because it takes one nation and identifies it more or less with a second in opposition to all the rest. Because it sets off the allies against all the other members of the international community. Because when viewed from the standpoint of what is coming more and more to be needed today, namely the general federation of nations, it sets up obstacles and opposition of a peculiarly vicious kind. The alliance in contrast to the world league is the private combination against the general welfare.

From the other point of view, however, from the point of view of the beginnings of international coöperation, the alliance looks somewhat different. It serves to start the process of international union going. If it be true, as Tolstoi said, that the worst thing in human life was for men to go apart from one another and the best thing in life was for men to come together, it may also be said that union and not separation is the law of welfare in international life. The alliance starts that process of unification. And in proportion as the number of parties to an alliance increases the arrangement becomes more and more valuable in this direction.

It is, at the same time, important that alliances do in

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fact tend to become more and more comprehensive in scope. Early alliances were narrow in objective and restricted to two parties, in the main. That objective was mutual aid in defense against attack. Later this objective came to be described as "the maintenance of the balance of power." This implied a considerable broadening of the objective of the alliance. It soon developed that the maintenance of the balance of power constantly required for its achievement the collaboration of a larger and larger number of nations. Thus for one reason and another the alliance tends by the operation of causes outside itself to become broader as international relations mature and to approach more and more closely the true international federation.

The idea of the balance of power is not unfamiliar at least by name to most of us. The phrase has been used a great deal in discussion of international relations in the past four hundred years. Yet it is badly understood, and, like the diplomat and the alliance, subjected to much unmerited abuse.

By a balance of power is meant substantial equality of power, of course, equality as between two nations or two groups of nations or among as many nations as are involved in the situation where the balance is to be maintained. It is not in the central idea itself but in certain subordinate aspects of the concept that the important points arise.

To begin with, this is not a rule of international law which binds the nations as such. There is no principle of international law which forbids inequality of power among

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the nations, although this means that the principle of international law which requires equal respect for the rights of all nations is thus deprived of what may seem to be its only logical basis. And no such principle will be adopted, in all probability, in any predictable period of time.

At the same time, and by contrast, this is not merely an idea from the foreign policy program of one nation, Great Britain, for example. Great Britain has indeed supported the doctrine of the balance of power very vigorously but so also, at times, have France and Germany and other nations. The principle has, in fact, enjoyed rather wide-spread support among the nations. The United States may again be said to stand in a minority of one, in so far as we have objected to the doctrine.

The doctrine of the balance of power is therefore a maxim of international policy. No nation, it might be stated, should, as a matter of prudence, be allowed to acquire such a predominant position as to upset the balance of power and endanger the liberties of its neighbors. And if by its natural growth any nation threatens to acquire such a position the remedy is for its neighbors to ally themselves together to prevent such a result. The picture is then complete.

It will now be clear that this action tends to expand in scale as time goes by and the range of national influence increases through increased facilities for communication. At first it is a local balance of power which must be preserved. Then a continental balance. Today the theater of operation of the principle is the world. The colonial expan-

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sion of France in Asia and Africa affects her position in Europe. The maintenance of the balance therefore requires world alliance.

The idea of the balance of power has been severely criticized, again chiefly by unrealistic and sentimental students of international affairs. Following the doctrine of the balance has been said to lead to conspiracy and intrigue and competition in power and armaments and even to that very thing which it was intended to prevent, spoliation of the weak neighbor by partition by agreement between the balancing rivals. It has been said that the principle does not preserve the peace but leads to alliances, counteralliances, a nightmare of alliances, and war.

In one central point this criticism is not so much unsound as impertinent. The object of the preservation of a balance of power among nations is not the preservation of peace but the protection of national liberty. It is believed that in a state of balance a nation inclined to become aggressive would be less likely to anticipate success in any venture and hence more likely to remain inactive. Moreover, merely not going to war to preserve the balance would not preserve a peace already broken by the aggressor. But the principle specifically calls for military action—war, as things still stand today—for its support under certain circumstances. It is felt that preservation of national liberty is preferable to peace in subjugation.

Most of the other criticism of the doctrine of the balance is sound, or at least literally accurate. The doctrine does

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tend to encourage the practice of competitive diplomacy and the employment of dubious devices for preventing national ascendancy on the part of the rival. But it is believed these evils are less objectionable than the evil of loss of national liberty. In part they tend to be cured by the same process which tends to convert the alliance into a league. As the balance must be preserved on a wider and wider scale, more effective—sounder, deeper, more effective—methods must be employed than petty conspiracy or intrigue. But finally the answer lies in the fact that the maintenance of the balance of power under modern conditions comes to be a task which rises above the level of diplomacy entirely and reaches the realm of international government. Two nations cannot, in these later days, maintain the balance by their own efforts. Three cannot, six cannot. The result is that the effort to maintain the balance develops into the organization and operation of an international concert. The chief merit of the doctrine of the balance, apart from its inherent soundness, like the chief merit of the alliance, resides in the fact that it leads on to something else, which is a very important service to perform.

The scathing comments which have been made by observers in regard to the lack of harmony in the performances of the international concert have been many. The cats on the back fence and the Paineville Discord Band have been cited by way of illustrating the impression made by the Powers in their efforts to produce concord and melody

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among their numbers. The international concert has appeared to many to lack that concert of spirit and voice which must be the essence of any true or effective group activity.

The international concert was, historically, not much more than a loose group of powers intended to exercise a certain amount of influence for the preservation of peace. It was never a narrow and formal alliance, looking ultimately to military action for the accomplishment of its designs. It was not yet a universal league of nations based upon a written constitution and operating by regular constitutional methods.

In the beginning the international concert was, and was called, the Concert of Europe. It grew out of the attempt of certain monarchical powers—Russia, Austria, and Prussia—to set up, under the name of “The Holy Alliance,” a close union for the preservation of peace and the legally established order of things in the years after 1815. When the Alliance failed, because England would not participate in its activities in suppressing popular revolution and maintaining monarchical privileges, the Concert came gradually to take its place. The Concert functioned rather effectively from 1825 to 1865 but was rendered increasingly ineffective by the Austro-Prussian and the Franco-Prussian wars and the division of Europe into two armed camps after 1875. When attempts were made, in the end of the century and in the last years prior to 1914, to revive the Concert, it was seen that it was no longer merely a concert of Europe.

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Turkey had been taken into the circle of powers in 1856, Japan in 1895. The United States, by her victory over Spain in 1898, her presence at The Hague in 1899, her actions in Far Eastern affairs in 1900 and 1901, and her actions at Portsmouth in 1905 and at Algeciras in 1906, not to mention the Second Hague Conference, in 1907, had attained the rank of a world power herself. Latin American countries and China were present at The Hague in 1907. By that date the Concert of Europe had become a world concert at least as far as geography was concerned.

Actually the concert now had little or no authority or prestige. It was cut in two by the European schism between France and Germany, Austria and Russia. When the threat of war came in 1914 the concert was ineffective to stop it. Alliances to preserve a balance, a concert to preserve the balance with peace: the former succeeded, at a tremendous price, in the years 1914-1918, because the latter had failed. In 1918 the world was confronted with the task of reorganizing the international concert as an effective league of nations, as an alternative to a recrudescence of alliances to maintain a balance of power.

The problem of international or interstate federation was not exactly a new one. Three or four distinct approaches had been made toward that goal in previous years.

For centuries practical men had experimented with leagues or unions of states among people of the same nationality or where the local conditions of life were fairly uniform. Greek and Italian city-states had formed rather

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successful leagues centuries ago. Such federations reappeared in late Medieval Europe. Switzerland provided a sterling example of the practical possibilities of federation or confederation among communities of divergent nationality. The United States had carried forward, despite all difficulties, the most elaborate and the most successful experiment at federal union on a large scale the world had ever seen. All of these experiences meant something.

For centuries also scientific men had studied the problem of peace and international union and had produced at one time or another a number of draft projects for international federation. German and French and American and other scholars had at least familiarized people with the idea of "a Parliament of Man, a Federation of the World." Certain projects of this sort produced during the years 1914-1918 contained many sound and realistic suggestions.

Nor were the experiences of the preceding hundred years with courts of arbitration, administrative bureaus, and international conferences without value. They permitted the nations to begin in 1918 with certain institutions already established. They taught lessons valuable in the expansion of the existing system. They revealed the shortcomings of what had gone before and the specific needs of the moment. The actual weaknesses of organized international coöperation—such as the lack of a continuous council of conciliation with obligatory jurisdiction—were known by 1918 because and only because of these experiences.

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Finally the experience with the concert in the years prior to 1914 were of the most immediate importance. The success of the concert prior to 1865, its weakness after 1875, these were known, together with the reasons therefor. Known also was the fact that only by the reestablishment of such a concert could anything serious be accomplished in the cause of international pacification. This meant that the work of rebuilding world peace began very largely in rebuilding the concert, in the form of the continuous Council of conciliation of the League of Nations.

In the formation of the League of Nations, however, there were encountered certain problems inherent in the effort at international federation under any name. There are many such difficulties but three are of paramount importance both in theory and in practical life. They may be called the problem of sovereignty, the problem of distribution of power, and the problem of enforcement.

The problem of sovereignty may be stated very sharply. How is it possible to establish effective international authority if the dogma of national sovereignty is to be respected? Men had encountered this problem in the establishment of the United States of America and had solved it in part by repeating frequently to themselves the formula "a sovereign Union of sovereign States" and in part by a division of powers between the Union and the States. But can such a solution be found in the international field? The problem may seem highly theoretical, yet it has one or two highly practical aspects. Aside from the fact that it counts very

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heavily in the American attitude toward the problem of international federation it influences constantly the presumption for or against international federation in general and the degree of authority enjoyed at any moment by any federation which actually is established.

How is it possible to reconcile international authority with national sovereignty? National sovereignty, or the principle of national sovereignty, holds that no state may be obliged to do anything to which it does not itself consent. Now if any effective international control is to be set up states must be bound by court decisions, administrative orders or rulings, and perhaps council or conference recommendations or agreements. How can these things be?

The answer seems to be perfectly plain and perfectly practical, in spite of the apparent logical or theoretical difficulty of the problem. A state may be bound by a court decision or other action of an international authority as a result of an original agreement whereby it agrees to be so bound, without experiencing either a violation of its sovereignty against its will or a voluntary loss of sovereignty by this action. The doctrine of sovereignty proscribes only actions inflicted upon a state against its will. It does not forbid the state voluntarily to subject itself to majority decisions or any other form of governmental treatment. Even the agreement to remain forever a member of a federal union does not—according to the American theory, as expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States—destroy

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or extinguish the sovereignty of the state voluntarily making such an agreement.

Such an explanation may seem unduly simple. There are, of course, many many subsidiary logical and practical problems involved. There is the problem of the state "compelled" by force to accept an arrangement "against its will." There is the problem of the state which gladly accepts a certain arrangement at a given time but is bitterly opposed to it when the time comes for its application. To the first there is a short and simple answer, namely, that no matter what may be the case in boundary settlements or peace treaties nobody proposes the establishment of any international federal union by any except the most freely given voluntary consent. And to the latter the reply is that the original agreement, which is the basis for the later application, is, in law and in practice as well, the basis for that later action and as valid as an expression of the will of the state as any current disinclination to have that agreement applied. An individual is never coerced unless he is corporeally coerced, a nation likewise usually agrees to the pressure but is not actually coerced. It is believed that all other similar objections to the doctrine of the original agreement as a means of reconciling national sovereignty and international authority can be similarly met.

The conclusive proof for most people, however, that national sovereignty and international authority can be reconciled in this way, and are so reconciled, that being bound by a later decision to which it has assented in advance by

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such an original agreement as is here supposed is not to be considered a loss of sovereignty, is found in the action and attitude of national Governments and public officials in such matters. These officials sign such agreements with no apparent feeling that they are thereby signing away national sovereignty. They subject their states to the application of such arrangements at a later date without any such feeling. In actual fact all of the sovereign states of the world have signed and submitted to such agreements with no admission of any loss of sovereignty whatever. This might seem to be fairly convincing——.

A second great problem to be faced in the organization and operation of an international federation is the problem of the distribution of power or the division of powers between the union and the states, the league and the nations. Such a problem has arisen in all of the administrative unions already established, as it has, of course, in the United States. In part this is another phase of the problem of sovereignty, or it provides another solution for that problem. Powers given to the union may be regarded as delegated to the union by the states, the union being, therefore, not the master but the servant of the states. Or the powers of government may be divided, as they must normally be divided, between central union and local state Governments. It is then quite obvious that each is sovereign in its own sphere——.

Of course, the problem of distribution is more than a phase of the problem of sovereignty. It is, in the early stages of development of international government, merely

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the problem of how far to go in setting up such government. In other words it is synonymous with the problem of creating such a government at all. But sooner or later it becomes necessary to decide whether a given subject should be handed over to the international authority for regulation or left in the hands of individual nations. The typical problem of distribution then arises: which subjects properly belong within the jurisdiction of the central authorities, which within that of the local authorities?

The task of answering that question is not easy, but, fortunately, it is not urgent. It will, in fact, answer itself if natural developments are not resisted and dogmatic ideas not opposed to simple facts. There is no way of answering the question in principle so as to avoid need for further thought. To say that matters of common concern should go to central authorities and matters of local concern only to the local states is sound but it leaves determination of which matters fall within each category to further consideration. There are, on the other hand, those who instinctively resist the concentration of power in the hands of central authorities at the expense of the states. The fact is that there operates within the life of the states in the world a tendency toward international centralization. One topic after another—extradition, export and import regulations, migration, armaments, nationality,—which has been a matter of national discretion in the past is recognized by treaty agreement to be ripe for international regulation in one degree or another. And if attempts are not made to restrict by

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dogma the natural evolution of the system the problem of distribution will take care of itself. We are not likely to stand in great danger of international overcentralization for years to come. We are suffering at present very seriously from gross international decentralization. The problem of distribution should be allowed to settle itself by natural processes.

Finally, given the establishment of an international federation in reasonable accord with cherished ideas of national sovereignty, given a reasonable solution of the problem of distribution, what about enforcement? Is it needed? How provide it? What form, if any, should it take?

The problem of enforcement has not been acute in the past. International government—arbitration, administration, and conference—has been based so largely upon voluntary action, conditioned so strictly by unanimous consent, and confined so closely to relatively unimportant matters, that cases of defiance of international authority have been few. But if international government is to be extended in scope, based upon majority action, or upon original agreements which must operate thereafter upon somewhat unwilling signatories, the situation will be different.

Of course there are certain sanctions which may be counted upon to operate automatically. The interests which lead nations to set up international authorities lead them to respect those authorities, more or less. The desire to have the other nations respect those arrangements operates to a

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like result. The force of public opinion—in reality a phase of the preceding influence—has a similar effect. But it is the provision and operation of extrinsic not intrinsic sanctions which presents the difficulty.

External enforcement of international authority might take one of several forms. An international police force has often been suggested. Such a police force would, presumably, compel respect for any international guarantees already set up and respect for decisions of the international authorities in the ordinary course of their activities. It might intervene in the territories of individual states for any reason which seemed to the international authorities to call for such action.

The difficulties in the way of such a program are obvious. Technical difficulties alone are almost insuperable: is the international police force to be a single corps or to consist of units contributed by the nations as such; if the former, how is the corps to be recruited; if the latter, who is to be in command and where are supplies to be purchased? Political difficulties are formidable—they are today decisive in preventing any such action—: the larger states, who would have to do the international policing, will not assume the task! Coupled with the technical difficulties it appears that the present political conditions among the nations—American timidity, British self-absorption, Russian isolation—make the organization of international enforcement impossible from a purely practical point of view. To be effective a system of sanctions must be strong enough to cope with the

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strongest nation or group of nations which should attempt to defy the community, and rest upon international coöperation solid enough to hold together in such circumstances; neither seems possible today.

The greatest opposition to international enforcement is likely to be felt, of course, by devotees of national liberty and independence. It is not this obstacle which has prevented the establishment of international enforcement in the world during the past ten years, at least not such opposition on the part of the Governments of the world. It has been timidity on the part of the Anglo-American publics and their indifference to a solution of the problem of effective international government that has held up progress in this direction. But the fundamental problem remains in existence beneath the surface and will emerge whenever Anglo-American collaboration for international enforcement is won: just how far is it desirable to go in establishing international order and in restricting national liberty? With all allowances for the doctrine of the original agreement, for the distribution of powers in the international federation in accord with the real needs of the situation, the fundamental problem remains: how far is the imposition of enforced order among the nations desirable? This question we—more likely our descendants—will have to decide.

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Chapter XIV

WAR

As these lines are written, on the youngest, the American, shore of the Pacific Ocean, a treaty is being signed in Paris, most sophisticated capital of old-world diplomacy, by which the leading powers of the world agree to renounce war in their dealings one with another. Other nations are expected to adhere later. The day may be memorable in the history of international relations. Just what does it mean? What is war and how is it related to international life?

“War,” of course, consists of general military action taken by one Government against another Government by land or by sea, or in the air also in these later years. It is not merely piracy, or riot, or rebellion, or revolution—colonial or otherwise—unless the latter assume such proportions as to lead the mother country or other countries to recognize it as war in the full legal sense of the term. It is not military intervention by one state in the territory of another for limited objectives, such as the protection of nationals abroad or suppression of persistent banditry endangering the safety of the intervening state. It is not reprisals by one state against another along limited lines, such as the arrest of citizens, seizure of property, embargo of

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ships, or other such specific action. Many of these things may lead to war. Many of these things may look like war to some extent. They are none of them war in the formal sense of the term as used in official international relations. And they are not as bad as war in a practical sense. The Chinese delegate at The Hague in 1907 complained that military expeditions such as the one which had been conducted by the Powers with the object of suppressing the Boxer movement in his country in 1900 were indistinguishable from, if not worse than, war. The military activities of the United States in Nicaragua in recent years have been characterized by critics of the Government as war. This seems nonsense. Such activities differ from war not only in name and legal status but in extent, objective, and by every other standard by which they may be measured. War by the United States in Nicaragua would involve action by the full force of the United States to subdue and occupy the whole country and to capture or destroy all the forces and the Government of the nation. War consists in general international hostilities with general objectives, not the special limited types of military action recently more familiar in the world.

The point at which the practice of war becomes significant is obviously at the point of causation. What produces war in the world, war between nations?

Clearly the causes of war lie deep in the facts of international life. Such a tremendous cataclysm as war is not produced by slight causes. Relatively slight occasions in the

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surface facts of international life may provide the decisive incident in leading to the operation of these causes and the outburst of war. But between the technological or mechanical occasions for war and the fundamental causes thereof there is an important difference.

No complete survey has ever been made of the causes of war. Desire for territory, either for its mineral or other wealth and population or for its value, if unsettled, as a home for settlement; desire for independence from imperialistic domination; commercial rivalry;—these are causes which have led to war in modern times. Dynastic rivalries and religious differences were among the important causes of war in earlier times. Other such factors have acted to cause the outbreak of war by leading to disagreements, demands and counterdemands, and the beginning of hostilities. These are in the strictest and truest sense of the term the causes of war.

Between these causes of war and the mechanical breakdowns which allow diplomacy to turn into hostilities there exist and operate several factors or influences which are neither causes nor mechanical occasions for war. They serve to exaggerate the force of the causes and to provoke the occasions for their operation. They are militaristic and nationalistic feelings and propaganda. The former are projections of the sense of national unity and the worth of a single nation, and of the power of the national military equipment. They serve to exaggerate the sense of national right and of national might in any given situation. The use

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of propaganda—publicity, advertising, education—by official authorities or private interested parties may or may not be needed to stir up such feelings, but if employed it serves to produce the same results. These factors neither modify nor in any way satisfy the causes or demands which make for war, but they emphasize and exaggerate them in all sorts of ways.

To these influences should be added the factor of modern journalism. Newspapers must sell in large numbers. Advertisers pay for space according to circulation figures and it is the payments from advertisers which support the paper. People will buy sensational news as they will not buy even good news. A newspaper correspondent at Geneva asked a delegate on the Council of the League of Nations one day whether there were any news. "Yes," said the delegate, "we succeeded this afternoon in preventing war between this state and that." "Hell, that is not news," said the correspondent, "but if you had failed to prevent war that would have been news." Hence the newspaper plays up news of international disagreement. And in addition the editor is very likely to desire to pose as a patriot and a statesman by supporting editorially the position of his own country in the crisis. This may be done in all sincerity or it may be done to boost circulation or it may be done because the editor owns oil lands or other interests in the neighboring state. In any event it has an effect similar to that of nationalistic and militaristic propaganda.

It is, however, the actual outbreak of war and the cir-

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cumstances thereof which demand attention today. If the disease of war is to be treated we must apply the treatment not, indeed, to the symptoms merely, but at least to the features of international relations where the causes of war operate to produce overt action or the beginning of hostilities.

War supervenes between two nations, it is true, by the action of the executive authorities of those nations. Military action is ordered by the military authorities or by the supreme civil authorities, Presidents or Prime Ministers, or a declaration of war is sent to another state by these authorities to be followed by orders for military action. Now these steps may be taken on the initiative of the executive officials themselves, if the national laws permit, or only after action by a representative assembly. In either case the executive officials must be in position to rely upon popular support. The simple fact of the matter is that the people themselves or their representatives authorize or permit such action or it never would be taken.

The critic of the professional diplomat and of the conduct of international relations will contend that the people and their representatives are induced to take such action by the representations of the executive officials. The Congress has never declared war on behalf of the United States except upon recommendation of the President. It is argued that the executive official either places the country in such a position that it cannot escape from acceding to his recommendation

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or that he brings such arguments to bear upon the popular assembly as to compel it to follow his lead.

This may all be granted, but we are still left with the question whether the executive takes such action without justification and whether he acts deliberately without sufficient reason. It may be admitted that on various occasions rulers or executive officials have arbitrarily carried a country into war knowing that the grounds in international relations were insufficient to justify such action. War has been used to quiet internal dissent and sustain a Government in power. But this must be rare in the nature of things and certainly has become almost impossible today in the presence of active popular control of executive officials. Impossible, that is, unless the executive can convince the popular assembly of the reasonableness of the cause for war. It is here that we reach the core of the problem. Can executive officials succeed in making out a case for war, when the grounds are insufficient in fact to justify war?

Again the answer seems to be that executive officials have in the past succeeded in convincing their people on inadequate grounds. They may continue to do so until people become capable of detecting the insufficiency of the case made out by the executive. The executive holds a tremendous advantage in making up a case for war. He can manipulate diplomatic exchanges so as to provoke ill-feeling abroad and at home. He can influence the press. He can stir up all manner of popular feelings and prejudices and utilize the news reports of international relations to that end. If

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he desires to do so he can probably fool the people very effectively. And providing for a popular referendum on the question would not alter this situation much; it might even give the executive and the politicians and the editors an opportunity to play upon the mob spirit such as they do not even now possess.

This does not imply that the responsible public official is very likely to attempt this sort of thing very frequently. For one thing, he may be credited with reasonable solicitude for the welfare of the nation and a desire to serve it well. For another, war places such a strain upon the national finances and national life generally in these days, that the public official makes trouble for himself by getting his country into war. This is particularly true of the treasury official. It seems that considerations of this type have operated very noticeably in the past decade: the nations could not afford war and treasury authorities have known this and held back the diplomats and the military. The military authorities are, of course, much more likely to lean toward war. They lean toward expansion of armaments, and they lean toward the use of those armaments. But in the general run of affairs it cannot be held that public authorities commonly press for war in spite of knowledge that war is not justified.

Without any special desire, indeed, to whitewash the diplomat or the executive official charged with the conduct of a nation's foreign relations, it seems that it is just here that chief emphasis should be placed. The diplomat and the executive and even the military official is charged with de-

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fense or promotion of the national interest. He cannot forget that. Nor can he feel certain that his action will be approved if he sacrifices the more immediate national interest to the more remote, even if the latter interest be a broader and deeper and more permanent interest such as preservation of peace. It is not impossible to discover cases where such officials have felt driven to take more drastic steps, to advocate war, against their own better judgment.

When to this predicament is added the inadequacy of the mechanical facilities for handling critical international disputes the rôle of the diplomat becomes anything but enviable. There have been pictures drawn of how diplomats make war, portraying these villainous gentlemen as being engaged in a highly exciting game of their own and as being concerned only with their own success therein. That picture is partially sound for certain individual diplomats in the past. In the main it is spurious romantic dime-novel fiction. The diplomat with the best will in the world could hardly escape his fate—to bring war upon his country—in view of the position in which he is placed. Not only is he under the pressure just described but he has entirely inadequate tools with which to work. Written diplomatic communications are hopelessly inadequate as a method for handling an acute international crisis: imagine a physician treating a desperately sick patient by correspondence. Personal conferences of individual diplomats are impossibly dramatic and narrowly competitive. General conferences are difficult or impossible to convene in times of crisis. The

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pressure for quick and also successful termination of the crisis is such as to destroy that ease of thought and discussion which is more than ever needed in such a situation. And reference of the dispute to arbitration or outside mediation seems to amount in itself to surrender. The diplomat's constant desire to avoid a crisis may be appreciated when the inadequate means available for handling a crisis when it has arisen are considered.

What happens, therefore, is that the public officials—diplomatic, military, and general executive officials—are likely to act, though in all sincerity, on grounds insufficient to justify war. They, like the popular assembly and people at large, have made little study of the problem of war, its costs, its rational justification, if any, and its possible value or benefits. It is hardly saying too much to assert that nations get into war as much by the insufficiently critical judgment of the possible results on the part of executive officials as by such ineptitude on the part of the people. The phrase “war breaks out” is hardly inaccurate; executive officials are led to recommend war by the turn of events rather than by a competently calculated consideration of probable gain and loss. When they are caught in the confusion surrounding such a crisis and are assisted or driven forward by waves of popular feeling which they themselves may or may not have set in motion, the course of events is likely to justify this description even more completely.

This obviously suggests an examination of the objectives in war and its possible values. War is resorted to in the face

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of a refusal of another country to meet some diplomatic demand made upon it. That demand may be a demand for satisfaction of some alleged right under international law and refusal of arbitration or conference upon the subject. It is more likely to be a demand for some satisfaction not provided by law, some demand of policy, such as cession of territory, independence for a colony, or something of this order. The objective in mind at the start may be definite but it is more likely to be somewhat general and political in character.

Immediately upon the outbreak of war, at all events, the original objective is swallowed up in the general situation. The political aspects of the situation become paramount. The attainment of a position in which the other state can be compelled to concede whatever is demanded, the original satisfaction and any other that may be desired, is the goal. The objective of war after war has begun is subjugation of the enemy to the will of the state going to war.

We are now in the realm of military art and science. The diplomatic interchange has ceased, to reappear only when military supremacy over the enemy is achieved, or definitely lost, or when the military situation becomes such that persistence along that line seems unprofitable.

This does not, however, mean, as might be supposed, that the appropriate method for conducting hostilities is indiscriminate violence against the enemy. There occurs, indeed, at this point, a curious refinement of the immediate objectives of the warring nation which seems incongruous at first

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glance. The military objective is not to injure the other nation. It is not to injure its people. The killing or wounding of soldiers of the enemy is no necessary part of the objective of military operations. The objective is to secure control of or neutralize his power of resistance. Occupation of his territory, and control of the inhabitants thereof, seizure of his public wealth, capture of his armed forces or their dispersal, prevention of the operation of his Government, these are the decisive steps. Killing his soldiers occurs as an incident in the course of these steps. This is said not out of a desire to be either flippant or pedantic, but in order to emphasize the true character of war: to impose the national will upon the enemy.

Because of the nature of this objective and also for purely humanitarian reasons, the conduct of war has been subjected to detailed regulations and restrictions in modern times. The two reasons just mentioned have played almost equal parts in producing the result mentioned. Using exceptionally cruel weapons, for example, is condemned by the rules of war because it produces unnecessary suffering but also because it has no relation to military success except, indeed, to rouse unreasonable resistance on the part of the enemy troops. Military men have written most of the rules of war with the effective conduct of war in mind. Protection for the civilian population aims not only to spare the non-participant but also to spare the military from his resentment and attack. The principle of war is that the nation of

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superior fighting power must triumph, and the rules of war are aimed at this end.

The effectiveness of these rules of war is doubted by many lay critics. Governments have not shared this view. Codes of the laws of war have been elaborated and issued to all military authorities in all practical seriousness. Military officers know their value in preserving order among the troops and preventing diversion of attention to pillaging and abuse of the enemy populace, with consequent retaliation therefrom or from enemy troops in accordance with recognized rights of reprisal. Violations of the laws of war occur in the main at the hands of the private soldier who disregards the national objects of military operations. Courts martial are burdened with the task of punishing him for his excesses. And in spite of atrocity literature and whispered tales of personal experiences in the field from individual soldiers it can be said in all accuracy that the rules of war are as well observed as traffic laws in peaceful communities and as well as can be expected in the disordered conditions of military activity. They are observed sufficiently well to justify the Governments in continuing their use although they are not observed as well as the military authorities desire. If anyone thinks that the rules of war count for nothing let him examine the conduct of troops in the field before the modern rules of war were developed and applied.

This does not mean, however, that the results of conducting military hostilities on a wide scale are capable of being confined to any neat and exact limits. Waging war to

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secure a national demand is like firing a load of buckshot to hit a sparrow. The effects on human beings, on property, on social relations, on social and individual thought and feeling, and the legal consequences of war are widespread and disastrous. There is little necessity—and little possibility—to exaggerate the scope and seriousness of these effects. The actual loss of life in modern war, and the injury to human bodies, has been exaggerated in the popular mind, in comparison with the loss of life and the injuries suffered in industry and in peaceful life. But the widespread injury to life and limb caused by the conduct of war both among military and non-combatant persons is hard to calculate. The destruction of property is likewise not unlimited but it is enormous, particularly if we take into account the values destroyed in sustaining military activities, the credit values destroyed, and the whole range of injury to national economic life. It is in the almost unlimited and the incalculable injuries caused to social relations and social psychology that war produces its most disastrous effects. The fact is that war is strictly incompatible with modern life, social and individual. Business and normal individual life, sane thinking and feeling and human behavior generally are all put out of existence by such an abnormal procedure. War and civilization cannot be reconciled in principle or in fact.

The legal consequences are equally absurd. In the course of war the original issue becomes obscured. Subordinate issues take on new importance. New issues arise. And all are treated at the end of the war either by the same legal

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standards available at the beginning—if the war be inconclusive—, or by reference to considerations of relative military success which have no bearing upon the merits of the issues at all. The most serious indictment of war lies in the fact that it does not necessarily accomplish any result in terms of its original objective even when it is successful, and even if we disregard its inordinate cost. War fails because it is ineffective.

This statement can be made today with reasons which did not obtain in earlier years. Wars for liberation of oppressed communities or for preservation of national unity were different matters; they are not likely to be as numerous or as necessary now, with the recent widespread acquisition of self-government. Wars between independent nations for the purpose of securing satisfaction of demands made by one upon the other are what we must consider. Today such wars are relatively few—the ratio of peace-years to war-years has risen greatly in the past century—, and each is more or less unique in its causation, but they are all alike incalculable in their results. They develop, after their outbreak, and this both as to the parties and the issues involved, until they are unrecognizable. They are indecisive, if not from a military point of view—and even this is more likely to be the case as time goes on, for technological reasons involved in military science—at least from the political point of view. As a form of international competition, military action has become technologically pointless.

Apart entirely from the movement for peace from with-

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out, therefore, the institution of war itself tends to be eliminated by the operation of internal causes. Resort to violence among human beings or groups of individuals may be suppressed or avoided or neutralized from outside. It is more likely to disappear, as dueling disappeared, because of influences operating within the activity itself.

It might be possible to formulate a prediction along these lines which would in general terms give an indication of the probable evolution of international practice in this connection. War, it might be said, will be abandoned by the nations when all prospective belligerent nations stand to lose more by war than any one of them can possibly gain and when all such nations come to see this. By nations here, of course, is meant the system of public authorities or officials and the people themselves in those nations. With increasing public control of executive officials and the conduct of national foreign relations this unified conception becomes possible and accurate. When all peoples and Governments see the probable net loss of war, war will be abandoned by the nations.

Such ideas are not new. Angell, and Bloch before Angell, predicted something of this kind. Both made the mistake of attempting to calculate too closely or specifically the net values involved and both were biased in making those calculations by pacifist prepossessions. Both overrated the intelligence of peoples and Governments. But the principle holds good today. It appears that war has now become unprofitable in fact and that people and their officials are coming

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to see this fact. At times, however,—just now, for example—it seems that the lesson of 1914-1918 was not learned quite thoroughly enough. Another year of war might have been effective in this direction. Another general war in the future may be needed. All this is relatively subordinate to the central proposition, namely, that when war comes to be, and comes to be understood to be, unprofitable, it will be abandoned.

In the meantime the nations or certain reflective individuals in the various nations who are concerned for reasons of personal or social interest to study and treat the problem of war and peace busy themselves in supplanting war or building peace from without the range of war itself. These activities are connected with the increased cost and decreased benefits of war but they start from independent grounds and they operate by independent and varied methods.

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Chapter XV

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It was Theodore Roosevelt, if memory serves aright, who complained that the picture of peace which was painted by too many of the advocates of peace reminded him of "one damned long Sunday afternoon walk." Certainly too many of the pictures of peace which have been drawn by its devotees have lacked the element of vigor which the concept must have if it is to appeal to hearty and wholesome spirits. It is not the peace of the grave-yard which is desirable in the world of nations but the peace of the well-kept fruit orchard. The ideal of peace must make room for the elements of life and growth along with the element of order and tranquillity if it is to command respect.

One of the most serious defects in the peace movement of the past has resided in the failure to define at all the goal sought. It has been assumed that everyone knew what was sought in the name of peace, just as it has been erroneously assumed that all understood the nature of war. As a result the advocates of peace have been left in tacit disagreement upon the nature of the goal sought and, more serious still, in disagreement, open and violent disagreement, concerning the proper means to be adopted to attain that end. It is necessary to begin by a definition of peace.

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It should be easy to agree that the friends of peace do not seek elimination of all international competition or all competition among the peoples of the various nations. Such a goal would lie outside the limits of the possible, for one thing. As the militarists are fond of asserting—with exaggerated implications for their own cause, of course—struggle is the essence of life. And, what is more to the point still, it is positively undesirable to eliminate all competition among the nations and their peoples in the field of art and science and industry and trade. The efforts for supremacy among the peoples in these fields are powerful in advancing the progress of human life and culture in the world.

It should also be possible to agree that friends of peace do not wish to eliminate and cannot hope to eliminate all use of military force by the nations. The use of force to suppress disorder within the individual nation, and, more clearly still, the use of force to suppress such activities as piracy and slave-trade upon the seas must be approved by all except those who take an absolute and uncompromising attitude of opposition to the use of all force for control of human actions. But it would be impossible to secure adoption of such an attitude by the nations and most people believe it to be unsound in principle.

Finally the friends of peace need not, in principle at least, oppose the use of force by the nations acting as an international community for the repression of national aggression against another nation and the general international peace and order. Such action, if it had to be put

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into actual operation, would probably defeat its own purpose and lead to an extension of international violence rather than its repression, and it can hardly be organized today in such a certain or reliable manner as to operate effectively as a pure threat. But in principle such action is clearly different from war. If the international community should act by armed force to repress a peace-breaking state the action would partake of the nature of police protection and differ fundamentally from the action of the aggressor state itself. At the same time it must be clear that such action, even if it becomes possible to organize and utilize it, must be reduced to an absolute minimum. Friends of peace may safely leave such a problem to the future, in view of its remoteness from actual accomplishment today.

Peace may, then, be defined as the elimination of military conflict between individual nations, with the substitution therefor, perhaps, of a minimum of international military action for protection of national rights. This would leave the way open for peaceful international competition in all the arts of life and international coöperation of all sorts.

It is obvious that even when so redefined peace is a negative goal. An attempt has been made in various quarters to confer upon peace an affirmative aspect by clothing it with references to creative international competition and coöperation. That effort represents a step in advance, in a certain sense, but it seems unsound in strict theory. What the friends of peace should do is to recognize that peace is merely a negative ideal, that it is a mere first step in the

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improvement of international relations, not the whole of the international problem, and that it must be supplemented by efforts for affirmative international coöperation. They will find that peace may best be attained, probably, by concentrating their efforts upon promotion of such coöperation from the very beginning.

What, then, are the most reasonable and promising steps to be taken for establishing and maintaining peace among the nations? To assume to suggest an answer to this world-perplexing question is to risk appearing presumptuous. The urgency of the question justifies all students of international relations, however, in contributing what they can to its solution.

The economists and the more radical students of the problem insist upon attacking the roots of the institution of war, as they see it, and demand elimination of the causes of war, material and spiritual. The more extreme forms of international financial and commercial rivalry must be eliminated together with the forces of national animosity or the fighting instinct. "Unless ye have peace in your hearts"—This is the sort of "logic" which neglects some of the premises and hence becomes illogical. The causes of war are as deep and as wide as human life. They cannot be eliminated. It is impossible to obtain universal free-trade and abolition of restrictions upon access to raw materials or readily to exorcise the spirit of pugnacity in its entirety from the human heart. Men have not attempted to build domestic peace upon any such unattainable foundation.

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New causes for fighting will appear to replace those removed. The elimination of the causes for war is an impossible and a Sisyphean task.

This includes the effort to secure the adoption by any important number of people of an attitude of non-resistance or a spirit of complete brotherhood toward other peoples. Even if such an attitude were sociologically sound it would be impossible of attainment for years and decades to come. Education of people to such a level of sentimental world unity would take generations and in the interval the outbreak of war would not only retard that process but might destroy the foundations of civilized life itself. As anything like an exclusive method of attaining peace this method must be condemned, albeit with sympathy for the motives of those to whom it appeals.

It is just here, of course, that so many persons of vigorous and constructive spirit are estranged from the peace movement. Youth movements and women's leagues for peace are unconvincing. The pacifist of the sentimental type, carrying an olive branch in one hand and a white dove in the other, makes "practical" men see red. The merits are much divided between these two persons, but it is deplorable that the peace movement should lose the support of just the person to whom it should appeal, the "practical" man. The latter should, certainly, recognize the importance of sentiment and even aspiration in the world of human affairs, but the pacifist should recognize the importance of common sense also.

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It is, of course, desirable to distinguish between the repudiation of war by persons emotionally hyper-sensitive to ideas of pain and suffering and the repudiation of war by persons too sensible to be fooled into disregard of relative values, mercenary or others. There is no question whatsoever that many of the advocates of peace are simply "soft"—soft physically or nervously in a very special way; unable to contemplate or bear suffering. And that another person, also an absolutist conscientious objector, may be very brave in driving an ambulance does not render the attitude which he takes a sound one either. The conscientious objector is either unable or unwilling to accept physical and nervous suffering or the idea of suffering for an ulterior social purpose unless that purpose be such as to appeal to him personally. But the person who sees that going to war "to defend the nation" often means engaging in an activity which costs millions in life and property for the sake of no adequate return is in an entirely different category. He probably will not shout his view from the housetops and he may go to the front if he has to and take a business-like though cynical part in the tragi-farce, as he regards it. But he will cut the ground from under the institution of war as the "conscientious" pacifist will not. The romance and blunder that is war must be fought by using the acid of realism, not by counter-romance and emotionalism.

The function of education in relation to the building of peace is, indeed, both complicated and uncertain. Friends of peace cannot expect to make away with war by this

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means alone. They cannot hope to make good cosmopolitans and brothers to the world out of our present-day nationalists all at once or by any evangelical conversion. But two things education can do: it can slowly make good citizens of the world and it can give the citizen of the individual nation some more accurate idea of what this world of nations is up to. Without raising the question of making cosmopolitans out of all people, it is possible to spread abroad that familiarity with conditions in other lands which destroys the instinctive distrust of, and even hostility to, the strange. It may even be possible to spread the idea that in some minute particulars "they do these things better in France." Finally it should be possible to explain so that the generally intelligent citizen may understand—and enjoy understanding—the nature of this world of nations, international politics, international law, diplomacy, and all of the other things described in this volume. If that alone could be done civilized men and women would stand no more of the arrant and inane bungling of 1914.

The logical antithesis of the movement for peace by prayer is the plan for peace by police force. The demand for peace by effective international government was put forward in the United States in 1915 by the "League to Enforce Peace," an organization made up of very "practical" men indeed. But it is impossible to pause long over this idea or program. Granted that peace has been attained within the nation largely by this means, the fact remains that it does not yet seem possible to treat the problem in

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this manner in the international field. Perhaps the international police force is nearer than it seems, but it is not near enough to reality to be relied upon.

It is this practical inadequacy of the extreme, the "logical," methods of attaining peace which makes the problem so difficult. It is exactly the complexity and delicacy of the situation which makes these methods impracticable, that renders both the theoretical solution of the problem so difficult and the application of such theoretical solution as we can devise so tedious and uncertain.

The solution lies in voluntary but organized international coöperation.

The reasons for insisting again upon the necessity for depending upon voluntary rather than coercive measures for maintaining peace are plain. Such a conclusion may, moreover, seem to condemn the program embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the efforts to secure peace along this line made at Geneva since 1920. That condemnation is a tentative one, however, and, more important still, it does not carry any condemnation of the creation, maintenance, and operation of the League for other functions. The affirmative element in the formula stated above is of paramount importance: it is organized international coöperation that is needed above all else.

By that phrase is meant the establishment, in a unified federal system, the maintenance, and the operation of courts of arbitration, administrative commissions, international conferences, and particularly councils of concilia-

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tion among the nations. The functions of all of these individual organs are now familiar. The defects of arbitration as now practiced have been exposed fully, and perhaps too severely. The merits of international administrative commissions and their power for useful service have been set forth. The fundamental creative powers of international conferences has been described. It is the council of conciliation whose rôle in preserving peace deserves further comment.

The avoidance of war must be attempted at the point where war appears, namely, in the defective mechanical facilities of ordinary diplomacy. The representatives of two nations fail to reach agreement in a given dispute and a crisis develops. Here is where the crucial need for international action arises. And what is needed is that relatively simple action which is called mediation in its first appearance. But mediation not of the uncertain and ultra-voluntary character which has been familiar in the past. What is needed is organized mediation or conciliation, practiced by a permanent, or continuous, or instantly available, international body representing the unified international community. Such a council must be created by an original agreement under which either party to a critical international dispute or any other nation may carry the dispute to the council for consideration, discussion, and recommendation. The agreement must pledge the prospective or potential disputants to attend and take part in the discussion. It must pledge them not to begin hostilities for a

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period sufficient to allow such discussion—a period valuable in allowing time for the cooling off of national feelings likewise. It may pledge them to accept arbitration by a court and the award thereof, or the recommendations of the council, if that be possible; it must at least provide for publicity of the recommendations and their consideration by the parties. It may not, as yet, provide for enforcement, it seems.

As a matter of actual fact if such arrangements can be provided the need for enforcement will probably be far less than might be thought “logical.” The mere processes of delay, consideration, discussion, and so on are powerful to deflate the urge to war. Even if the council must prolong its discussions without definite solution of the dispute—if only the council can prolong its discussions even without a solution!—war is probably avoided. With the increasing conviction that war does not pay little more than these processes is needed to turn the course of events away from war or to allow the course of events to run on past the turn down the warlike path. Allowing the dispute, deliberately arranging to have the dispute, become involved in the tedious complexities of conciliation is the sovereign cure for the war fever. Delay is the febrifuge of war.

There are two other types of the peace movement which are of considerable value likewise. These are the movements for disarmament and for the outlawry of war, as it is called.

Disarmament is not a new idea. Limitation upon armaments by quantity and by type and limitations upon certain methods of conducting hostilities are very old. Some of these

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limitations aim not at peace except in that they aim to restrict the incidence of war. But in the past fifty years there has appeared a movement for partial or extensive disarmament as an aid to peace. It is argued that large armaments encourage nations to assume bellicose attitudes, that they encourage military authorities to seek war as an opportunity to display their prowess, and that they create in other nations a sense of fear and insecurity.

These contentions are probably quite sound in one degree or another. It is possible to support them by rather impressive exhibits of evidence drawn from recent periods in international relations. But they can easily be exaggerated. Mere possession of large armaments has not invariably meant danger to a neighboring weaker state, and no greater danger than would flow from the discrepancy in size between the neighboring states, standing armaments or no standing armaments. Moreover most of the states of the world are not heavily armed, yet the dangers to peace in the world are not confined to the few heavily armed nations! Nor are all military and naval officers raging chauvinists. Probably the soundest objection to large armaments is one which is given relatively slight attention by the pacifists: they cost too much money.

Nevertheless, or for all of these reasons in so far as they are accurate, disarmament would most certainly be desirable if it could be attained. Disarmament alone is probably the only absolutely certain preventive of war. The objection to

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disarmament as a program of peace is its impossibility of attainment.

For no single nation can make any progress in the direction of disarmament by itself. It would be undesirable to have the most pacifically inclined and the most unaggressive nation disarm while other nations remained armed. And no such step would probably be permitted by the people of that nation; if the step were taken events—war scares or actual attack—would almost certainly compel a resumption of armaments. No single nation—except one of the weaker nations which exist on sufferance or under protection of the principle of the balance and which might as well disarm anyway—can disarm alone.

Second we cannot expect to secure any considerable degree of disarmament in any near future by agreement. The measurement of armaments and agreement upon scales of disarmament is extremely difficult as a mere technical problem: are medical officers to be counted in determining war strength? Proportional reduction would sanctify existing inequalities and be unacceptable to the at present weaker nations; reduction to equality would destroy present advantages and is unacceptable to the stronger powers. And if all these technical or technical-political problems were solved two insuperable obstacles remain, namely, the negative demand for security and the affirmative policy of national action for enforcing demands upon other nations. National security and protection of national rights is demanded as a prerequisite for disarmament. It is impossible today to pro-

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vide such security by guarantees of territory and rights under international law, for reasons now familiar by repetition, especially because of the uneven willingness, really the uneven unwillingness, of the strong powers to give and enforce such guarantees. And finally, most decisive though least obvious of all, disarmament is inhibited by the persistence of the assumption that national welfare depends upon national power to assert and enforce demands upon other nations. Given that assumption—which is accurate in absence of international enforcement or abandonment of war as an instrument of national action—and a maximum of armaments in comparison with other nations seems entirely logical from the point of view of any one state.

This leads naturally to a consideration of a second form of peace movement very popular in recent years, especially in the United States, namely, outlawry of war. By the phrase is intended international agreement declaring war illegal as a form of action. International law has always permitted if not positively authorized recourse to war by a nation in circumstances which seemed to that nation to justify such action for satisfaction of legal rights or national interests. It is now proposed to forbid such action.

Again the proposal or the ideal is not so much unsound as unattainable. True, the advocates of outlawry demand no stipulation of any sanctions for enforcing such an agreement. Even if its advocates would permit their creation it would be impossible to secure acceptance of sanctions of such a step, and invocation of the sanctions would defeat

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the purposes of the agreement. But even without sanctions, even with no sanction but the force of public opinion, the nations, the more powerful nations, will not accept obligations or agreements outlawing war. They may, indeed, accept obligations not to wage aggressive war. But retention of the right of self-defense, the right to wage defensive war, and of the right to decide when such action is required, very largely nullifies such an agreement. Moreover, there is great need for proscribing intervention and other use of force short of war if the object—perfect peace—is to be attained.

There is involved here, of course, the agreement signed at Paris on 27 August, 1928. Apart from its effect in relation to American participation in League activities the agreement is, it seems, subject to the comments just made. Of course, it is not as easy today as it once was to claim that any given action is required in national self-defense. It would be difficult to persuade other nations to so regard American military action to prevent Japanese acquisition of the Galapagos Islands or British military action to prevent French acquisition of Ceuta. And it may be that what the world of nations needed just now, after unfortunate experiences with complicated programs of peace by coercion and futile disarmament conferences, was a simple declaration: "No more war." But if the tacit reservation "except in self-defense" is allowed to operate very widely the outlawry of war accomplished by the agreement will be slight. In principle, at least, and waiving any suggestion of exag-

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generated interpretation of the exception, the nations clearly are unwilling to outlaw war as such.

The preceding paragraphs should not be taken to imply that nothing can be accomplished in the direction of disarmament or outlawry, any more than the condemnation of the program of peace and security by coercion means that limited agreements for guaranteed peace and security such as the Locarno treaties are impossible. Indeed, the one lesson which the experiments of the decade since the war should have taught men, in connection with the problem of peace, is precisely this: no single drastic cure is possible. The more radical the proposed method of treatment (elimination of causes, non-resistance, international enforcement, disarmament), the more nearly impossible is it to secure its acceptance. No panacea will do. Partial elimination of the causes of war—in as far as that is possible—, reduction of the childish pugnacity of primitive nationalism, restriction (perhaps by international agreement, perhaps by individual national moderation and economy) of armaments to relative defensive needs,—all these things are possible. The Pact of 1928 may, finally, have much influence along all these lines.

But what must be done above all else is to attack the international dispute by the patient methods of conference and conciliation already described. Men must build peace piecemeal. It is not armaments which make disputes,—though they may exaggerate national attitudes in the presence of disputes,—but disputes which make armaments;

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disarmament will come automatically when disputes disappear. Prohibiting recourse to war will do no good if international disputes are allowed to develop freely. Treaties of commerce are well observed by the signatories, but treaties prohibiting war seem to be very insecure if serious disputes are allowed to arise and mature. Just as the radical methods of treating the problem of war and peace which turn upon a treatment of causes seem inferior in effectiveness to the treatment of the dispute itself, so the sensational methods of treating the consequences of the international dispute—limitation of armaments and prohibiting the resort to arms—seem inferior in practicability and therefore in effectiveness to the same method.

The contemporary course of events indicates growing appreciation of this situation. The dramatic attempt to extirpate war by the coercive measures of the Covenant of the League, repeated and intensified at Geneva in 1923 and 1924, has been more or less expressly abandoned. The year 1928 saw the movement toward disarmament delayed or questioned more seriously than ever. What is more, the effort to secure agreements for obligatory submission of disputes to arbitration, once regarded as another panacea for war and injustice, and stressed so heavily in 1920, 1922, and 1924, and reliance for peace upon this device, has also been largely neglected. Today there has developed, instead, a great proliferation of agreements for conciliation, inquiry, and similar treatment. Treaties of this type were signed with many countries by the United States under the leader-



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The signing at 10 Downing Street, London, of the treaty previously drafted and initiated at Locarno; Sir Austen Chamberlain is watching M. Briand and Herr Stresemann engage that France and Germany shall never go to war again.

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ship of Secretary of State Bryan. They were allowed to lapse in subsequent years. Since that time—since 1920—many such treaties have been signed among themselves by European powers. The United States has begun to renew these agreements and revise them. It is in this form of action for peace that the Governments of the world place most confidence today.

This situation does not please the professional pacifist any too well. He wants more drastic action and he dislikes to see the credit go to the Governments themselves. Apart from the general desire for peace which is universal, the peace movement has not been very effective in bringing to fruition the series of treaty negotiations just mentioned. Certain individual Secretaries of State or Foreign Ministers or Prime Ministers have done more for peace than the agitators and have acted without any great popular pressure being brought to bear upon them. They have acted because of a desire to serve their country or humanity, because of a desire to win a place in history, because of a realization of the costs of war and its burdens upon the national treasury and the national life.

In short, peace is being built up by normal means by those normally charged with that function, namely, by the progressive evolution of international governmental co-operation in the hands of national public officials. In the normal course of social and governmental evolution in any community the use of force by members of the community becomes less and less tolerable, more and more injurious to

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the individual members and to the community itself. They come to see this and to desire to dispense with this method of action—the reaction pictured in the last chapter. They act through such public authorities as exist, or they create others, to substitute pacific methods for violent methods of settling disputes among them. And peace is thus established, not by action of persons who set themselves off from the general body of members of the community and who set themselves up in opposition to its public officials, but by the members and the officials of the community itself.

The nations are today nearer to the dawn of permanent peace than ever before. The world may have seen its last great war. The international community may be about ready to begin to live—.

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Chapter XVI

PAN-AMERICANISM

SUPERFICIALLY the experience and the action of the United States in connection with Pan-Americanism or the Pan-American Union seem to contrast very strongly with our experience and action in connection with the League of Nations, and that in more ways than one. We started the League of Nations and then handed over its development to other nations, while other nations started the Pan-American movement and we took over its leadership later. We began, after the League was established, by having nothing to do with it, then we began to participate only very gingerly in its non-political activities, but now we have increased our participation until we are taking part in the treatment of highly political problems, such as disarmament, under League auspices. In the Pan-American Union we began by large participation in all its activities while we have later come to hesitate to take part in some of its more mature political developments. In other ways, however, our experience and our attitude in the Pan-American field duplicates in a strikingly significant way our action in connection with the League.

Pan-Americanism, as an idea and a movement, takes its origin from two very simple facts of geography and politics.

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The existence in this hemisphere of twenty independent nations to the south of us is the first of these facts. The fact that these nations are all republics and all profess certain similar doctrines of constitutional and international politics—republicanism, pacifism—is the second. There were not, originally, the present full score of Latin American nations, but in those earlier days the similarity of political principles was even greater than it is today, and the common feeling of defense against, and even antagonism toward, non-American nations was also stronger than it has continued to be at the present time. Hence it was quite natural for such a movement to spring up and develop apart from any deliberate efforts to promote it.

Such efforts were in fact made at an early date,—after 1820—, and that by the leaders of Latin American nations rather than by ourselves. We did, it is true, proclaim the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, as we had recognized, and continued to recognize, the Latin American nations when they made their appearance as independent republics beginning in 1822. But neither of these actions involved in themselves any decision looking toward union among the American republics. The Monroe Doctrine was, as it still remains, for the most part, merely a warning on our own part to non-American nations to leave the Latin American nations alone in their territorial possessions and their political independence. It was Simon Bolivar, “the George Washington of South America,” who took the lead in sponsoring the movement for Pan-American union, in a conference which

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met in the city of Panama in 1826. Pan-Americanism began in Latin America.

The United States occupied a peculiar position in relation to this movement for the next fifty years. Bolivar's program contemplated a real political league of the Latin American nations for mutual defense against Europe and for the preservation of peace among themselves, and he did not contemplate participation therein by the United States. We were finally invited to attend the Conference of Panama but we feared embroilment with Europe (this in spite of our bold stand in 1823!), and the slave interests feared efforts by the Latin Americans to liberate Cuba and Porto Rico from Spain and thus set up, near our shores, possible convenient places of refuge for escaped slaves. All through the next half-century various factors, some of them still operative today, prevented cordial feelings and coöperation between the United States and Latin American nations. The treatment of negroes in this country—compared with their treatment in Latin American countries—was one of these. Reputed designs on our part to interfere in the political affairs of, and even to seize territory from, Latin American nations was another; filibustering expeditions setting out from our shores, and the Mexican War, were actual cases in point. Racial, religious, and linguistic differences constituted a third disturbing factor. And we were, ourselves, too pre-occupied with internal problems of economic development, slavery, and the preservation of the Union, to be much interested in the development of Pan-American relations.

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Nothing much came of either the conference of 1826 or other conferences held by the Latin American nations in subsequent years, and it remained for us to take over the leadership in the movement after 1875 by which time we had settled the problems of slavery and national unity and had begun to develop economic interests which turned our attention to foreign markets. It was James G. Blaine, Secretary of State under President Garfield in 1881, who asserted that leadership by extending an invitation "to all the independent countries of North and South America" to meet in Washington in November, 1882. His objects were to secure the adoption of methods for preserving peace among the American nations and to "lead to a large increase in the export trade of the United States." A change in administrations in Washington led to a withdrawal of the invitation of 1881 but in 1888 the invitation was repeated and in 1889 the first Pan-American Conference met in that city.

Today the Pan-American movement has taken on a fairly complete and formal organization. At the base rests the "Union of the American States," consisting of the United States and the twenty independent Latin American nations. The principal organ of the Union is the "International Conference of American States," commonly called the Pan-American Conference. Next comes the "Governing Board" and finally the "Pan-American Union" which might be called the Pan-American Bureau, to distinguish it from the Union of States itself. This organization was originally developed by resolutions adopted in successive Conferences

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but was finally codified in a Convention adopted at the Sixth Conference, held at Havana in 1928.

The membership of the Union is both incomplete—as a Pan-American Union—and very unequal. Canada is not a member although today she is capable of diplomatic action independent of Great Britain; in earlier days membership on her part was impossible; recently there have been suggestions of inviting her to join. And none of the American colonies of European nations—such as the Guianas, British Honduras, or Martinique—belong to the Union. On the other hand the members now in the Union vary from small States such as Panama and Haiti to the larger Latin American States—such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico,—and the United States, and the tremendous variation in size among the members is paralleled by equally tremendous variations in economic, social, and political conditions. Eighteen of the Latin American nations are dominated by people of Spanish descent, one by Portuguese descendants (Brazil), and one by French negroes; in all of them negroes, Indians, and persons of mixed blood form large parts of the population.

All States members of the Union are entitled to send delegations to the Pan-American Conferences, which have been held, on an average, every six years since 1889, five years being now the normal interval between meetings. The Conferences elect their own officers, adopt their own rules of procedure, and function entirely according to their own desires. Committees are created and business is trans-

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acted by debate and vote in both plenary sessions and committee meetings, but, as in the case of all international conferences, the definitive action of the Conference takes the form of the signature of international treaties among the participating nations, or of resolutions whose binding force is very uncertain. The Conference deals with all matters of interest to the American States, both of an economic or social, and a more strictly political character, including transportation, exploitation of raw materials, labor, education, communications, migration, codification of international law, and dozens of other matters. Numerous special conferences have been held on financial and scientific matters in addition to the general conferences.

The Pan-American Conference constitutes the main organ of the Pan-American Union, and deserves chief attention in this connection. The series now extends backward over a period of forty years, during which meetings have been held at Washington (1889), Mexico City (1901), Rio de Janeiro (1906), Buenos Aires (1910), Santiago, Chile (1923), and Havana (1928). The Union and the Governing Board and the Bureau aside, this series of conferences in themselves are of real and great importance.

For one thing, this series has not always been clearly recognized as a series until the adoption of a convention on the Union and its re-organization at Havana in 1928. There has been some element of irregularity about the meetings; they have not been impromptu or extemporaneous meet-

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ings exactly, but they have not been entirely dependable as a series.

Second, the Conferences have been even more devoted to oratory and rhetorical display than most international conferences. There has been a vast deal of beautiful and fervid eloquence in the Pan-American Conferences. If the meetings were held as a means of getting expressions of sentiments of brotherly love, ideal international justice, peace, progress, and prosperity, they certainly have served the purpose. If they were intended as something more than fora of international aspirations it must be admitted that it is as such that they have functioned chiefly in the past.

It is also true that the Pan-American Conferences have tended to become less rather than more cordial from 1889 down to the Sixth Conference in 1928. Certainly the difficulties increased steadily with the meetings of the Fourth (1910), Fifth (1923), and Sixth (1928) Conferences. Increasing self-assurance on the part of Latin American States, increasing suspicion of the motives of the United States under President Taft (Mr. Knox was Secretary of State), President Harding, and President Coolidge (with Mr. Kellogg as Secretary of State) produced this result. Wise and reassuring words by Secretary of State Root in 1906, by President Wilson in 1913 and at other times, and by Secretary of State Hughes in 1928, were needed to avoid open rupture between ourselves and Latin America.

The situation at the Conference in Santiago, in 1923, became very acute. Political problems were brought for-

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ward in considerable numbers—disarmament, arbitration, recognition. The proposal to reorganize the Union and to convert it into something more effective as an international league was on the slate. The Monroe Doctrine was under fire. And, what made matters worse, the United States assumed a particularly rigid, not to say stubborn and obstinate, attitude. Nothing was accomplished in the matter of disarmament among the Latin American States, the influence of the United States not being clearly exerted to that end. The Governing Board of the Union was reorganized in part against our wishes but in part left as we insisted in spite of Latin American objections. Nothing was accomplished, because of our opposition, in the direction of converting the Union into an effective league, or converting the Monroe Doctrine into a common program to be defined, supported, and applied by all the American States. The Conference adjourned amid criticisms and recriminations on all sides.

The Sixth Conference met in 1928 in an atmosphere of great tension. Almost all of the contentious questions of 1923 were still unsolved and feelings were running high. In addition, the Commission of Jurists appointed to prepare a code of international law for adoption by the American States was ready to report and it was known that the proposed drafts contained many highly provocative elements. And to make matters doubly difficult the United States was or had recently been engaged in a protracted and very ambiguous intervention in the domestic affairs of

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Nicaragua. It is not to be wondered at that all member States sent unusually competent delegations to Havana and that President Coolidge crossed to Havana to open the Conference. The situation was most dramatic.

It is still too soon to estimate with confidence the results of the Sixth Conference. Many inconclusive "Resolutions" were adopted dealing with economic and social matters, but it was on the political side that the Sixth Conference seemed most significant. Here Mr. Charles Evans Hughes, formerly Secretary of State, head of the delegation from Washington, did yeoman service to prevent a serious clash between Latin American views and our own. By a remarkable mixture of firmness and flexibility, of assertions of national policy and encouragement of cordial international understanding, he saved the situation from what might easily have been a disastrous debacle. Even so we probably shall find that, by force of the circumstances themselves, we actually lost ground on every major point at issue except one, and that that victory may put us in the League of Nations instead. We were induced to permit still further reorganization of the Union and the Governing Board, in the interest of the Latin Americans, our intervention policy or activity was still further condemned, we were led to agree to obligatory arbitration or conciliation of all our disputes with Latin American States in the future, and the Monroe Doctrine came in for still further criticism and circumscription. Within the year, in signing a treaty of pacific settlement with some fifty nations all over the world, we felt it unwise

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to insert in that agreement any provision protecting the sacred doctrine from the application of the agreement and, in signing with Latin America two treaties submitting all questions to obligatory pacific settlement, we allowed to be included questions affecting the doctrine as well. Verily times had changed. The lone victory gained at Havana consisted in keeping the Union out of the political field (in principle); the indirect result of this must be to turn us toward the more important organization at Geneva.

The Governing Board is the least familiar but in a certain sense the most strategically important organ of the Pan-American Union. It consists of one representative from each Member state, and now elects its own Chairman and Vice Chairman. It watches over the results of the Conferences and the activity of the Pan-American Bureau, appointing the Director General of that body. It meets frequently throughout the year and exercises general supervision over all matters pertaining to the Union, including finances.

The Pan-American Bureau—legally called the Pan-American Union—is located in Washington. It is headed by a Director General and staffed by numerous experts in commercial and legal matters, as well as by a force of clerks, drawn from all Member states. It serves as an office for deposit of ratifications of treaties concluded in the Conferences and as a bureau for the collection and distribution of data upon all matters pertaining to inter-American relations, economic, social, and political. It has, however, no

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executive or administrative authority to apply the treaties signed by the American States as a true administrative bureau would have.

The outstanding problem to be faced in connection with the Pan-American Union arises precisely at this point. The Union has confined itself to the development of ideas and feelings of inter-American solidarity and the signing of treaties and resolutions designed to express that solidarity. These conventions have dealt with matters of commerce, public health, education, science, finance, and political matters such as international law and arbitration. But execution of these conventions has been left to the individual states. No inter-American court or administrative service has been created to apply these agreements. Moreover, the treaties when signed have not always been ratified and carried out by the Member states and there is much room for the charge that the Union has remained largely ineffective and innocuous. Many aspirations toward inter-American peace, progress, and coöperation have been expressed but they have sometimes remained nothing more.

For this the United States is largely to blame, although not entirely. The Latin American states themselves, while devoted to the ideas of international peace and coöperation, have not been entirely prepared to see effective arrangements made to carry out such ideas. They have, moreover, been afraid that any such arrangements would merely give to the United States an opportunity to impose upon them its own standards and its own ideas in matters of commerce,

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sanitation, and diplomacy. We on our part have hesitated to appear to demand such arrangements and have been somewhat afraid of seeing the Latin American states array themselves together to impose their ideas upon us. As a result we have not desired to convert the Union into an effective international organization or league of nations in this hemisphere, although such proposals have been made repeatedly in recent years in the Pan-American Conference.

The position of the United States in the Union is, indeed, a delicate one. We have dominated the Union to a certain extent by our power and influence, but we have hesitated to exercise such domination. We have found our position the object of suspicion and our policies—the Monroe Doctrine, intervention—subjected to more or less candid criticism. At the Fifth Conference, at Santiago, Chile, in 1923, and at the Sixth Conference, at Havana, in 1928, this was particularly true. For one thing, our Secretary of State held the Chairmanship of the Governing Board *ex officio* until 1928; for another the Bureau was located in Washington and the Director General was a citizen of the United States. We have naturally played the leading part in the Union—and just as naturally we have been the object of some mistrust on that account.

In another direction we have run counter to the ideas of our Latin neighbors. Just as we have opposed the conversion of the Union into an effective league of nations so we have opposed the expansion of its activities into the field of political questions. We have feared to see the Monroe Doctrine,

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our intervention activities, our actions in recognizing new Governments in Latin American states, and the settlement of disputes with these states, subjected to Pan-American discussion and regulation. We have striven to keep economic and social problems uppermost in Union discussions and activities. Now the Latin Americans are both backward economically and devoted to political speculation and what they consider to be the important principles of international justice. And they feel that we desire to maintain the Union as an agency for exploiting them commercially while refusing to permit the Union to apply to our actions in political matters the standards of international justice.

Certain changes have recently appeared in these matters. Certain of the Latin American states have themselves become more mature and have come to resent interference by their own Latin American neighbors. No little suspicion has existed, in some cases for years, between certain of these states. And we have begun to manifest a willingness to submit our own policies, even recognition, intervention, and the Monroe Doctrine, to discussion in Pan-American Conferences. We have signed arbitration treaties subjecting such questions to impartial judgment. Nevertheless the two major problems of the Union remain: the problem of making its enactments really effective and the problem of extending its action to crucial political questions. Both of these problems are bound up with the position of the United States in the Union.

Meanwhile the question of the relation between the

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Union and the League of Nations has become acute. The Latin American nations were introduced into international society by us very largely. They went to the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 under our sponsorship. They entered the World War in response to our exhortation. And they joined the League of Nations partly because it was an ideal which appealed strongly to them but largely because we led the way. Now that we have not yet entered the League the situation is somewhat anomalous.

Many things should be noted concerning Latin American membership in the League. All but two of these states joined the League sooner or later; three were kept out for a time at our behest, but two of these joined subsequently. They have been glad to enter into an international forum on their own feet, a forum where our voice is not heard. They have thought somewhat of securing protection from the League against us. Two or three of them have taken very active part in League work. On the other hand, Ecuador and Mexico have never joined the League—there is talk now of Mexico entering—and Costa Rica and Brazil have withdrawn from the League—although Costa Rica is about to reënter. Argentina, although regarded as a Member, has limited her participation in League activities since receiving a rebuff in the Assembly in 1920, while several other Latin American states have, largely because of their small size and limited world interests, held only nominal membership. And, largely because of the wisdom of non-American League members, the League has not yet been induced to

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play the rôle of defender of Latin America against "the colossus of the North."

The fact is that most of the Latin American states have no great reason for participation in the League except for the idea of the thing or to secure protection against their stronger neighbors, including the United States. But likewise they have little basis for vigorous participation in Pan-American Union activities. The only basis for participation by any nation in such organized international coöperation is found in wide-flung national interests and substantial national power. These most of the Latin American states do not have. Five or more of them—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, and Mexico, and perhaps Uruguay—might reasonably play serious parts in both the League and the Union. But so, on the same ground, might the United States, and hence there remains for all the problem of how to reconcile League membership and Union membership. Action by the United States to join the League would not simplify matters, for in that case the Latin American states would desire all the more to maintain their representation at Geneva for reasons the opposite of those which have animated some of them in the past.

The solution of the problem turns in part upon what happens to the Union and in part upon what happens to the League and our own relations thereto. We might stay out of the League and turn to the development of the Union into an effective league in this hemisphere, or we might join the League and allow the Union to subsist on a

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much lower and less important plane. The leading Latin American states are not likely to be willing to withdraw from the League and confine themselves to a Pan-American Union dominated by us. The League might subdivide itself and allow the Union to take its place in this hemisphere, but such action becomes less likely with every year that passes. If the League continues to exist, to become more and more stable, and to expand its activities as it is still doing, and if, as is happening every year, our own participation in League activities increases, the opposite solution may be imposed by the facts of international life, whatever we might like to see the Pan-American Union be or become.

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Chapter XVII

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

CONSTITUTION AND ORGANIZATION

Two radically different views are held, by two different circles of students of the problem of government, concerning the nature of a Constitution. To some it is obvious that the Constitution of a country consists of the fundamental social elements and political practices and principles which have historically come to make up the nation,—such is the British view of the Constitution. To others it is natural to think of the Constitution as a plan of government deliberately worked out in advance and adopted for application in the future; such is the American view and that of by far the majority of the peoples of the world today. The framers of the Covenant of the League of Nations, led by an American President, proceeded upon the American theory. Ever since the League was established it has been running under British leadership and on the British theory.

The Covenant of the League was drafted at the Peace Conference of Paris in February, March, and April, 1919, at the end of the World War. It was signed as part of the treaties concluded among the erstwhile belligerents and put into effect on 10 January, 1920. It had been prepared by

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various preliminary studies extending back to 1917 which merely culminated in the drafting at Paris.

The British were the first to prepare a preliminary plan for a League of Nations. This project, known as the Phillimore Plan from the name of the chairman of the committee which drafted it, was ready in March, 1918, and led indirectly to the drafting of a plan of his own by President Wilson in August of 1918. Wilson's plan was revised in January, 1919, so as to include material from suggestions of his advisers and British students of the problem, including especially General Jan Christian Smuts, South African leader and statesman. An official British revision was ready at the same time, and an amalgamation of the two served as a basis for discussion by the Commission of the Peace Conference charged with drafting the Covenant, of which President Wilson was chairman. Minor contributions were made by French, Italian, and other representatives in the course of these discussions.

Certain features of the process by which the Covenant was produced are striking and significant.

In the first place, the popular forces pleading for peace and international coöperation played only an indirect part in the process. The peace movement as such played little part in the Peace Conference or in the drafting of the Covenant. The philosophic projects of Kant and Franklin and others exerted little influence on the action. Modern political science of the professional or academic type played only a slight part in the scene, and it was the experience of the

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leading men of various nations in operating the machinery of national government and international relations which counted most as a guide to what should be done in building the new League. National federation and international co-operation in the past were the precedents most clearly in point.

And in the second place it was not Wilson alone but it was Wilson in the main, it was not the United States alone but it was the United States in the main, and certainly it was the United States and Great Britain together which gave the League of Nations to the world. Wilson's drafts counted more heavily in the January, 1919, amalgamation than did the British draft, while the British had been the first to put forward a serious project and had contributed—through General Smuts—important elements to Wilson's plan itself. The Covenant of the League of Nations was—for praise or for blame—not the work of Woodrow Wilson alone although he and his country were more responsible for its content and its adoption than were any others.

The text of the Covenant consists of twenty-six articles, or about ten pages of printed matter, or about twenty-five hundred words. It has been altered but slightly since put into operation in 1920, but such alterations as have been made have been carried out by revising the text itself and not by adding amendments at the end thereof.

The Covenant begins with a preamble stating the principal objects of the framers in creating the League, together with the methods which they expect to be most effective in

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that work. This is followed by articles dealing with membership in the League, the general structure of the organization, and articles dealing with the individual organs of the League and the seat of League headquarters, together with an important article (Article 5) on procedure, requiring unanimity in all important League decisions. There follow two articles on disarmament, and then come the seven articles dealing with guarantees (Article 10), pacific settlement, and enforcement of League obligations which came to be regarded by President Wilson and the other framers as "the heart of the Covenant." The last ten articles deal with relations to non-Member States, with the registration, validity, and revision of treaties or other "international engagements," with the Mandate system, labor, and other social problems, relations with preëxisting international organizations, and amendments. The document is neither very bad as a piece of drafting nor is it by any means perfect.

At the same time when the Covenant was being drafted at Paris by one Commission of the Peace Conference there was being drafted at Paris also but by another group of men in another Commission of the Peace Conference another document by which there was set up a second league of nations, so to speak, namely, the International Labor Organization. This organization was provided with a Constitution of its own, similar to the Covenant, but was to be regarded as an integral part of the main League. Two years later a third institution, the Permanent Court of Inter-

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national Justice, or World Court, was set up by means of a third international document, the Statute of the Court, and this institution may also be regarded as a branch of the League itself. The Constitution of the Labor Organization and the Statute of the Court differ in content, in their detailed provisions, and in other ways from the Covenant, but they may be regarded as forming with it the fundamental laws of the whole League.

The League of Nations is made up of certain nations called the Members of the League. The League might have been constituted, conceivably, as a "league of peoples," whatever that may mean, but it was not; it is and must remain for a long time to come, a league of nations. Certain nations (twenty-eight) entered the organization by signing and ratifying the Covenant, others (fourteen) by "acceding" thereto subsequently, and still others (fourteen) as a result of election by the League after its establishment, including Germany, elected in 1926. At its maximum the League membership included fifty-six states; Costa Rica and Brazil are the only states which have ever withdrawn from membership after having entered, and Costa Rica plans to return. Four important states, Russia, Turkey, Mexico, and the United States, and some six or eight minor states have never entered, although all of the important non-Member states have participated more or less extensively in League activities and there are suggestions of approaching membership for Turkey and Mexico, at least. The European states form the largest territorial bloc in the

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League, the Latin American states the next, and the few independent states of Asia, Africa and Australasia make up the remainder; there is little or no solidarity in these blocs in the League. Most of the League Members are also Members of the World Court and all are Members of the International Labor Organization.


The backbone of the League organization is the Secretariat. This consists of a Secretary General, a Deputy Secretary General, three Under Secretaries, and a staff of experts and clerks numbering in all some five hundred persons of forty different nationalities, and all chosen not so much because of nationality as because of their ability as experts in certain subjects or as mere employees. The Secretariat is divided into eleven Sections, each equipped with its own experts and clerical force, and each dealing with Political Questions, or Mandates, or Health, or some other subject of League activity. Affiliated with the Secretariat are three Technical Organizations dealing with Transit and Communications, Economics and Finance, and Health, each of which boasts one or more standing committees and a conference or conferences which meet at irregular intervals; these organizations number some one hundred and fifty or two hundred persons each. Affiliated with the Secretariat also are certain international bureaus which existed prior to the establishment of the League itself, such as the International Hydrographic Bureau. There is some apparent duplication of organization here and considerable complexity of structure, but the arrangements have been devised

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as a result of needs felt in actual practice and they work very satisfactorily.

Next to the Secretariat comes the Council of the League which consists of fourteen persons representing fourteen Member states. Five Great Powers—France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan—are permanently represented on the Council; the other nine states to be represented on the Council are selected each year by the Assembly. The Council is presided over by each of its members in rotation, as Chairman, and different members of the Council act as Reporters on various subjects. The Council also sets up from time to time various Commissions made up in whole or in part from persons outside the Council itself, and also calls into existence various international conferences to deal with different subjects, which act in collaboration with the Secretariat and affiliated bodies,

The fundamental organ of the League is the Assembly. This body consists of three representatives of each Member state, men or women, all appointed, as are the individuals on the Council, by the Governments of the Member states themselves, at their discretion, and each delegation having one vote. The Assembly elects its own President and twelve Vice-Presidents, but the Secretary General of the League acts as its Secretary. The Assembly subdivides itself into six standing Commissions upon each of which each Member state is represented and each of which deals with some important phase of Assembly work such as Armaments, or Social Problems, and numerous special committees are created



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Delegations on the floor of the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva; the British and Hungarian delegates are in the foreground.

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from time to time as the need arises. All of the permanent commissions of the Assembly collaborate with the Sections of the Secretariat and with the affiliated organizations as well.

The Permanent Court of International Justice consists of eleven judges and four deputy judges all chosen by the Council and Assembly, for terms of nine years, from distinguished jurists all over the world; although the United States has not been a Member of the Court, two American jurists, John Bassett Moore and, later, Charles Evans Hughes, have been so elected. The Court elects its own President and Vice-President from among its own members and appoints a Registrar from outside its own ranks. The Registrar appoints his own staff of assistants and clerical employees. The Court is subdivided into three chambers, one for Summary Procedure, one for Labor Questions, and one for Transit and Communications, but the Court usually sits as a unit.

The International Labor Organization constitutes a duplicate League by itself. It was created in 1919 in response to demands from labor leaders that labor be given a league all its own, and it still exists as just that, no less and no more. It consists of an International Labor Office corresponding very closely to the Secretariat of the League, a Governing Body corresponding roughly to the Council, and a General Conference corresponding closely to the Assembly. The Labor Organization even possesses a Panel of Inquiry from which Commissions of Inquiry may be created to deal with industrial disputes, a rough analog of the

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World Court, although this Panel has not been used so far and may become a dead arm. The Labor Office is about as large as the Secretariat but much simpler in structure. The Governing Body and General Conference, on the other hand, are both larger and more complex than the Council and Assembly of the League. The former consists of twenty-four persons, eight of whom represent the Governments of States of Chief Industrial Importance—Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Italy, and Japan; four others represent other Governments elected by the General Conference; the remaining twelve are chosen, six each, by the employer and employee delegates in the Conference. That body is made up of four delegates from each Member state, two selected by the Government and one each by the employer and employee organizations therein. Similarly, on the Panel of Inquiry each state names one Government, one employer, and one employee delegate.

The headquarters of the League are located in Geneva, Switzerland, ancient refuge of oppressed liberals in Europe and the cradle and home of many cosmopolitan and international movements. The Secretariat has been housed in an old hotel building—renamed the Palace of Nations—which has been remodeled with difficulty for the purpose. The Council meets in the same building. The Assembly meets in an old auditorium called the Hall of the Reformation, built upon the site of one of Calvin's meeting houses and located in a remote part of the city. These buildings were made available to the League in its younger and more penu-

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rious days by the generosity of the City of Geneva and the Swiss and other friends of the League. Plans are now on foot and property has been acquired as a result of which new buildings will be provided for the League organs, including a large library building donated by American philanthropy. The International Labor Organization, which was at one time housed in totally inadequate quarters—quarters generously provided again by the Swiss hosts of the League—in an old German school on the hills back of Geneva, has since 1925 occupied a commodious if not beautiful new building constructed for the purpose on the shores of Lake Geneva near the Palace of the Nations. The Permanent Court of International Justice sits in the Peace Palace at The Hague, capital of The Netherlands, a building constructed by the generosity of Mr. Andrew Carnegie, and housing also the old Hague Court of Arbitration, the library of the Court, and other international judicial bodies. Certain branch offices and field agencies of the League and the Labor Organization are located in various cities—London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Constantinople, Tokio, Rio de Janeiro, and Washington, D. C.,—all over the world.

The expenses of the League amount to about \$5,000,000 per year. About one-half of this is spent by the Secretariat and affiliated organizations. The Labor Organization spends somewhat less than this amount, chiefly because of the absence of the extensive affiliated organizations. The expenses of the Council, Assembly, and World Court are relatively small. The expenditures heretofore made upon buildings

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and equipment have been slight but are now due to increase somewhat, and not without just cause. After all, the budgets of this world governmental establishment have been rather modest when compared with national budgets for either civilian or military services; one first class cruiser costs \$30,000,000.

The revenues of the League come from three sources, namely, sale of League publications and interest on moneys on deposit, private philanthropic contributions, and contributions from the Member states. The first two currents of revenue are relatively slight in volume and call for no explanation. The third constitutes the main source of revenue of the League. Contributions to be paid by Member states are fixed by the Assembly in accordance with the ability of the Member states to pay, taking into account various factors such as per capita wealth, public revenues and so. Great Britain and France contribute most heavily, each about \$450,000 per year; China, Italy, Japan, Spain, Argentina, and Canada follow in something like the order named—the contributions are revised annually and vary from year to year. At the foot of the list are found states contributing only \$10,000 or \$5,000 per year. It is nevertheless true that some of the Member states feel that their quotas are exorbitant; like every other organization, the League of Nations has some difficulty in collecting all “dues in arrears.”

Several aspects of the situation in regard to the general organization of the League are important.

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Thus, the League as it stands today is in part a product of the Covenant but in large part a product of developments since 1919. The internal structure of the Secretariat, the affiliated organizations, the commissions and conferences set up by the Council, and for that matter the Court and the Labor Organization themselves, all exist independent of any provisions in the Covenant. Even if the Court and Labor Organization may be said to rest upon constitutions of their own they have also, and particularly of the latter is this true, grown beyond the provisions of those documents. The League is a living organism developing internally and externally in response to the principle of adaptation to need, and not a tight little scheme set up by a paper constitution drafted at Paris in 1919.

But this growth brings with it two problems, one of extent and one of form, and the two are interrelated. If the present organization is measured against anything existing prior to 1914 it is almost incredible in its extent and elaboration. Such an international governmental organization would have appeared to the men of 1914 absolutely unthinkable, impossibly utopian and distinctly undesirable. And protests have arisen from time to time in the Assembly over the growth of League structure, personnel, and expense. On the other hand, if it be compared with the governmental establishment of any single one of the major Member states the League is a modest enough affair, and it does not include any military or naval services at all—only disarmament services. Finally if it be compared with

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what would be needed by any real international government or superstate the result would be even more striking. The expectation must be that the League establishment is likely to grow rather than decline in the future.

Shall this growth take the form of an expansion in the Secretariat or an expansion in the affiliated organizations and the collateral commissions and conferences? Even if it be assumed that the Labor Organization is to persist as a distinct unit rather than be amalgamated with the League, a fairly safe but by no means an inevitable assumption, the problem is still an acute one. If simplicity of structure were thought to be desirable there might take place at Geneva what has taken place in many States in the United States and what is promised soon for the Federal Government in Washington, namely, a wholesale reorganization of the entire administrative system. Such a reorganization would be tremendously difficult, but it might conceivably be accomplished and that without changing the Covenant itself. Short of any such drastic step efforts may nevertheless be made to check the growth in complexity of the League system by conferring upon enlarged Secretariat divisions and existing organizations new functions as they become necessary. Time alone will tell the story, but the problem is a real one and one already present in the minds of League leaders.

Two other problems of League organization arise on the heels of the foregoing. The apparent duplication of units in Secretariat, Assembly, and affiliated organizations seems

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open to question. The duplication is more apparent than real. The Section of the Secretariat is the permanent central clerical or administrative unit for treatment of any given problem, such as Health, or Mandates. The Commission of the Assembly dealing with the same subject is merely the committee of the representative or policy-forming, not to say legislative, organ of the League. And the Technical Organization or Advisory Committee on the same subject is the consultative body of technical experts capable of giving aid to the Section of the Secretariat or the Assembly committee. Where the serious problems arise is in the holding of independent Health conferences, for example, in addition to the Assembly itself, and in the development of field administrative services by the Technical Organizations and independent Bureaus in addition to the Secretariat services. The explanation is to be found in the fact that the Secretariat, in order to be cautious, has not expanded its services so as to provide field agents in any considerable numbers and in the fact that the Assembly has, under similar pressure, grossly neglected its potential function as a legislative or treaty-making body. This attitude on the part of the Assembly may be inevitable. It is however, an illuminating commentary upon any idea of restricting League growth and activity: the only result of restricting Assembly and Secretariat is to encourage the development of twice as much organization and activity elsewhere and to increase the complexity of the whole situation.

The personnel problem of the League, particularly of the

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Secretariat, has been happily simple down to the present time, but is potentially very difficult. The personnel force was built up when the Member states were not paying much attention to the League. Wise regulations were adopted regarding appointments, periods of employment, salaries, treatment generally, and dismissal. Individuals were in the main chosen for their abilities rather than for political or nationalistic reasons. A fine corps of civil servants of many nationalities, imbued with a true spirit of internationalism, was built up. That condition has lasted until today. But recently certain Governments, the French, German, and Italian, for example, have begun to lean in the direction of seeking more appointments for their nationals and seeking to exercise control over their nationals after these individuals have accepted service in the Secretariat. Such a development could be disastrous for the League. It was quite natural, English and French being the official languages of the League, and France and Great Britain being the two countries chiefly interested in establishing and maintaining the League, not to mention their contributions to its revenues, that French and British nationals, together with French Swiss from Geneva itself, should at first hold a lion's share of jobs in the Secretariat. It was perhaps natural that numerous Americans should have sought and obtained posts in the Secretariat when it was thought that the United States intended to take a prominent part in the League, and also natural that many of these Americans should resign or be released when this event did not take place. It is

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quite natural for Germany, now a Member, to seek posts for her nations in reasonable proportions. But for any Member states to attempt to distort the personnel policy of the Secretariat in the interest of national influence would be serious treachery to the principles of League organization and action. It must be hoped that the wise policy of the Secretary General will be firmly upheld in this delicate but vital matter.

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Chapter XVIII

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ACTIVITIES

A POPULAR column-conductor who offers his contributions to the wisdom and the gayety of the nations in one of our larger American newspapers is wont to counsel his readers when they are displeased with the state of the weather or the color of the stone of a new building on Michigan Boulevard to "write your Congressman!" In a similar manner, in recent years it has not infrequently been asked, in the face of similar circumstances, "Why doesn't the League of Nations do something about it?" And the writer has not infrequently been asked, at a time when some nation seemed bent upon creating a very dangerous situation by its actions in Morocco or Albania: "Why doesn't the League of Nations stop it?"

Now all of these recommendations or queries betoken a very natural reaction to the present-day international situation. This was the very feeling, indeed, which produced the League of Nations in the first place, back in 1919, the feeling, namely, that there should and must be some agency available to do something about these things when it is needed. But they also betoken, if taken seriously, an exag-

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gerated conception of the scope and authority of the action of the League both as originally created and as it actually stands today. All of the preëxisting system of diplomacy, treaty-making, arbitration, and so on continues to exist side by side with the League although it tends to lose ground to the League year by year. Just how far is the League a Jack of all trades and a maid of all work, or an all powerful dictator, as many people seem inclined to believe at the present moment?

The most striking feature of the situation lies in the manner in which the structure of the League of Nations has grown in practice until it reaches far beyond what was contemplated in the Covenant or even in the Covenant, the Statute of the World Court and the Constitution of the International Labor Organization combined. The growing tree has outreached the modest trellis sketched for it in the plans of the gardener-architects. This is true to an even greater extent of the activities of the League, considered in themselves and apart from League structure. In the great debate of 1919-1920 we in this country tried to visualize the scope and the nature of the action of the League by studying the texts of the Covenant and the Labor Organization Constitution. Later we tried to do the same thing for the Court. We should have known that what the League would become, particularly in point of its activity, would depend more upon the facts of international life than upon the terms of any document. In the event it might be said that the activity of the League is less intense than we anticipated

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in quality and much greater in quantity. The League does not act as decisively or authoritatively as was expected but it acts upon a great many more subjects.

The expansion of League activities has occurred chiefly in social and humanitarian questions. It was here that the Covenant and the plans of 1919 were most fragmentary and sketchy. It was here that the social disorganization of the post-war years pressed most acutely for action. As a result it was here that the activities of the League, as well as its structure, expanded most readily, particularly as this could take place without raising the more troublesome issues of national sovereignty and international authority which caused so many misgivings when prospective League action was considered.

The activities of the League in social and humanitarian work are almost innumerable. They have included the feeding and housing of homeless refugees in Eastern Europe. They have included the repatriation of thousands of such refugees in the same regions. The treatment of the sick, the prevention of the spread of disease by epidemic, and the general control and improvement of conditions of public health have been added. And there is all the League work for control and suppression of the drug traffic and the traffic in women and girls, and for many other purposes of a similar nature.

The supervision, at least, of all of this social and humanitarian work falls largely to the Health Organization and the Sections of the Secretariat devoted to Health and Social

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Questions. But special conferences called by the Council have played a large part in planning this work as have also the Advisory Commissions on Opium Traffic, Traffic in Women and Children, and Child Welfare, not to mention the Committee of the Assembly devoted to Social Questions. And the Assembly as a whole and the Council itself have both devoted much labor to these problems. In these matters, as in all other matters, the function of the Assembly and of the special conferences is to lay down the principles of policy to be followed in the work by discussion and the signing of treaties among Member states, that of the Council and the Sections of the Secretariat and the Advisory Committees to elaborate concrete programs of activity to be carried out in the field, while the actual execution of such programs falls to the Health Organization and special agencies working under it or under the Council and Secretariat. In preparation for the formulation of policy and the formulation of detailed programs of action the collection of data is carried on constantly by the Health Organization and the Health Section of the Secretariat.

Traffic and communications problems constitute another branch of League work. The improvement of railway and steamship communications is the main item in this program but the work extends to postal, telephonic and telegraphic communications and to aërial navigation. This work is even more highly technical, if possible, than the health work of the League, and has been left largely to the Transit and Communications Organization. The Assembly,

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the Council, and the Secretariat (Transit Section) have also played a part here but the most important work has been done by the special conferences held by the Transit Organization.

Economic and financial problems were very acute at the end of the World War. With national currencies plunging into bottomless pits and industry and trade thrown into chaos in many countries as a result of the dislocations of war quick and effective rescue work was imperative. The Economics and Finance Organization was created to fill this need. As in Health and Transit problems so here it was felt that the regular organs of the League were inadequate to cope with the emergencies arising on every hand. And the bulk of the work in this field has been accomplished by the Economics and Finance Organization with such aid from Council, Assembly, and Secretariat and the appropriate Committees and Sections of the last two as could be rendered by them.

In all of these matters the task of binding up the wounds of the war has largely been superseded today by work of a more permanent and fundamental character. Such tasks as the financial rehabilitation of Austria and Hungary, particularly apt examples of activities undertaken by the League outside of the scope of the Covenant, but forced upon it by the urgent requests of the interested parties, do not need to be continued or repeated now. Created in part to meet the peculiar needs of the years 1919-1921, these organizations are now building for the future and attempting

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to develop sound social and economic conditions for times of peace.

In labor matters the League as distinct from the Labor Organization has little to do. In connection with all of the subjects just discussed labor problems are encountered, however, as well as in connection with the work in Mandates and Minorities. The Labor Organization operates in labor matters more nearly as a unit than can the varied organs of the League in social and economic problems. Collection of data by the Labor Office, formulation of policy by the General Conference, including the signing of many labor conventions, securing ratification and execution of these conventions by the Labor Office and Governing Body, such is the procedure in general terms. And while the labor conventions signed in the Labor Conferences have not been ratified and applied as rapidly or effectively as could be wished, the work of the Labor Organization as a whole may be regarded as reasonably satisfactory in view of all the circumstances.

Quite different is the administrative work of the League or its activities in carrying out certain provisions of the peace treaties and the Covenant where the work to be done is already settled in general terms. The League was not given many tasks in connection with the peace settlement itself. The victors in the War did not entrust to the League the more crucial assignments such as the collection of reparations and the supervision of German demilitarization, happily or unhappily as it may seem to different observers.

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But the holding of plebiscites and the execution of the results thereof was in some cases delegated to the League, the execution of the arrangements for the government of the Free City of Danzig and of the Saar Valley, and the administration of the Mandates system and of the agreements for the protection of Minorities were placed more or less completely in its hands. Through the High Commissioner of the League in Danzig and the Governing Commission of the Saar Valley the administration of these areas is supervised by the League. Through the Mandates Commission and the appropriate Sections of the Secretariat and Committees of the Assembly, not to mention the Assembly as a whole and the Council, the League attempts to see that Mandatory Powers observe the terms of their Mandates over Syria, Palestine, and other areas, and that various states observe the treaty stipulations which they have accepted for the protection of alien minority populations within their borders. These are all delicate and thankless tasks but in no work are the services of the League more important for permanent international order and justice.

Somewhat different from this work still but likewise of an administrative character, is the internal administration of the League and the care of its constitutional development. The Secretary General must conduct his establishment according to sound principles of financial and personnel administration. The Assembly and Council must watch over his work in this matter. The budget of the League must be prepared in the Secretariat and passed by the Council and

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especially the Assembly. The Secretariat and Council must prepare for Assembly meetings. The Assembly and Council must watch over the development of the structure of the Secretariat and over the structure and activities of the affiliated organizations and elect the judges on the World Court. The Assembly must control any increase of the elective seats on the Council and elect the Member states entitled at any given time to non-permanent seats therein as well as elect new Members to the League itself and propose amendments to the Covenant. In all of this internal administrative work and in the development of the League as an institution the Assembly comes eventually to say the final word in most cases.

The crucial work of the League comes in political questions and in the preservation of peace. The settlement of international disputes was the one function of the prospective League for which the framers of the Covenant planned most deliberately. In the central articles of that document—Articles 11 to 16—elaborate stipulations were inserted to provide for inquiry, conciliation, and arbitration of international disputes in the future. Two things have happened to these arrangements: the complicated and formal arrangements of the Covenant have not been employed to any great extent; and the purposes of these provisions have been served even more naturally, simply, and more effectively, perhaps, than the framers foresaw. There was no sharp break or new beginning in international political relations in 1920, when the League was established, either in subject

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matter or in methods. Quite the contrary, indeed, was true, for never was the continuity of current international relations as strong as in the immediate post-war years. Many international disputes, most of them of long standing, in their essentials, although somewhat modified by recent events, perhaps, flourished on all sides. And they were brought into the Council or the Assembly not so much to be treated formally and according to the new and rigid procedure set out in Articles 11 to 16 of the Covenant, but as part of the current business of the League. The result has been that to this day the League—for the Secretariat soon became involved in the settlement of such disputes also, through its Political Section—has been busy settling international disputes as a matter of routine.

Much difference of opinion has developed among observers of League activities in settling disputes as to the value of the activities. It has been charged that the League has been ineffective, at least against the Great Powers, and biased or partial to the victors of 1918. It is said that the League has, moreover, been trading upon existing war-weariness and dealing with recurrent disputes in an extremely shallow catch-as-catch-can method rather than solving or attempting to solve the problem of war and peace by fundamental and therefore permanently effective measures.

For these comments there is some justification, but not much. In the only case in which the League confronted a Great Power—the Corfu episode of 1923—it exercised a

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very serious influence on the settlement and was prevented from going further only by the position taken by the French Government and the Council of Ambassadors in Paris. The League as such can always be rendered impotent by the obstructiveness of one of its Members, Great Power or small—Persia blocked League action very effectively in another matter in 1927. Furthermore, it is really not among the Great Powers that most disputes calling for composition from without arise but among the smaller States. From 1920 to the present—as prior to 1914—and in this hemisphere as well as in Europe, it is among Balkan or Baltic or Central American States that the dangerous disputes arise, disputes dangerous because actions taken by the parties thereto may result in upsetting or in threatening to upset the existing international equilibrium and involve the Great Powers thereby. If the League can succeed in composing all disputes among the smaller powers it will have done the most valuable work for peace possible in the mere current preservation of peace.

That the League has been partial to the victors of 1918 in the treatment of current international disputes seems to be true to a certain degree. Britain and France and Italy and their satellites have run the League pretty much to suit themselves. This, however, raises questions which must be left for discussion in the next chapter.

The charges that the action of the League for peace has been wholly opportunistic and shallow would be very serious if true. And it is true to some extent. Particularly

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in the years immediately following the War and the Peace Conference, it was just about all that the League could do to keep up with current disputes and prevent the kettle from boiling over. The treatment of the war problem by way of the fundamentals had to wait for a time.

Since 1923 the League attack on the fundamentals of the war problem has, however, been developing strongly. In the Covenant the campaign for peace is envisaged in four somewhat distinct but interrelated forms: disarmament, guarantees, settlement of disputes, and removal of causes, in the order named. In the years since 1923—ever since 1920 to some extent, of course—the League has been working at the peace problem along these avenues.

In the disarmament work of the League not much has been achieved. Commissions and conferences, Assembly, Council, and Secretariat have wrestled with the subject for hours and days and not much has been accomplished. Participation by Russia and the United States has, perhaps, helped to some extent, but in spite of violent demands for action by the former and continued hopefulness on the part of the latter not much promise can be held out of any serious accomplishments in disarmament in the near future. A Preparatory Commission is still preparing for a conference—in 1930 or 1935 or 1970. The obstacle is perfectly clear: nations do not yet feel that they can lay aside the assumption that they may be called upon to defend their rights and interests by force. Given that assumption they insist on determining the range and character of their arma-

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ments by reference to what they consider to be their own needs and capacities, including geographical conditions and their pocketbooks. And neither extensive nor proportional disarmament can be had under such conditions.

The provision of a guarantee of national security in the Covenant was not based solely on the idea that it would make for disarmament and peace. But in later years the effort to attain disarmament under League auspices has been reënforced by the attempt to provide effective guarantees of national security. It was found (shades of American fears of 1920!) that the guarantees in the Covenant were too much subject to delay and discretion on the part of Member states to be reliable. A Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was proposed in 1923 to remedy this defect and when it proved unacceptable a Protocol for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes was signed and submitted to Members in 1924. The Protocol provided not merely for guarantees and looked not merely to disarmament but also to the settlement of disputes by conciliation and arbitration both as a step in support of the guarantee of security and also as a means of preserving peace directly. But this also failed of acceptance. Great Britain and the Dominions declined to ratify it and it is obvious not only that Russia and the United States would reject any such a scheme but that guaranteeing and protecting by force the territories and rights of Members could not be accomplished without their aid. Today the League program of a universal guarantee by force of Members' rights and security is dead, in spite of

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hopes in Continental Europe for its revival and in spite of tacit reservations by France and her satellites to the Briand-Kellogg peace pact.

There remain the attacks upon war by developing pacific settlement and the attack by removal of causes. The League has done much along both lines. While the latter method is slow—impossibly slow to be accepted as the sole method to be employed—it is fundamentally useful and conferences on economic relations and other war-breeding problems held at Geneva and elsewhere all contribute strongly in the right direction. But it is by the development of means for the settlement of disputes that the League seems to be doing most today in the cause of peace. Many agreements have been signed among Member states, both within and without League meetings, for conciliation and arbitration or adjudication of disputes. The League established the World Court and thus provided the finest international tribunal ever provided for the purpose. The Members have available a form of agreement by which they may subject all disputes to this body and a score or more of them have so agreed. The old exceptions, removing from the scope of arbitration such questions as involved “national honor” and “vital interests,” have been forgotten. Facilities for conciliation in political disputes, where arbitration by law is inappropriate, have been multiplied also. Altogether the improvement in quality, not to mention the sheer quantitative increase, in facilities for pacific settlement in the past decade has been



© Wide World Photos
The Permanent Court of International Justice, or the World Court, meeting in the chamber used at other times by the old Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Peace Palace at The Hague. The President is in the center; John Bassett Moore, American, is the second on his left.

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nothing short of miraculous judged by the standards prevailing in 1914.

One element was until recently lacking in this whole situation. Certain nations had agreed to submit all disputes to arbitration or conciliation—most of them had, in fact. But Russia and the United States stood out, not to mention Turkey and Mexico. And all of them had reserved a right to go to war after arbitration or conciliation in certain circumstances. The facilities for pacific settlement were available but there was no general and comprehensive pledges to utilize them and not to go to war. That pledge is provided in the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War which has resulted from a polite remark by M. Briand, an unwilling response by Mr. Kellogg, followed by a tremendous development in the terms of the arrangement—a development induced, it seems, very largely by the sheer logical implications of the original idea plus the facts of the current international situation. In the result, in spite of a tacit reservation of rights of self-defense, we have a pledge of pacific settlement which should amount to more, in combination with the facilities for conciliation and arbitration which have developed in connection with League discussion during the past decade, in the cause of peace than any single step ever taken except the creation of the League itself in 1919-1920. Assuming that the signatory Governments can be held to bona-fide observance of its terms by their peoples, we seem to have just about reached the final beginning of world peace.

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The part played by the United States in the conclusion of the Briand-Kellogg treaty raises the question of her participation in League activities in general,—still reserving the question of formal membership for later consideration.

In point of historic fact, of course, the United States led the world in the establishment of the League of Nations. As a result of misunderstandings and disagreements between the President and the Senate in the Winter of 1919-1920, the Senate refused to advise and consent to ratification of the Covenant and we did not become a Member. As a consequence of the interpretation placed by opponents of American membership in the League upon the results of the Presidential election of 1920 the Harding administration drew still further away from participation in League activity. There was and is little or no ground for interpreting the voting in 1920 as indicating popular opposition to American membership—as President Coolidge and other equally competent students of American politics have agreed—but anti-League Senators and editors throughout the country succeeded in imposing that interpretation upon the event. For two years the President and a Secretary of State who had been at heart pro-League ignored and condemned the League and all its works. There seemed to have taken place a complete reversal of our original position.

Many individual Americans had sought and held posts in the Secretariat or affiliated organizations, and unofficial American interest in and friendship for the League persisted, however. Soon it was borne in upon the administra-

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tion that the League was engaged in work upon certain subjects of considerable importance to us and, upon invitation, we began to send unofficial observers to sit in at League Meetings, and to designate unofficial members who would actually take part in the work of League administrative commissions. Then we sent official delegates without power to act. Finally we have for three or four years now participated officially and actively in many League activities, political as well as purely non-political. Today we are more deeply engaged in many League activities than are most of its Members. To the question of American membership we shall turn in the next chapter. Meanwhile a final review of the relative positions of the various organs of the League and of the characteristic form of their action will be useful.

To make a long story short, it may be said that the Assembly passes resolutions and the Council and Secretariat carry them out. The General Conference of the Labor Organization and the special conferences called outside of the Assembly go on beyond the passage of resolutions, as does the General Conference itself, to the conclusion of treaties; the Assembly has grossly neglected its opportunities here. The Council, of course, does a good deal besides carry out the resolutions of the Assembly and so does the Secretariat, but both organs, together with all special commissions of the affiliated organizations, act in principle as agents for executing Assembly and Conference decisions. The World Court decides cases submitted to it by the parties or questions referred to it by the Council. The Labor Office

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carries out Labor Conference decisions as far as possible but the Governing Body is somewhat less deferential to the General Conference than is the Council to the Assembly.

Indeed the Assembly has finally won for itself the position of paramount prestige and influence in the whole League structure. This was the intention of the framers but at first the Assembly failed to live up to the plan. Moreover the Assembly has fluctuated in its vigor, assertiveness, and influence—the Fifth Assembly rose to the heights, the Sixth sank into the depths. But on the whole the Assembly is now to be regarded as the main organ of League life.

The Council is today in a curious predicament. It has more or less clearly resigned the dominant position it once held and adopted a subordinate rôle. Yet it has been increased to fourteen members and cannot seem to lose altogether its propensity to indulge in international politics of a very sharp and decisive variety. The Council is not yet a mere administrative commission.

The outcome of the conflict of tendencies regarding the Council, the reason for the supremacy of the Assembly, and the most critical current problem regarding the Secretariat all turn upon one factor. Indeed the future of the still only partially used World Court and the efficacy of the Labor Organization also turn—as does the success of all organized international action for that matter—upon the same factor. That is the positions taken and the policies pursued by the individual nations which are Members of the League or which are as non-Members related to it in some one or

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another peculiar way. This crucial question will now occupy us in the final chapter on the League.

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Chapter XIX

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

THE NATIONS AND THE LEAGUE

THERE was a vast deal of talk in the United States, and some discussion in other parts of the world, at the time when the League of Nations was being created, as to whether or not the prospective League would turn out to be a "superstate." The modest claims of the League in subsequent years have made such a suggestion seem to have been particularly ridiculous, in so far as it was made in any honest sincerity. The League of Nations is not a superstate but an interstate; that is, it is an organization for facilitating interstate coöperation. It is inadequate to describe the League, as some of its friends do, as merely a method of doing business coöperatively. It is both a system of organs as well as a system of forms of procedure for coöperation among the Member states. But it is hardly anything more. As a result what the League has been, is, and will be, what it has done in the past, can do today, and may be expected to do in the future, depends not so much upon the League itself, its organs and personnel, as upon its Member states.

Of course any organized institution such as the League acquires by its very existence a certain amount of personality

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or corporate reality of its own. It is not quite true that the League of Nations consists merely of the nations of the League, as someone has put it. The various organs of the League have come to have a life and an activity which seem to exist somewhat independently of the Member states. This is not true of the Assembly or Council to any great extent. At any moment any one state may, perhaps, regard the remainder of the body of which it is a Member as "the Assembly" or "the Council." And whenever those bodies are unanimous in their decisions they appear to possess an identity of their own. But in all such cases a little scrutiny and reflection will show that the Assembly and the Council are merely groups of states or their delegates, with no reality except as aggregates of delegates acting upon mandates from individual nations. The same is true of the Labor Conference and the conferences of the affiliated organizations. It is only in the Secretariat, the Labor Office, the administrative Commissions, and the World Court—roughly in the non-policy-forming administrative organs—that the tendency toward independent corporate life for the League becomes clearly manifest. Even here, of course, the absolute and undisputed control of all League activities lies in the hands of the Member states whenever they care to exercise it, and the only basis for the apparent independent authority of Secretariat, Labor Office, or Court is found in the fact that the Member states have previously bestowed upon these organs a certain degree of discretion. The main conclusion already drawn will prove to be sound, namely, that

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the League of Nations is what it is and does what it does because of its Member states.

Now the Members of the League vary greatly in all sorts of ways. The differences among the states of the world at large being as great as they are the differences among League Members are bound to be very great. These differences are the factors which are most decisive in determining the scope and direction of League action.

About half of the League Members are European states. As a result of this fact and the fact that it is in the relations among European states that the most troublesome problems of international relations have arisen in the past twenty-five years, the League has acted mainly as a European League. Latin American, Asiatic, African, and Australasian states are both less numerous and less vitally interested in the League and its work than are the European states. At the same time this aspect of the situation is growing steadily less important as World War questions are settled and the inter-relations of all states increase and are intensified.

Out of the fifty-odd Members of the League five states regard themselves and are regarded as Great Powers, namely, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan. While there are many gradations of power among the remaining Members the difference between the least powerful of the Great Powers and the most powerful of the other Members is so great that the League often seems to consist of the few Great Powers and many small ones. This

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naturally colors the whole situation. It is not a very wholesome situation but it seems unavoidable.

Further narrowing the inner circle of the League, the relative lack of interest felt by Japan in European affairs and the relative weakness of Germany since the War, coupled with a certain unwillingness of Fascist Italy to participate whole-heartedly in organized international co-operation, leave to France and Great Britain the chief burden of carrying on the life of the League. The Japanese profess their loyalty to the League and take a reasonable share in its work, and the Italians do not abstain from or obstruct League action to any great extent, but the support of the League from these two countries is distinctly less than that accorded by Great Britain and France, even with a Tory Government in power in London—Labor and Liberal Britain is solidly pro-League, Conservative Britain only partially so—and M. Poincaré still Premier in Paris.

The position of Germany in and toward the League is very suggestive upon the whole problem. She desired to enter the League in 1920 but was kept out. She then came to regard the League as an embodiment of the power of the victors in the War, and became somewhat hostile to it as such. Her presence in the League, originally opposed by France and the Allies, and still as late as 1924 opposed by France, came, however, to be strongly desired by the Members of the League in general, partly in order to bring her within the range of League action and partly to set aside the last vestiges of the War. Germany was therefore persuaded

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to enter in 1926 on substantially her own conditions! Since her entry she has taken a very active part in League work, making up as far as possible, by her interest in seeing international relations regulated and conducted wisely and in securing certain definite ameliorations of importance to herself, for her lack of power and influence. Gradually Germany is coming to occupy, as a result of the display of an able diplomacy and an apparently sincere internationalism in place of national power, a leading position in the League beside Britain and France. Fascist Italy is by comparison losing her opportunity of playing a rôle as one of the leading powers in the League.

Somewhat comparable with the position of Germany in the League is that of the Scandinavian states and The Netherlands. These states do not possess and cannot exercise at Geneva any really great political influence in comparison with France and Great Britain. They do, however, feel a very keen and a thoroughly genuine interest in and sympathy for the League idea. They take part in League activities with less invidiously national desires and demands than Germany even. In many ways Nansen and Branting and Unden and similar personalities from these states have been the most valuable devotees of League ideals and League practices among all the many striking personalities at the Palace of Nations. If the Great Powers must run the League as they would dominate international affairs without the League it is an enormous advance to have them conducting international affairs in or through the League

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where they can be watched and criticized by these independent small powers.

Certain of the smaller Continental states have taken a strong attitude of support for the League also, but on one condition, namely, that they shall be well treated by League authorities. Perhaps it is too harsh to include Belgium in this group—after all she has not had much to ask of the League—, but Poland and Czechoslovakia, not to mention Rumania, Jugoslavia, and Greece, have clearly taken this position. Benès of Czechoslovakia and Politis of Greece have been very prominent at Geneva and very competent and very helpful, but these smaller Allied states have seemed to think of the League as a league of victors as even France and Great Britain have not.

As would be quite natural, therefore, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey have felt somewhat differently. Turkey has not entered the League because the League and its leading Members seemed to stand back of Greece in her attack upon Turkey immediately after the World War and seemed intent upon wresting control of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus from her. Bulgaria and Hungary have felt similarly, the former because of League support of her three neighbors to north, west, and south, and Hungary because of League friendship for Rumania and Czechoslovakia and even for Austria, that one of the former Central Powers most responsible for precipitating war in 1914 but most successful in winning League and Allied friendship afterward. Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria all joined

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the League relatively early, but the last two have not infrequently been in hot water at headquarters.

Nothing of special importance marks the positions of Finland, most of the Baltic states, or Portugal, in the League. Lithuania has run into League action or attempted action in connection with the status of Memel and Vilna—and she has not come off well in those encounters,—but there is no particular significance to be attached to all this. Switzerland likewise has played a considerable but a relatively neutral part in League life; she entered with some misgivings, in spite of or rather because of her strong devotion to true internationalism, and she has constantly striven to remain faithful to that and only to that ideal.

The fact that most of the work of the League, in social and humanitarian matters as well as in political matters, centers in Europe and that the European nations are the most active Members of the League is not surprising. It is in Europe that national and international life both reach their maximum peaks on this planet. It is here that we should expect League activity to reach its maximum.

The effect of this situation upon the attitudes taken by non-European Members is nevertheless significant. They have joined the League and they take part in its activities, not so much because of the value of those activities upon their interests directly as because of the general ideal of international coöperation, the general aim of international peace, or the political prestige of such participation. Thus it is for the Latin American states. Thus it is for the British

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Dominions, for whom the prestige value of League membership counts heavily in their climb to diplomatic autonomy or independence. Thus it is for all the states of Australasia, Africa, and Asia, even, indeed, including Japan. Most of these states, in fact, would be glad to see the League restrain the European Powers, or the Great Powers at least, in their general world policies further than it does. Non-European states Members of the League resemble smaller European states herein. China in particular has hoped to use the League in this way—not with any great success hitherto. The Latin American states would many of them like to see this extended to the United States. In short, the League often seems to embody a perpetual campaign against the Great Powers both within and without Europe and a perpetual anti-European animus on the part of almost all of the non-European Members.

It must be many years before this situation changes very much. There is no great degree of unity among all the states of Europe yet in political matters, much less among all the states in the world. If the stability or the success of the League turned upon the idea of such unity the present situation would be most unpromising. In social and humanitarian affairs the degree of world unity existing today is much greater and is constantly on the increase. The desire for the maintenance of peace is nearly universal, whether this desire be based upon substantial material interests, as in Europe and the United States, or upon ideas and ideals of a sentimental sort. All of this means, and very emphatically

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means, that no very great demands can be placed by the League upon its non-European Members except in the social and humanitarian work and then in exchange for direct benefits received. Or, to put it more accurately, it means that non-European League Members are not going to be willing to assume any very great obligations toward one another or toward European League Members except in the work of the League in social and humanitarian matters wherein direct benefits accrue to participants. Even Great Britain has been found unwilling in very recent years to assume obligations in connection with the maintenance of peace under League auspices where the prospective burden seemed greater than the prospective benefit.

Russia has provided a troublesome problem in her relations with the League from the very beginning. The Russian Government has professed great devotion to the cause of peace in the world. She accepted the Briand-Kellogg treaty with alacrity albeit without enthusiasm in view of its very modest scope. Her devotion to the cause of strictly international peace, however, and to the cause of international coöperation, has been tempered by her skepticism concerning the value of the national state and more especially the value of the existing states of the world, many of which are not purely national and all of which are capitalistic in social and industrial organization. The Russians endorse the doctrine of national self-determination but attach more importance still to the development of power by the proletariat, in every nation and all over the world. Moreover the Rus-

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sian Government has denounced the League as an organization of capitalistic states some of which were, in 1920, when they were at the same time engaged in setting up the League, engaged in attempting indirectly to overthrow the Soviet Government by counter-revolutionary enterprises in Russia itself. Down to the entry of Germany into the League Russia denounced the League and would have none of it.

Recently Russia has begun to relent and participate in League activity. She feels the need for reinstatement in European international relations and world politics. Relations with individual European powers have grown slowly closer and better during the past five years in spite of the misadventure with the Tory Government in England. In social and humanitarian work Russia has always given some coöperation to the League, although she regards the International Labor Organization as a pitiful and treacherous compromise with capitalist Governments and capitalist law. It is in the League work to preserve peace and more particularly in the disarmament work of the League that Russia is most interested. She obviously could not participate in any program of peace and security by coercion, partly because of the profession of an absolutist ideological opposition to the use of force in international affairs and partly because she could not encourage and coöperate with capitalist states in such activity. Russia must be listed with Britain and America among those states apparently opposed to any system of coercive sanctions. She does propose dis-

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armament, however, and that on a scale which seems impossible of acceptance by the Great Powers. It is charged that her proposals—proposals for complete and immediate disarmament on land and sea for all nations, or as near thereto as may be attained—are insincere, intended solely to stir up trouble among League Members, to discredit the League, and deceive the world concerning her real intentions, which, it is charged, are warlike. That Russia could intend any military adventures beyond her own borders seems absurd, apart entirely from any professions on her part; she knows that exactly this action would be the last straw needed to discredit her in the West, and bring Europe down upon her. She may be fairly suspected of a willingness to discredit the League, stir up trouble among the Members thereof,—between the pacifist small powers and the Great Powers and their satellites,—and to take sides with Germany against France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Russia does, however, still fear attack and invasion from the West, apparently, and her proposal may be regarded as sincere in the sense that she would be glad to see it accepted. Like other states she needs the money spent on arms for other objects, and, perhaps unlike more prosperous nations, she sees that; if she could serve the end of economy while getting rid of Polish and Czech and Rumanian and French threats from the West she would be very happy indeed.

What will come of this relationship can not be clearly foreseen. The Russian disarmament program is not likely

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to be accepted although extensive disarmament such as she proposes may prove possible in the next five years as never before. If her radical proposals fail will she back off and eschew the League entirely? What chance is there of her moving in the other direction, as she is now, expanding her participation, and even applying for Membership? What would be the attitude of League Members, and of the United States, in such circumstances?

It does not seem that Russia will be forced to withdraw from participation at Geneva or will desire to do so. The League Members will probably find it possible to go some distance to meet Russian views just as the Russians will probably find it possible to become more moderate in their proposals. Relations with Great Britain should be adjusted after the next Parliamentary election in that country and, before many years, with the United States. Application for membership in the League by Russia must, however, seem to lie far in the future, unless it be realized that the Russian Government has already swung around considerably toward more moderate views on both social and political problems. Whether Russia applies or not, what attitude the Members take upon such application—most of them who are concerned at all directly enjoy good relations with Russia today—and where the United States would stand, depends upon how far the League progresses in the next few years toward a more effective internationalism, how far Russia retreats toward a more reasonable national and international program, and upon how far the United States advances toward

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formal acknowledgment of her instinctive and already active policy of participation in League activity. Russian relations with the League, like Russian relations with Western Europe, are certain to remain of paramount importance and of fascinating interest for a decade to come although an attempt at a partial solution of the problem should be expected with the next five years.

The position and attitude of the United States toward the League is not identical with that of most of the non-European or the American states. It might be said, perhaps, that where most of the non-European states need to belong to the League for the sake of political prestige, but take little part in League activity and get relatively little out of it except in social and humanitarian matters, the United States does not need to enter the League for reason of prestige but must find it worth while to take part in many League activities, political activities included (disarmament, settlement of disputes), for value received. On all the facts it would be expected that the United States would find her interests in international coöperation to run with those of the Great Powers of Europe rather than with those of Latin America. She is interested in conditions in Europe as is no nation of Latin America, Africa, or Asia. It is particularly to be expected that the United States would find her interests to run with the Great Powers rather than with the small states.

The Senate of the United States failed to approve the Covenant in 1919-1920 partly for personal and partisan reasons but partly—and mainly, as far as a decision was

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made upon the merits of the controversy—because of provisions in the Covenant looking to forcible action for guaranteeing possessions and rights of Members and preserving peace. Such provisions would make heavy demands upon every Member State. Perhaps that demand would be too heavy for us even if it could be borne by the European nations, especially the Great Powers, who would be most intimately concerned and most directly called upon to discharge such a function. Many of the items of the settlement of 1920 seemed to be unjust and unstable in themselves, and bound to cause trouble as time went on.

The situation is still doubtful. It is not clear that the people of the United States voted in 1920 against Membership in the League even with the provisions for coercion in mind. It is not clear that British and Dominion refusal to get back of the reinvigorated program of coercion in the Protocol of 1924 is final. It is not clear that regional guarantees, renunciation of war, and pacific settlement have finally displaced the program of security and peace by international enforcement. It does seem, however, that such a development has taken place, and if it has, if coercion has been eliminated from the application of the Covenant, then the United States might be expected to find the main obstacle to her entry into the League removed. She is participating in League activities very extensively. She has done a great deal in the Briand-Kellogg treaty to complete the process of eliminating coercion from League practice. Entry into the World Court becomes imminent. What will

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be the outcome on the question of formal entry into the League is uncertain, but if the League maintains its stability and continues to develop its own prestige and its activities as it has done in the first decade of its existence, and if the elimination of coercion from League practice proves to have been real, present currents in general international relations and in the foreign policy of the United States would seem to be calculated to take the nation into the League in something short of another decade, or about 1937.

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Chapter XX

PERSONALITIES AND POLITICS IN THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE factors which determine the course of events in international affairs are the facts of geography, economics, and social psychology. Oil and cherry blossoms, and men's reactions thereto, rule the world. Abstract ideas or unfounded theories have little power, by comparison with these influences, in molding the world of international relations. What shall become of this world of nations in the future depends mainly upon the developments in this field of material and sensual life.

What is actually happening to that world of nations is rather startling, if its implications are explored. Communications are being developed until it is possible to anticipate a complete unification of world markets and world supplies of material goods, and a complete unification of world information and experience in another seventy years. Travel and foreign residence, the intermingling of peoples and races, the exchange of ideas and experiences seems destined to bring substantial world unity in race and culture in a not very distant future. The development of colonial autonomy and independence seems certain to wipe out the colonial status entirely within a not unimaginable period.

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National discretion in all matters of common international, or rather of world-wide, concern, seems certain to be surrendered in exchange for the greater happiness obtainable by international regulation. International federal union seems destined to grow from its present loose form into something firmer and more effective and to lead in perhaps another seventy years to something approaching a real world state. The pace of social evolution has been speeded up by these very developments which give not merely pace but direction to that evolution, namely, increased facilities for communication. The net effect is a rapid—indeed, as measured against the four thousand years of modern history, a catastrophic—liquefaction and consequent unification of world society such as could have come only by just the means provided by the communication facilities of our era.

It is perhaps still more startling to speculate upon the possibility of arresting or escaping such developments. This means merely looking at the matter from the other side, but it is profitable, psychologically, nevertheless. Is there any possibility of discarding these present means of communication and transportation? Of stopping the development of world industry, trade, and finance? Of preventing travel and the intermixture of races? Of preventing colonial evolution, international unification, the coming of the world state? Suppose that we were all agreed that the present trend of evolution was bad, undesirable, hideous—as some of us do feel: what possibility would there be of stopping it?

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In all literal seriousness it seems to the writer that the answer is clear: not a chance in the world. It seems to him that without a shadow of doubt what is happening already today is what is described above, and that the course of events in this particular matter is set for good and all.

Then, too, certain outlying results or applications of these main developments challenge speculation. A unification of religious beliefs, of social creeds, seems unescapable. A unification of, or a simplification of, social manners and customs, including the relations between the sexes. The differences between individuals and among groups of individuals, these are what stand to be most affected and even eliminated by the processes most powerfully at work in the world today. Even the world-old differences of geography and climate, distribution of raw materials and conditions of living are coming under man's power. The foundations of the world of differentiated nations and individuals are being undermined or taken over into man's conscious control. And the result is a new set of conditions for the international problem.

Senator Reeds still debate in the Senate, however, and of more immediate interest just now than conditions a century hence are the parts played by the parties actively interested in international affairs today. The nations, like the people who compose the nations, are not nearly as advanced in thought and practice as their outward manner of living, adopted in response to changes in technique and fashion, without much reflection, would lead one to expect them to

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be. The next seventy years will be the great period of truly international life and action in all history, prior to the coming of the world state; who, then, are the principal actors, the directors or stage managers, and who the audience? What interests animate them?

Are the nations not the parties to the action? The references so frequently made to countries by name—"France," "Germany," "America"—are in part unreal formalisms, but not entirely so. To a certain extent it is grossly unscientific and misleading to speak of countries in this way, in view of all of the varied strands of interest, feeling, and opinion which go to make up any one country. Moreover, in each country some one or more groups or interests will usually be found to be in control, to the exclusion of the other groups in that country. Yet this unified concept of the nation and its Government is not less accurate but more accurate than formerly. If there are more conscious interest groups in the modern state there are also more numerous and more effective facilities for synthesizing those interests in the system of public education, representation, and control. As time goes on the fiction of national personality becomes less and less a fiction.

Nevertheless, nations cannot, in view of sheer physical considerations, act except through individual human beings or groups of human beings. This means that even if nations are admitted to be real personalities in themselves there enter upon the international scene with them certain other personalities who must be taken into account. These are the

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officials speaking and acting on behalf of the national states.

In point of fact a nation is much more frequently represented, in the general and realistic sense of that word, in international life, by its unofficial citizens or nationals than it is by those whose function it is to "represent" it officially. Thousands of private citizens of a given nation engage in international life and come into contact with the nationals and governments of other states for every one official of that nation who takes such action. These private individuals and corporations, therefore, stand alongside of the nations themselves and their officials as interested parties in international life.

The situations or occasions in which these parties act upon one another are familiar enough in the main. The contacts of formal international relations,—in diplomacy and organized international coöperation,—are those which come first to mind, contacts in which the States and their officials take part. The widest and most numerous range of such occasions, however, are found in international intercourse or world trade, travel, and communication, as carried on by private individuals. Moreover, in ordinary daily life within the boundaries of one nation, as it appears, there is more of international contact, world living, and formal international action than is commonly detected. Most international life is lived not on the high seas or in some international spaces or vacua but within the nations themselves! A citizen mailing a letter abroad, a foreign tourist stopping at a hotel, a policeman arresting an alien, a foreign consul

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dealing with the local business men—these are typical examples of international life or international action. It is the motives of the parties in all such situations that must be taken into account.

To ascribe a motive to a nation is difficult because of the difficulty of ascribing unified personality to a nation and because of the facts which lie back of that difficulty. The nation seldom has any unified purpose. Why did the United States go to war in 1917? To ask the question is to answer it: for many reasons such as defense of neutral rights at sea, prevention of victory for the Central Powers whose aims seemed to threaten popular liberty and international progress in the world, or to protect investments in Allied loans. Mixed motives and subconscious motives render an answer to the question as to a nation's purpose at any time very difficult.

Nevertheless a nation as such does at times have certain conscious and unified purposes and they are at times decisive in their influence upon international affairs. The fundamental and primary purpose of a nation is to defend and promote its own welfare. This naturally includes expansion and aggrandizement, territorial and economic. There is no room whatever to regard the nation as, in its own thought or feeling, an agent or servant of humanity. Perhaps the nation should take that attitude. In fact it does not. It does find that its own advantage is frequently identified with the welfare of the international community,—increasingly so, indeed. There is no need—as there is no room—to imagine

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an altruistic motive on the part of a nation because that nation takes part in organized international coöperation. Perhaps other nations are taking action to compel or persuade it to join them—in preserving peace or eliminating tariff barriers—by adequate inducements. Seeking national welfare through international welfare is then possible. In case of conflict between the two, however, national welfare must come first with the individual nation. It does come first today, and it will for some time in the future.

Public officials acting on behalf of national states experience the pressure of motives still more mixed and confused. Subconscious impulses of patriotic devotion, selfish ambition, and obscure tribal and ethnic superstitions play their part. An individual man who is also a public official is a bundle of impulses such as could be created in no other conceivable way.

The individual human being acting as a public official in international affairs may be able to guide his action to some extent according to instructions issued to him by his Government. Even in this case, however, he must use a great deal of discretion in interpreting and applying these instructions. No instructions, moreover, were ever entirely complete, and diplomats and consuls must often act according to their own best judgment. When they come to act in this manner they may still act so as to promote the objective of national interest as far as possible, but the possibility for the entry of the most powerful of all human motives, self-aggrandizement, is great. Where the national objective can,

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as it very often can, at least in the judgment of the official, be reconciled with the operation on the personal motive the result must be a perplexing intermixture of purposes.

The individual diplomat or arbitrator may be swayed by considerations varying all the way from a desire to go down in history as a great public servant, or even a servant of humanity, to the desire to make a pecuniary profit out of his position in public affairs. Personal prejudices and emotions—M. Poincare has often reminded us that he is a son of Lorraine—are powerful. Social ambitions of diplomats and wives of diplomats are at times decisive. Desire for notoriety or fame is felt. All of these motives and many more, influence the course of official international affairs.

The private individuals who take part in international life vary widely in outlook. There is the clergyman who preaches peace and the military man who preaches war—there are, of course, preachers who clamor for war and military men who clamor for peace, but they are the exceptions. There is the coast dweller who is sensitive to the outer world and the inland dweller who is an isolationist. There are the exporters and the importers, the sailors and the travelers, and many more. They all occupy their posts in the game of international affairs with widely differing ideas and feelings.

The influence of the stay-at-homes is very persistent and often effective. Men and women who never make any direct contacts with other nations or nationals of other lands, who never consciously read foreign literature or come to know

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and appreciate foreign culture often express themselves strongly on international problems and exert decisive influence on public international affairs. Stay-at-homes voting for war or peace, for national isolation or intervention, on insufficient grounds of information or judgment, are a menace to the nation and world peace as well.

Almost as dangerous are those who have made some contact with the outer world but have not benefited by it in thought and mind. They may have touched upon foreign life too briefly or too carelessly. They skimmed the surface and acquired little sound understanding of the things they saw. Lacking real information on foreign affairs, they go upon grounds of sentiment—"I just love Italy!" or "I think Italians are so cruel, don't you?"—, or merely personal grounds—"I spent a Summer in Germany, you know, and I think it is a wonderful country!" The results are hard to calculate.

Individuals and corporations with business interests in foreign lands are impelled by much more definite and stable motives. It is the fashion to hold the international trader, banker, and concession hunter responsible for a good deal of the trouble which develops in international relations. For this there is good reason; competitive efforts for raw materials and sales markets at times are very dangerous to world order. The other side of the balance is important also: most of the international traders and bankers of today are impelled by motives which coincide entirely with programs for greater international stability and peace coupled

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with freer international trade and intercourse of all kinds. They want to make money; this may involve competition with foreign business; it may, however, involve combinations with foreign concerns; and it does not in the great majority of cases mean dangerous international rivalry. Just as modern science has outstripped modern political and ethical thought, so modern political thought and practice have fallen behind the development of contemporary economic organization and activities. World order is coming not in spite of but upon the basis of, modern international economic practices.

Editors and politicians seem to go off on the other tangent again. Their motives are quite clear. They want to secure a following of people who will buy their papers (increased circulation being requisite for fat advertising contracts) or vote for them in elections. To do this they must either give people what they,—the people,—want, or make them,—the people again—, want what the editors and politicians think is good for them. The former is much easier. Besides, the editors and politicians often have the same tastes as their followers. Now the things which people want in international affairs are their own safety and prosperity and—if possible in addition—increased prosperity and glory, at the expense of foreigners and foreign countries. They may desire safety very strongly and they may just possibly desire glory in the form of a share in world peace and progress—both of these motives are apparently becoming stronger today—, but they are

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more likely to feel a stronger appeal from other more naïve suggestions of national advantage from the platform and the editorial column or the "news" (as presented by the editor). The politician and the more or less anonymous and hence irresponsible journalist, particularly the latter, are among the most dangerous characters in contemporary public life.

The preachers and the teachers at times seem to follow in their train. Preachers are found crying crusade against the heathen and teachers are found to prove the social values of variety, liberty, disorder, and conflict. But not frequently. In almost all religious and ethical systems brotherly love is a prominent element and most preachers preach peace, albeit a rather sentimental and spineless peace. The teachers, or scholars and scientists engaged in teaching,—perhaps the writer is prejudiced here—go upon the opposite basis, viz., facts and the inferences which may properly be based thereon. And all the facts seem to point in one direction, namely, toward order and increasing international system and progress under law, with as much liberty and variety as can be reconciled therewith. The preachers and the teachers have their own personal ambitions, of course, and now and then one of them will seek notoriety and acclaim—and pecuniary rewards—by turning sensationalist, and then it may be either sensational nationalism or sensational internationalism that comes forth. But this seldom happens, perhaps because these gentlemen have by the course of training through which they have passed

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oddly lost sight of the fundamental consideration of their own personal identity and personal advantage——.

Likewise the military and the women play varying parts in the discussion of international questions. There are military—and naval—men in active service who are opposed to international disorder and war, either because they want to escape war or because they see the advantages of international coöperation. There are also many veterans who are strong advocates of international peace and order for very obvious reasons: they have known at first hand the obscene horror of war. But for many veterans who never saw action, or, seeing action, were untouched by its horrors, as for many military men in active service who have not yet seen action, the situation looks different. They want the glory and the thrill. And the women are like the preachers. Many of them, most of them, because of their personal experiences in conserving human life in the family, and resultant traits of thought and feeling, are opposed to war. A few unnatural would-be amazons cry for blood. The motivation of all these groups varies widely from individual to individual, from time to time, from place to place.

The individual who is observing all of these interested parties and their motives may himself be subject to certain impulses or prejudices which will affect his impressions on these matters very strongly. What is already in the observer's head is just about as important in any investigation or reflection as what is to go there or issue therefrom.

If the observer believes in advance that his own country

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is "superior" to any other country on earth he will be totally unable to study international affairs fairly. The idea of "superiority" here is so general as to have little real meaning anyway; if it be split up into superiority in literacy, in prosperity, in armaments, then it may begin to be manageable. The chief trouble with this national superiority complex is its unproven and its rigid character. It may be true that American food is superior to English food but it has not been proven, or, if it has, the person who holds that view usually holds it not because he knows of this proof, and he holds it so rigidly that it could not be either weakened or strengthened by such proof! Possession of—rather, being possessed by,—such a fixed idea is disastrous to any fair study of international relations.

A similar prejudice is revealed in the hostile reaction felt by many an individual in connection with the terms "foreign" or "foreigner," or even the term "international." To many, indeed, there is something peculiarly sinister about the latter term, in spite of its use in the names of our ultra safe and sane knife and fork clubs. The prejudice betokens latent fear, suspicion, and hostility. Now such feelings are, in view of the history of international relations and the still dominant philosophy of international relations, partially justified. But it goes without saying that such a state of mind is fatal to any progress in the study of international affairs. Even if internationalism were an "unmentionable" disease it would have to be mentioned in order to be adequately considered and treated. Being, as it is, merely a

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fact of the contemporary world, it—and its most formal expression the League of Nations—must be approached with an open mind.

Feelings of special intensity toward peace and pacifism often hamper the individual in his thought on these problems. If peace seems to him the sum of all the good, the true, and the beautiful he will have a distorted view upon problems of nationality, international action, and war. If peace seems to him a weak ideal and pacifists poltroons he is likely to be similarly diverted from the truth. Persons with clergymen or military or naval officers in the family are in a precarious predicament!

Many other prejudices operate in this manner. The conviction that the international bankers, or “the capitalists” generally, are really in control of international affairs is widespread today. There is some foundation for this idea, but not much. Like all simple and dramatic explanations of complex situations it is too simple and dramatic to be true. And its effect is to grossly distort the thought of many people on the problems of world affairs.

Color, race, and religious prejudices are still more intense and disastrous. They are all on the decline today, especially religious prejudices, but in so far as they survive they are absolutely and inevitably irreconcilable with objective thought on international relations. Whatever be the values of this, that, or the other creed or race, whatever be the values of secularization and racial intermixture—and there is much room for discussion there, of course—there

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is absolutely no room in the mind of the fair student of international relations for the instinctive feeling that other religions or other races than his own are, as such, "inferior."

A curious turn or perversion in modern democratic philosophy produces in many minds a prejudice against the Great Powers which causes difficulties also. This is to some extent paralleled by a not so unexpected feeling of contempt for the smaller or the more backward nations—these being by no means, of course, necessarily the same. To these must be added the opposite—an instinctive sympathy felt by many for the small or the backward nation. The idea that a small nation is, as such, the equal of a large nation is, of course, most undemocratic, for it results in placing each individual in the latter far below each individual in the former. The serious thing, however, is the warped effect produced on the mind of the student by all of these preconceptions.

Anti-British, pro-French, or anti-Italian feelings are similarly out of place. All of these phobias and phobias, whether based, as they usually are, upon vague sentimental grounds, or upon definite and well-considered reasons, are detrimental to progress in understanding this world of nations. Even in the latter case the student who forgets that "Germany" includes many groups of opinion and that Germany in 1914 may not be the Germany of fifteen years later is bound to go astray in his conclusions.

And so with the extremely self-conscious and self-confident realist who feels that he is too sharp to be fooled by all this palaver about international law, international au-

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thority, or international coöperation,—he knows that there is nothing to it all! The fact is that he is being fooled by his own cleverness. International ethics are not what they might be, international law and government are not as effective as they will be later, but to discard all thought of such things as totally ineffective today is about as unrealistic as to assume that they are completely effective. What is more to the point, such a state of mind renders the individual victimized by such prejudices totally incapable of discovering whether in fact contemporary international organization has any value and strength or not. It is equally true that unjustified confidence in the possibilities of international coöperation and the progress already made in that direction is disastrous.

The formal ways in which the private individual may take part in the control of international affairs are, on the other hand, definite if limited. Voting upon candidates and measures, appealing to public officials after election, these are in substance the principal methods by which the individual may, within the framework and established practice of modern government, influence national action on international questions. He is, moreover, expected by his fellow-citizens to take such action, he is entitled to take it, and he is a fool if he does not do what he can to protect his own interests thereby.

The relative influence of any one individual on the action of the Government in any given question must, of course, be slight. He is only one in thousands or millions. Moreover,

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so long as men and measures, personalities and policies, are confused as they are today in popular elections, it is bound to be very difficult for the voter to concentrate his support or his opposition upon the measure which he has in view. The persistence of the false idea that problems of foreign affairs have no place in a political campaign, or the equally important unwillingness of the candidates for public office to discuss problems because of ignorance or desire to emphasize domestic issues, makes it still more difficult to accomplish anything in this connection. Nevertheless it is a normal method of exerting control over state action in international affairs.

The submission of questions of international relations, as such, apart from the election of individual officials, to popular vote has been suggested in recent years and tried in at least one country—Switzerland, pioneer European democracy in modern times. Unless twentieth century society goes off from popular government generally, in the direction of the decision of questions of public policy by expert scientific research, a not impossible development, and one already appearing in limited areas today, the submission of questions of international relations to referendum seems bound to come. A referendum on the question of war or peace, now demanded by some of the pacifists, seems a very dangerous experiment, given the still latent feelings of anti-foreign and anti-international animosity to be found in so many minds and hearts today. But on the general question,

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and within the limits mentioned, the probable trend of future developments seems clear.

Appealing to public officials in current questions of international affairs seems futile to the average individual. And it cannot be guaranteed as of certain effectiveness, it is true. Nevertheless, the official has certain very urgent reasons for giving heed to such communications. He holds his office and must retain it by popular election. His party at least must have such support. The individual writing in is probably an exceptionally well-informed, interested, and outspoken individual—else he would not be writing. He may damage the official's reputation irreparably back home or in the country at large if he is not at least given due consideration. Representatives do keep track of such communications from their constituents; write your Senator, write the Secretary of State, write your President!

Informal or unofficial participation in control of international affairs, or the possibilities of such participation, are almost as easy and broad in scope as official participation is limited. Beyond the now almost universal participation in international intercourse or world living—trade and travel and international communication generally—which has its effect, there is the whole world of private associations and their activities. An individual may join a business club—Rotary or a Chamber of Commerce—and have a share in the adoption of resolutions which are likely to influence governmental action on peace, war, or international trade. He may write letters to newspapers or articles for maga-

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zines—or books for those who choose to read them—or speak upon the public platform, and help to mold public opinion in these matters. He may merely talk with his fellow-citizens in the cafeteria or across the bridge table. He may merely think! And his thoughts, his conversation, his speeches or his writings, his activities in this or that or the other organization will have their due share of effect—provided he himself understands. All of which can come about only if the individual shall cease to regard international affairs as something strange and sinister. Only if he shall cease to be moved by emotional prejudices and get down to thinking out a practical mode of organizing and conducting international affairs for maximum satisfaction of human needs. In order that this may be made a more enjoyable world in which to live. That is what is actually happening today.

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